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Prior research shows that when a firm uses an approach to innovation based on diverse, 
distant, and distinctive knowledge it can enhance its ability to develop innovations. 
However, less is known about how such an approach to innovation affects evaluations in 
financial markets by securities analysts and investors.  In this dissertation I examine how 
a firm’s approach to innovation influences its ability to attract coverage and favorable 
recommendations from securities analysts. After considering the influence of innovation 
on analysts’ evaluations, I examine how analysts’ recommendations, in turn, influence a 
firm’s ability to attract investment. I argue that when a firm uses an approach to 
innovation based on diverse, distant, and distinctive knowledge it may complicate 
securities analysts’ efforts to evaluate its strategy, which may make them less willing to 
provide the firm with coverage and favorable recommendations. I also explore how 
disagreement among securities analysts’ recommendations may create opportunities for 
investors, which can ultimately help a firm to attract investment. This dissertation 
contributes to strategy research by highlighting an important trade-off related to a firm’s 
approach to innovation. Whereas prior research has shown that using diverse, distant, and 
distinctive knowledge helps a firm to develop knowledge-based resources, this research, 
in contrast, shows that such an approach to innovation may hinder efforts to capture value 
from these resources in financial markets. This research also contributes to the literature 
on financial intermediaries. It shows that financial markets are not fully intermediated by 
analysts’ recommendations and that uncertainty reflected in disagreement among 
analysts’ recommendations can signal valuable opportunities for investors that will make 
them more likely to buy shares in a firm.  Furthermore, it also shows that characteristics 
of investors and aspects of a firm’s innovation strategy, which enhance investors’ ability 
to identify and profit from opportunities that arise under uncertainty, will make investors 
even more likely to buy shares when analysts disagree about their recommendations. 
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
THEORETICAL MOTIVATION 
 A firm’s resources can provide the basis for its competitive advantage (Barney, 
1991; Grant, 1991) and by acquiring and aggregating knowledge, a company can produce 
valuable knowledge-based resources (Grant, 1996). Innovations are an important type of 
knowledge-based resource, which may contribute to a company’s success (Rumelt, 
1984).  However, developing innovations typically involves uncertainty as it requires a 
firm to make choices among several apparently feasible alternatives (Dosi, 1982). 
Uncertainty, in turn, enables a firm to develop resources that are different from those of 
its rivals, which can contribute to the persistence of resource heterogeneity across firms 
(Nelson, 1991).  In this way, uncertainty may help a company to develop the unique and 
potentially valuable resources that can provide the basis for its competitive advantage 
(Barney, 1986; Peteraf, 1993).   
 The link between innovation and a firm’s success has led to numerous strategic 
management studies which emphasize the potential benefits associated with a company’s 
approach to innovation. Studies show, for example, that the manner in which a company 
acquires and combines knowledge can determine how successful it is at developing 
innovations (e.g., Rosenkopf & Nerkar, 2001; Katila & Ahuja, 2002; Ahuja & Katila, 
2004). However, after a firm has developed resources, its ability to capture value from 
them ultimately depends on evaluations made outside of the firm’s boundaries 
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(Thompson, 1967; Barney, 2001). These external evaluations not only influence the 
firm’s ability to commercialize its current innovations (Nelson & Winter, 1982), but may 
also influence its ability to attract critical inputs from outside parties, such as the talent  
needed to develop future innovations (Henderson and Cockburn 1994; Cockburn and 
Henderson, 1998). 
 The same uncertainty that makes it possible for a firm to develop valuable 
innovations can make it difficult for outside parties to understand them (Rindova & 
Petkova, 2007; Kaplan & Tripsas, 2008). This, in turn, increases outsiders’ reliance on 
expert evaluations as a basis for providing or withholding inputs to firms (Rao, 1994; 
Pollock & Gulati, 2007). One particularly important and consequential type of expert 
evaluation is provided by securities analysts (Useem, 1996).  Such analysts serve as 
expert intermediaries in financial markets by mitigating uncertainty that investors face 
when evaluating a firm’s strategy (Rao & Sivakumar, 1999; Beunza & Garud, 2007).  
Moreover, securities analysts have discretion over the set of firms which they cover (Rao, 
Greve & Davis, 2001) and over the specific recommendations they provide on those 
firms (Mikhail, Walther & Willis, 1997). Research shows that both securities analysts’ 
coverage decisions and their recommendations can influence the firm’s ability to attract 
critical inputs and external support (Womack, 1996; Zuckerman, 1999; Pollock & Gulati, 
2007).   
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 Studies suggest that securities analysts and investors consider a firm’s innovation 
activities when developing their assessments (Levitas & McFadyen, 2009; Benner, 2010). 
However, the fact that uncertainty can simultaneously help resource creation (Barney, 
1986; Peteraf, 1993) and hinder external evaluation (Thompson, 1967), suggests the 
possibility that a firm may face a tension between  how its approach to innovation, which 
helps it create resources, may subsequently hinder efforts to elicit favorable evaluations 
from outside parties.  With the goal of exploring this possible tension, the present 
research seeks to examine the potential influence of a firm’s approach to innovation on 
expert evaluations in financial markets. Since different types of evaluations occur in 
financial markets, this study is divided into distinct sections that correspond to the 
different coverage, evaluation and investment decisions made by analysts and investors.   
OVERVIEW OF THEORY DEVELOPMENT 
 When attempting to understand how a company’s approach to innovation 
influences experts’ evaluations, a natural starting point involves the key features of 
internal innovation that have been examined by prior studies.  Developing innovations 
requires a firm to create new combinations of knowledge components that are available 
from a variety of sources (Kogut & Zander, 1992; Fleming, 2001). By using knowledge 
components from different technological areas a firm can increase the diversity of its 
knowledge. After making decisions about the diversity of the knowledge that it uses, a 
firm also make choices about how it will obtain that knowledge. Specifically, a firm may 
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decide to use more proximate knowledge from its internal stock of knowledge 
components or to explore externally for more distant knowledge. In addition to having 
discretion over the diversity and distance of its knowledge, a firm also has some 
discretion over how similar or distinct its knowledge is from that of its competitors.   
 Studies have examined how these features of a firm’s approach to developing 
knowledge influence its ability to innovate. Prior research shows how a firm’s ability to 
develop innovations is enhanced by (1) combining diverse types of knowledge (Ahuja & 
Katila, 2004; Leiponen & Helfat, 2010), (2) drawing on distant sources of knowledge 
(Rosenkopf & Nerkar, 2001; Katila & Ahuja, 2002), and (3) developing knowledge that 
is different from industry rivals (Ahuja & Lampert, 2001; Katila & Chen, 2008).  
Accordingly, when examining the influence of a firm’s approach to innovation on expert 
evaluations, I focus on these key features that have been deemed important by prior 
researchers.  
 Analyst coverage is a logical starting point to examine how a firm’s approach to 
innovation affects financial market evaluations because a firm needs to be covered by an 
analyst before it is able to compete for evaluations (Jensen, 2004).  Accordingly, I begin 
by examining how an approach to innovation based on the use of diverse, distant, and 
distinctive knowledge affects the firm’s efforts to attract analyst coverage. To do so, I 
build on prior research about the potential challenges that such an approach to innovation 
may create for outsiders who are attempting to understand a firm’s strategy (e.g., 
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Plumlee, 2003; Gu & Wang, 2005).  In spite of the various benefits associated with the 
use of diverse, distant, and distinctive knowledge in innovation, such an approach may 
make it difficult for analysts to evaluate the firm. This might be due to the inherent 
complexity associated with diverse knowledge and the unfamiliarity associated with 
distant and distinctive knowledge.  Moreover, it appears likely that the potential 
difficulties that analysts face evaluating a firm may be relevant to their decision of 
whether to provide coverage for the firm.  
 After exploring how different features of the firm’s approach to innovation 
influence its ability to attract analyst coverage, the question remains as to how these same 
features will influence the recommendations that the firm subsequently receives from 
analysts.  Therefore, I next examine how a firm’s approach to innovation based on the 
use of distant and distinctive knowledge will influence the favorability of the 
recommendations that it receives from securities analysts, controlling for the analysts’ 
decision to cover the firm. After the initial coverage decision has been made, analysts’ 
concerns likely shift to the more immediate task of accurately evaluating the firms they 
are covering (Stickel, 1992; Hong, Kubik & Solomon, 2000). Whereas the use of distant 
knowledge might create challenges related to the increased risk associated with 
exploration (March, 1991; Benner, 2010), the use of distinctive knowledge may enhance 
the firm’s ability to gain favorable recommendations because of the greater value 
associated with possessing unique resources (Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993). Finally, after 
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considering how a firm’s approach to innovation influences coverage and 
recommendations, I then focus on how analysts’ recommendations influence the firm’s 
ability to attract outside investment. 
 The relationship between favorable recommendations and investment is fairly 
well established (e.g., Womak, 1996). Although favorable recommendations can help 
firms attract investment by mitigating the uncertainty that investors face (Beunza & 
Garud, 2007), securities analysts do not always agree about their recommendations 
(Fanelli, Misangyi & Tosi, 2009).  The residual uncertainty that is implied by 
disagreement among analysts may be relevant to investors’ efforts to identify 
opportunities in financial markets. Specifically, just as a firm’s ability to develop 
valuable resources is enhanced when uncertainty reduces competition for such resources 
(Barney, 1986; Peteraf, 1993; Denrell, Fang & Winter, 2003), investors’ ability to 
identify lucrative investment opportunities may also be enhanced when uncertainty 
among securities analysts reduces competition for potentially lucrative investments. 
Accordingly, after considering the favorability of securities analysts’ recommendations, 
investors may also take into account the level of disagreement among analysts as a means 
of identifying opportunities. 
To test the propositions relating to these different stages of financial market 
evaluations, I focus empirically on firms in the medical devices (e.g., Mitchell, 1989; 
Chatterji, 2009), computer hardware (e.g., Baysinger, Kosnik & Turk, 1991; Henderson 
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& Stern, 2004) and computer software industries (e.g., Lavie, 2007). The medical devices 
industry is appropriate because firms and their investors face substantial uncertainty 
when developing and evaluating innovations (Garud and Rappa, 1994; Rasheed, Datta & 
Chinta, 1997) and because firms often depend on financial support from equity markets 
to pay for innovation (Zinner, 2000).  Similarly, the computer hardware and software 
industries are also innovation-driven contexts (e.g., Eisenhardt & Tabrizi, 1995; 
Henderson & Stern, 2004; Lavie, 2007), where securities analysts are relevant to the 
evaluation of firms’ strategies (Jensen, 2004). 
POTENTIAL THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTIONS 
 This current research attempts to contribute to the strategic management literature 
by drawing attention to a potential trade-off that a company may face when attempting to 
develop competitive advantage based on innovation. Somewhat paradoxically, it suggests 
that an approach to innovation based on the use of diverse, distant, and distinctive 
knowledge that is beneficial to a firm’s efforts to develop internal resources may actually 
hinder its efforts to win the favorable evaluations needed to attract critical inputs from 
outside parties.  
An additional contribution of this research may be to highlight the process 
through which different types of expert evaluations influence a firm’s ability to attract 
critical inputs from outside parties.  By following the entire chain of evaluations in 
financial markets from coverage to investment, this study may illuminate potential trade-
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offs associated with a firm’s approach to innovation that it may encounter at different 
stages of evaluations.  Furthermore, this research may also offer insights about when 
expert evaluations are more or less important to a company’s efforts to attract inputs from 
outside parties.  
   Finally, this research also attempts to advance understanding about how expert 
evaluations influence a firm’s efforts to attract outside resources. By considering the 
potential role of uncertainty to outside parties’ efforts to identify opportunities, the 
current research suggests that it may be necessary to distinguish between the favorability 
of expert evaluations and the level of agreement among them. Even though research from 
different theoretical perspectives suggests that developing an external consensus may 
contribute to a firm’s success (e.g., Thompson, 1967; Dosi, 1982; Suchman, 1995), this 
current research draws attention to a potential downside associated with the use of 
consensus to attract inputs from outside parties. Namely, too much consensus among 
experts may sometimes limit outside parties’ ability to identify opportunities. In doing so, 
it may make these outside parties less willing to provide the critical inputs that a firm 







Chapter 2:  Core Concepts and Literatures 
INNOVATION  
 Resources are important to a firm’s competitive success (Barney, 1991; Grant, 
1991). The investments that a company makes over time can produce valuable resources 
from which it may derive competitive advantage (Dierickx & Cool, 1989). Innovations, 
which embody the cumulative investments a firm makes in knowledge, are an important 
type of resource that can contribute to competitive success (Rumelt, 1984; Grant, 1996). 
However, creating innovations often entails considerable uncertainty, since it requires a 
firm to choose among several potentially viable alternatives (Dosi, 1982; Nelson & 
Winter, 1982). Although uncertainty prevents a company from knowing in advance 
precisely which alternative will prove to be the most valuable, that same uncertainty 
creates opportunities for a company to pursue alternatives that are different from those of 
its competitors (Barney, 1986; McGrath & McMillian, 2000). When combined with path 
dependence that prevents firms from easily switching among alternatives, uncertainty 
may contribute to the persistence of resource heterogeneity across firms (Nelson, 1991). 
Without uncertainty, consensus among firms about the value of developing a resource 
would increase competition for that resource to the point where any potential value would 
eventually be eroded (Rumelt, 1987).  Therefore, uncertainty allows firms to develop a 
competitive advantage from resources, like innovations, by making it possible to create 
valuable resources and by helping to limit competition that would otherwise eat away at 
the value that a firm creates (Nelson, 1991; Peteraf, 1993).  
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 To develop innovations, firms create new combinations from existing knowledge 
located in the firm or in its environment (Kogut & Zander, 1992; Fleming, 2001).  In 
order to access the knowledge required to innovate, companies must also overcome 
internal inertia that favors the use of existing knowledge (Nelson & Winter, 1982; Helfat, 
1994).  When accessing and combining knowledge to create innovations, prior research 
suggests that firms make decisions about (1) the diversity of knowledge that they will 
combine, (2) the distance that they will search to find the knowledge and, (3) the 
distinctiveness of the knowledge relative to that of their rivals (Nelson & Winter, 1982; 
Henderson & Clark, 1990; Fleming, 2001).  Strategic management research suggests that 
innovating based on the use of diverse, distant, and distinctive knowledge can help a firm 
to develop valuable resources. 
 Increasing the diversity of knowledge helps the firm to create innovations based 
on new knowledge combinations (Schumpeter, 1934; Fleming, 2001). Moreover, studies 
indicate that the diversity of knowledge that a firm uses enhances its ability to create 
innovations (Ahuja & Katila, 2004), and that combining diverse types of scientific 
knowledge increases the usefulness of the firm’s innovations (Fleming & Sorenson, 
2004). In addition, research also finds that the number of knowledge sources from which 
a company draws increases its innovative output and contributes to the commercial 
success of its innovations (Leiponen & Helfat, 2010). Taken together, these studies 
indicate that an approach to innovation that emphasizes knowledge diversity— based on 
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the use of multiple types of knowledge— increases the firm’s innovation output and 
contributes to the success of its innovations.  
 Utilizing knowledge that is distant relative to the firm’s existing knowledge may 
also benefit a company by increasing the amount of knowledge available to develop 
innovations (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; March, 1991).   Note that knowledge distance is 
not the same as knowledge diversity. This is because a company can increase the use of 
distant knowledge without increasing knowledge diversity if it simply combines more of 
a similar type of knowledge obtained from outside of the firm.  Studies show that a firm 
that innovates using distant sources of knowledge has a greater impact on the 
technological development of its industry (Rosenkopf & Nerkar, 2001; Phene, Fladmoe-
Lindquist & Marsh, 2006). The use of distant knowledge also improves a company’s 
ability to develop new products (Katila & Ahuja, 2002).  Accordingly, using distant 
knowledge can benefit the firm’s efforts to innovate. 
 In addition to having discretion about the diversity of knowledge used and the 
distance searched to find this knowledge, a firm may also decide how distinctive the 
knowledge that it uses is from that of its industry rivals (e.g., McEvily & Chakravarthy, 
2002). By developing knowledge that is distinct from industry rivals, a firm is more 
likely to develop breakthrough innovations (Ahuja & Lampert, 2001). Moreover, a 
company that searches for knowledge in ways that are different from its rivals is likely to 
have greater innovation output and to develop more innovative products (Katila & Chen, 
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2008).  Again, this literature shows that developing knowledge that is distinct from rivals 
can help the firm to innovate. 
EXPERT EVALUATIONS 
 After a firm has developed resources, such as innovations, its ability to profit 
from them depends on value assessments that occur outside its boundaries (Barney, 2001; 
Priem & Butler, 2001).  Evolutionary theory scholars suggest that value assessments 
about a company’s innovations are made in what is referred to as the selection 
environment (Thompson, 1967; Nelson & Winter, 1982). The selection environment, 
which encompasses different groups of outside parties, influences the success of the 
firm’s innovations by determining “the manner in which customer and regulatory 
preferences and rules influence what is profitable” (Nelson & Winter, 1982: 266).  It may 
include outside parties with a direct interest in the success of a firm’s innovations, like 
customers and investors, as well as other parties, such as regulators and experts, who 
influence the success of a firm’s innovations through their assessments (Nelson & 
Winter, 1977).  
 It is important to note that research has examined the role that evaluations made in 
the selection environment play in determining the success of a firm’s innovations.  Not 
surprisingly, such studies typically show how a firm’s customers influence the success of 
its innovations through their purchase decisions (Abernathy & Clark, 1985; Christensen 
& Bower, 1996; Martin & Mitchell, 1998).  However, because of uncertainty surrounding 
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the assessment of innovations, customers’ decisions to adopt or reject an innovation may 
themselves be influenced by evaluations of still other outside parties, such as regulators 
and standards setting bodies (Nelson & Winter, 1982; Tushman & Rosenkopf, 1992).   
 A variety of studies corroborate the importance of these other outside parties to 
the success of a firm’s innovations. For example, Wade (1995) has shown that gaining 
support of communities comprised of individuals and organizations that use and develop 
related innovations was critical to the success of microprocessor firms. Podolny & Stuart 
(1995) demonstrate, in the context of the semiconductor industry, that the impact of a 
firm’s innovations depends not only on technological characteristics of the innovations, 
but also on the size of the firm’s technological niche and on other outside parties 
associated with the innovations. Similarly, Garud, Jain and Kumaraswanmy (2002) found 
that the success of Sun Microsystems’ efforts to promote Java standardization depended 
on its ability to develop an external coalition of support, which included users and 
influential outside parties. Also, Rosenkopf and Tushman (1998) examined how 
community networks that encompass manufacturers, suppliers, professional societies and 
regulatory bodies emerged to help mitigate uncertainty related to the evaluation of flight 
simulation technologies.  The above studies strongly suggest that a firm’s ability to attract 
critical inputs from outside parties depends not only on the evaluations of customers, but 
also on expert evaluations made by a variety of outside parties. Given the relevance of 
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outside evaluations to the success of a firm’s innovations, it is important to more closely 
examine how experts evaluate firms.  
 The evaluations of outside parties can help to mitigate uncertainty that may 
complicate a firm’s efforts to attract critical resources from outside parties (Thompson, 
1967).  For example, uncertainty due to asymmetric information between buyers and 
sellers about the quality of a good or service can cause markets to fail as those parties 
become unwilling to exchange resources (Akerlof, 1970). Similarly, uncertainty about the 
attributes and evolution of technologies can complicate outside parties’ ability to 
understand resulting innovations (Rindova & Petkova, 2007; Kaplan & Tripsas, 2008).  
Both economists and organizational scholars agree on the significance of experts’ 
evaluations as a way to reduce uncertainty that can prevent the exchange of resources.  
The economics literature suggests that experts’ evaluations facilitate exchanges by 
reducing search costs and information asymmetries that can limit parties’ ability to 
objectively determine the value associated with an exchange (e.g., Biglaiser, 1993; 
Lizzeri, 1999). In contrast, the organizations literature draws attention to the role that the 
evaluations of experts plays in influencing parties’ subjective perceptions about the value 
and legitimacy of an exchange (e.g., Pollock & Rindova, 2003; Graffin & Ward, 2010). 
Both because of their role as information providers and as assessors of value, experts’ 
evaluations can influence a company’s ability to attract the critical inputs it requires.  
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 Numerous studies have shown how the evaluations of experts can help a firm 
attract critical resources.  For example, Rao (1994) showed that auto companies that won 
reliability and performance certifications were more likely to survive than rivals that 
performed poorly on such evaluations.  Similarly, Rindova and colleagues (2005) found 
that winning favorable rankings from media experts enhanced business schools’ ability to 
attract inputs by charging a premium for MBA tuition. Zuckerman and Kim (2003) also 
found that feature films attracted more customers when they received reviews from critics 
that specialized in major releases. It is evident from these studies that the evaluations of 
outside experts can be important determinants of a company’s success. 
 While experts’ evaluations have been shown to have a wide-spread influence, 
they are particularly important in financial markets, where uncertainty makes it difficult 
for investors to understand and evaluate a firm’s strategy (Zuckerman, 1999). For 
example, securities analysts’ recommendations help to mitigate uncertainty (Beunza & 
Garud, 2007) and research shows that getting favorable recommendations can help a firm 
attract investment (Womack, 1996).  Moreover, securities analysts may be especially 
influential in innovation-intensive contexts, where investors may face greater difficulty 
than normal understanding the firm’s strategy due to the high level of uncertainty 




 Securities analysts make choices about which firms they cover (Rao, Greve & 
Davis, 2001) and about the specific ‘buy’ or ‘sell’ recommendations that they provide for 
those firms (Mikhail, Walther & Willis, 1997). Both their decisions about coverage and 
their decisions about recommendations are consequential to firms. For example, gaining 
analysts’ coverage is an important external endorsement that helps the firm attract critical 
inputs and support (Zuckerman, 1999; Jensen, 2004; Pollock & Gulati, 2007).  Even after 
the firm has convinced analysts to cover it, winning favorable evaluations from them is 
an additional way in which it can compete to attract inputs from investors (Womack, 
1996).  Empirical evidence shows that, when evaluating a firm, securities analysts and 
investors routinely consider the company’s approach to innovation. For example, Levitas 
and McFadyen (2009) found that patents serve as an important external signal that helps a 
firm attract financial resources by lowering its need to hold liquid assets. Similarly, 
Benner (2010) also found that securities analysts consider a company’s approach to 
innovation when developing buy/sell recommendations.    
 In spite of the importance of experts’ evaluations, prior literature shows that 
experts do not always agree in their evaluations (Fanelli, Misangyi & Tosi, 2009). Such 
disagreement implies that some level of uncertainty remains (Barney, 1986).  Studies 
across a range of theoretical perspectives have indirectly touched upon the role that 
consensus may play in a firm’s efforts to attract critical inputs and support from the 
environment (e.g., Thompson, 1967). These studies suggest that achieving external 
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agreement on a variety of issues may be important to a firm’s success.  For example, 
research shows that consensus among external parties underlies the legitimacy that an 
organization depends on for its successful interaction with outsiders (e.g., Suchman, 
1995; Cattani, Ferriani, Negro & Perretti, 2008). Other research in the context of 
technology suggests that consensus among outside evaluators about the performance and 
attributes of innovations contributes to the success of a firm’s innovations (e.g., Dosi, 
1982; Nelson & Winter, 1982).   
 In conclusion, the literature reviewed above suggests that aspects of a firm’s 
approach to innovation that are beneficial to its efforts to develop resources may also be 
relevant to the external evaluations that a firm depends on to attract critical inputs from 
outside parties.  Only very recently have scholars begun to examine how a firm’s 
innovative activities influence external assessments in financial markets (Benner, 2010). 
Accordingly, relatively little is known about how different aspects of a firm’s approach to 
innovation may relate to the external evaluations that the firm relies on to attract critical 
inputs from outside parties. Furthermore, prior research has not systematically examined 
how a firm’s approach to innovation influences the different stages of financial market 
evaluations that may ultimately culminate in investment.  
 The literature reviewed above also suggests that uncertainty may be a double-
edged sword that can help the firm to develop resources, while simultaneously 
complicating efforts to capture value from resources or attract inputs from outside parties.  
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While prior studies highlight the importance of experts’ evaluations as a way to mitigate 
uncertainty that can prevent outside parties from providing critical inputs to a firm, they 
have not considered the potential role that disagreement and uncertainty may play in 
outside parties’ own efforts to identify valuable opportunities.  Furthermore, prior 
literature has also not considered the possibility that the favorability of external 
evaluations and the level of consensus among evaluations may exert distinct influences 
on a firm’s ability to attract critical inputs. 
 In subsequent chapters I build on the literature reviewed above to explore these 
issues. In chapter three, I develop theory about how a firm’s approach to innovation 
based on the use of diverse, distant, and distinctive knowledge influences securities 
analysts’ decision to cover that firm. Next, in chapter four, I explore how a firm’s 
approach to innovation influences the favorability of the recommendations it receives. 
After considering these influences, I focus in chapter five on how the level of 
disagreement among securities analysts’ recommendations influences the firm’s ability to 
attract investment.  After developing the theory in chapters three and four about coverage 
and recommendations the theory is tested using data from the medical devices, computer 
hardware and computer software industries. Finally, the theory developed in chapter five, 
which requires detailed innovation data from the food and drug administration that is not 




Chapter 3: The Approach to Innovation and Analyst’s Coverage 
 A firm’s resources can provide the basis for its competitive advantage (Barney, 
1991; Grant, 1991). Innovations embody the knowledge that a firm internally 
accumulates over time (Grant, 1996) and are an important type of knowledge-based 
resource that can contribute to a company’s success (Rumelt, 1984).  However, 
developing innovations entails uncertainty since a firm must select among a number of 
viable alternatives (Dosi, 1982).  Although uncertainty makes it possible for the firm to 
develop valuable resources (Barney, 1986; Peteraf, 1993), it can also make it difficult for 
the firm to attract inputs from outside parties (Akerlof, 1970). 
 Research shows that securities analysts are an influential type of outside party 
whose recommendations can mitigate the uncertainty that outside investors face (Beunza 
& Garud, 2007).  Such analysts make decisions about which firms they cover and about 
the specific recommendations and forecasts that they make for these firms (Jensen, 2004). 
Before a company is able to compete for favorable ‘buy’ recommendations from 
securities analysts, it must first convince analysts to cover it (Rao, Greve & Davis, 2001).  
Some research suggests that analysts’ coverage is itself an important endorsement that 
can help a firm to attract outside resources and support (Zuckerman, 1999; Pollock & 
Gulati, 2007).  Both the value of coverage as an endorsement in its own right and its 
importance as a stepping stone to subsequent competition for favorable assessments make 
gaining analysts’ coverage a consequential event for a firm, one that may contribute to 
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the development of competitive advantage. Because innovations may both serve as a 
source of uncertainty to investors and a source of value to firms, it is natural that 
securities analysts will evaluate them. Studies show that securities analysts evaluating a 
firm do indeed consider its approach to innovation (Benner, 2010). Consequently, it may 
be relevant to explore how a firm’s approach to innovation influences the coverage that it 
receives from analysts. 
 To understand how a firm’s approach to innovation influences its ability to attract 
analyst coverage, I consider factors that have been deemed important by prior research. 
That research has emphasized the innovative benefits that a firm may derive when its 
approach to innovation emphasizes the use of: (1) diverse types of knowledge (Ahuja & 
Katila, 2004; Leiponen & Helfat, 2010), (2) distant sources of knowledge (Rosenkopf & 
Nerkar, 2001; Katila & Ahuja, 2002), and (3) knowledge that is different from industry 
rivals (Ahuja & Lampert, 2001; Katila & Chen, 2008).  The relevance of these features of 
a firm’s approach to innovation highlighted by prior research suggests that they may be a 
natural starting point for examining how a firm’s approach to innovation affects analysts’ 
coverage. 
 In this first study, I explore how a company’s approach to innovation influences 
its ability to attract coverage by a securities analyst. Central to the arguments developed 
in this section is the idea that securities analysts may experience professional 
consequences if they fail to select firms that they can successfully evaluate and 
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understand (Hong, Kubik & Solomon, 2000). Specifically, analysts’ ability to accurately 
evaluate a firm may contribute to their career progression, professional longevity and 
compensation (Stickel, 1992; Hong, Kubik & Solomon, 2000). Therefore, their decision 
to provide coverage for a given firm is likely based on a consideration of the likelihood 
that they can successfully evaluate the firm.  Arguably, factors that make it difficult for 
securities analysts to develop accurate recommendations should make them less likely to 
provide coverage for that firm. Conversely, factors that make it easier for analysts to 
develop accurate recommendations should make them more likely to provide coverage 
for that firm. 
 Given the above, the propositions that I develop below build on this assumption 
that securities analysts anticipate their ability to accurately evaluate a particular firm 
when deciding whether to cover it.  Based on this assumption, I argue that different 
aspects of a firm’s approach to innovation that improve or diminish analysts’ ability to 
understand and evaluate a firm may make them more or less inclined to provide 
coverage. Since an approach to innovation based on the use of diverse, distant and 
distinctive knowledge may make it more difficult for analysts to accurately evaluate a 
firm, I argue below that the use of these features may complicate the firm’s ability to 
attract coverage.  Somewhat paradoxically, this study may suggest that an approach to 
innovation that is beneficial to the firm’s efforts to develop resources may be detrimental 




 As mentioned earlier, the use of diverse knowledge can help a firm to develop 
innovations (e.g., Ahuja & Katila, 2004).  But, in spite of the innovative benefits 
associated with the use of diverse knowledge, it may increase the difficulty that securities 
analysts have understanding the firm’s strategy.  In the same way that securities analysts, 
who typically specialize in one or a few industries, prefer firms that are less diversified 
from a product market perspective, since such firms are easier to understand (Zuckerman, 
2000) and less costly to evaluate (Bhushan, 1989), they may also prefer firms that are less 
diversified with respect to their knowledge.  When a firm uses diverse knowledge it 
makes its knowledge more complex by increasing the number of interdependent elements 
(Simon, 1962). Simply stated, complex knowledge is more difficult to understand 
(Zander & Kogut, 1995; Rivkin, 2000). Just as the complexity of a firm’s knowledge can 
hinder rivals’ efforts to imitate it by making it more difficult for them to understand 
causal linkages that contribute to competitive advantage (e.g., Reed & DeFillippi, 1990; 
McEvily & Chakavarthy, 2002), the use of diverse knowledge may also complicate 
outside evaluators’ ability to evaluate the firm’s more complex approach to innovation. 
 Studies show that securities analysts are less likely to incorporate complex 
information in their forecast revisions (Plumlee, 2003) and their forecast errors are higher 
for companies that are more technologically diverse (Gu & Wang, 2005). Accordingly, 
companies with greater knowledge diversity may require more time and effort for 
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analysts to evaluate and place those same analysts at greater risk of developing inaccurate 
assessments.  Because of the career incentives that securities analysts have to 
successfully evaluate a firm (Hong, Kubik & Solomon, 2000), they will avoid firms with 
greater knowledge diversity due to the increased difficulty that they will have in 
understanding and evaluating these inherently more complex firms. Thus: 
Proposition 1 (P1):  The greater the firm’s knowledge diversity, the lower the 
likelihood that a securities analyst will cover the firm. 
 
KNOWLEDGE DISTANCE 
 In addition to making decisions about how many different types of knowledge it 
will use, a firm can also make choices about how it will obtain that knowledge.  In spite 
of inertial pressures that tend to favor the use of existing knowledge (Nelson & Winter, 
1982; Helfat, 1994), extant literature shows that it is possible for a firm to overcome 
these pressures by exploring for distant knowledge outside of its boundaries (e.g., 
Rosenkopf & Nerkar, 2001; Katila, 2002). Securities analysts face constraints on their 
time and attention that influence their ability to evaluate firms (Baldwin & Rice, 1997; 
Clement, 1999). When faced with cognitive limitations, boundedly rational decision 
makers routinely rely on shortcuts and heuristics to guide and simplify their decision 
making (March & Simon, 1958; Cyert & March, 1963).  Scholars have shown that 
securities analysts often base their recommendations on heuristics that are unrelated to 
their formal forecast models (Bradshaw, 2004; Barniv, Hope, Myring & Thomas, 2009).   
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 The degree to which new information is consistent with that with which decision 
makers are already familiar can increase their expectations about the likelihood of future 
events (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973, 1974). This, in turn, may contribute to analysts’ 
confidence in being able to develop accurate evaluations when the company builds on 
familiar knowledge.  Furthermore, by making extensive use of the same knowledge it 
will be easier to understand due to increased repetition (Winter & Szulanski, 2001), 
which may help to simplify evaluations. In contrast, a company that explores extensively 
is more likely to build on distant knowledge with which analysts are unfamiliar. By 
exploring more distant knowledge, the connections between the firm’s past and current 
knowledge may also be less clear, which may make it more difficult for analysts to 
evaluate its strategy. Because of the lack of familiarity with this more distant knowledge 
and analysts’ diminished ability to evaluate the firm, analysts may have difficulty 
accurately evaluating companies that build more extensively on distant knowledge. 
 It is important to note that studies in the finance and accounting literature lend 
support for the above assertions. For example, a longitudinal examination of more than 
700 firms across multiple industries found that securities analysts’ forecast errors were 
higher for firms that built on new and original knowledge than for firms that build on 
more familiar knowledge (Gu & Wang, 2005). Because of the career incentives analysts 
have to provide coverage for companies that they can successfully evaluate (Hong, Kubik 
& Solomon, 2000), this lack of familiarity with a firm’s distant knowledge will increase 
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the amount of time and effort that analysts will need to expend evaluating it. Further, to 
the extent that analysts can anticipate the higher forecast errors associated with evaluating 
a firm that uses more distant knowledge with which they are less familiar (Gu & Wang, 
2005), they may also have a lower  expectation that they will be able to successfully 
evaluate the firm. Since covering a firm that explores more distant knowledge will entail 
greater effort, while also putting analysts at greater risk of developing inaccurate 
evaluations, analysts will be less likely to cover such firms. Hence: 
Proposition 2 (P2):  The more extensively the firm explores distant knowledge, 
the lower the likelihood that a securities analyst will cover the firm. 
 
KNOWLEDGE DISTINCTIVENESS 
 In addition to having discretion over how many types of knowledge it uses and 
from where it obtains that knowledge, a firm also has discretion over how similar or 
different its knowledge is from that of its competitors. One way to understand how 
distinctive a firm’s knowledge is from other firms is by looking at the degree of 
knowledge overlap among firms (Mowery, Oxley, & Silverman, 1996). Greater 
knowledge overlap with competitors implies greater similarity in knowledge, which may 
suggest that a company’s knowledge is not distinctive relative to that of its competitors. 
Conversely, less knowledge overlap with rivals suggests that a firm’s knowledge is more 
different and distinctive relative to that of its rivals.   
 In addition to the influence that diverse knowledge and distant knowledge exert 
on the analysts’ decision to cover a firm, the degree to which the firm’s knowledge is 
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distinctive from that of its rivals may also influence analysts’ decision to provide or 
withhold coverage.  In a similar fashion to how distant knowledge may create challenges 
related to unfamiliarity, distinctive knowledge may also create similar challenges.  
 Studies show that technological norms that develop in an industry can influence 
how outside parties evaluate innovations (Garud & Rappa, 1994) and contribute to the 
evolution of technology (Anderson & Tushman, 1990).  In a similar fashion to the 
way that categorical conformity may facilitate investors’ understanding of the firm 
(Zuckerman, 1999), the extent to which a firm’s knowledge conforms with the 
knowledge of other firms in its industry may also make it easier for analysts to 
understand the firm’s knowledge. The increased familiarity associated with knowledge 
that conforms to industry norms will increase the likelihood that an analyst will cover the 
firm, since the firm’s knowledge is more comprehensible and consistent with that of other 
firms. This, in turn, will increase the analyst’s ability to successfully understand and 
evaluate the firm’s internal innovation, making her more likely to cover the firm.  Hence: 
Proposition 3 (P3):  The greater the knowledge overlap between the firm and its 
industry rivals, the greater the likelihood that a securities analyst will cover the 
firm. 
 
 To help increase confidence in the drivers of the propositions discussed above, in 
the next section I examine contingencies about the knowledge overlap between the firm 
and the securities analyst and the innovation intensity of the focal firm’s industry. These 
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contingencies may help to shed additional light on the causal mechanisms invoked for 
propositions two and three.  
CONTINGENT EFFECTS 
 In developing proposition two, I argue that securities analysts are less likely to 
cover a firm that explores distant knowledge because they will tend to be less familiar 
with its knowledge.  If lack of familiarity contributes to the difficulties that analysts have 
in evaluating these firms, then it should be the case that the relationship between 
exploration of distant knowledge and coverage will vary depending on analysts’ level of 
familiarity with the types of knowledge upon which a firm is building. Just as knowledge 
overlap among organizational subunits may enhance a firm’s efforts to transfer its 
knowledge internally by making parties more familiar with its knowledge and better able 
to understand it (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Grant, 1996), greater overlap between the 
knowledge of analysts and the knowledge of the firm may also facilitate analysts’ 
understanding of the firm’s more distant knowledge.  
 The increased familiarity that results from greater knowledge overlap between the 
securities analyst and the firm will make it easier for analysts to understand how the 
firm’s more distant knowledge relates to its existing knowledge and how it will 
contribute to future performance.  In this way, greater knowledge overlap between the 
firm and the analyst should increase the likelihood that analysts will be familiar with the 
more distant knowledge that the firm is drawing upon.  Their increased familiarity with 
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the firm’s knowledge may make them more confident that they will be able to 
successfully understand and evaluate the firm. Consequently, the enhanced ability of 
analysts with greater knowledge overlap to comprehend and assess the firm’s knowledge 
will diminish the negative influence that exploring distant knowledge has on a firm’s 
ability to gain analysts’ coverage.  Therefore: 
Proposition 4 (P4):  The greater the knowledge overlap between the analyst and 
the firm, the less negative the effect that exploration of distant knowledge will 
have on the likelihood an analyst will cover the firm. 
 
 Whereas proposition 4 deals with the contingent effect of knowledge overlap 
between the analyst and the firm, propositions 5 and 6 explore the contingent effect of the 
innovation intensity of the firm’s industry. Innovation-intensive industries are typically 
characterized by high levels of technological change and uncertainty (Nelson, 1991; 
McGrath, 1997). This technological change and uncertainty will compound the 
difficulties that securities analysts face in attempting to understand the distant knowledge 
that a firm develops through exploration.  In innovation-intensive contexts, analysts must 
not only overcome difficulties understanding the firm’s distant knowledge in relation to 
the firm’s prior innovative efforts, but they must also overcome challenges understanding 
the firm’s knowledge against the backdrop of a changing technological landscape. 
Accordingly, the increased uncertainty associated with innovation-intensive contexts may 
make analysts even more likely to provide coverage to a firm that builds more 
consistently on existing knowledge, since such firms can be more easily evaluated.  In 
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contrast, a company that builds on more distant, unfamiliar knowledge will be even less 
likely to receive analysts’ coverage, since technological uncertainty will make it even 
more difficult for analysts to accurately assess the firm’s innovative efforts.  Hence: 
 Proposition 5 (P5):  The greater the innovation intensity of the firm’s industry, 
 the more negative the effect that exploration of distant knowledge will have on 
 the likelihood an analyst will cover the firm. 
 
 At the same time that innovation intensity may increase analysts’ preference for 
internal knowledge as a way to understand and evaluate the firm it may also decrease 
analysts’ ability to successfully evaluate the firm based on external industry norms. Prior 
literature suggests that increased rate of change and variation associated with innovation-
intensive industries may affect the stability of industry norms (Anderson & Tushman, 
1990; Kaplan & Tripsas, 2008).  Since industry norms are less stable in innovation-
intensive contexts, they may be less useful to securities analysts as a basis for 
understanding a firm’s innovative activities. The possibility that an industry’s 
technological norms may be relatively weaker and provide less guidance may decrease 
analysts’ expectation about being able to successfully evaluate a firm with knowledge 
overlap in an innovation-intensive industry. Therefore: 
Proposition 6 (P6):  The greater the innovation intensity of the firm’s industry, 
the less positive the effect of knowledge overlap between the firm and its industry 




 This study examined the influence that a company’s approach to innovation exerts 
on a securities analyst’s decision to cover that firm.  Figure 1 illustrates the theoretical 
model for study one that was developed in this chapter of the dissertation. 
 In the next study, I continue to explore the influence that a firm’s innovative 
activities exert on external assessments in financial markets. Specifically, I focus on how 
the distance and distinctiveness of the firm’s knowledge, examined above in relation to 
analysts’ coverage, will also influence its ability to gain more favorable recommendations 
from a securities analyst who is already covering the firm.  In the next study I argue that 
the cognitive challenges that influenced the initial coverage decision will be less relevant, 
since analysts have had to overcome these challenges when providing coverage to the 
firm. Given the career incentives that analysts have to accurately evaluate a firm (e.g., 
Stickel, 1992), securities analysts’ concerns will likely shift to more pragmatic and 










Chapter 4: The Approach to Innovation and Recommendations 
 After exploring the link between a firm’s approach to innovation and its ability to 
attract coverage from securities analysts, the question remains whether these same 
aspects of the firm’s innovative activities will influence the evaluations of analysts who 
are already covering the firm. This present study explores the influence that a firm’s 
approach to innovation has on the favorability of the recommendations it receives from 
analysts, controlling for the initial decision to provide coverage that was examined in the 
previous study. With the initial coverage decision behind them, I argue that securities 
analysts’ concerns shift from cognitive challenges influencing whether or not they expect 
to be able to successfully evaluate a prospective firm, to more immediate concerns about 
accurately evaluating the performance of the firms that they are already covering (e.g., 
Stickel, 1992).   
 By following the chain of analysts’ evaluations from the initial coverage decision 
all the way to the point where analysts provide specific buy/sell recommendations for 
firms, this research may draw attention to a potential secondary trade-off that the firm 
may face between conformity and differentiation (e.g., Deephouse, 1999; Zuckerman, 
1999) in the context of financial market evaluations.  Whereas a company’s approach to 
innovation based on the use of distinctive knowledge may hinder efforts to attract 
analysts’ coverage by making its knowledge more difficult to understand, I argue in this 
second study that the use of distinctive knowledge may subsequently help it to win more 
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favorable recommendations by increasing the uniqueness of its knowledge.  In the next 
section, I develop propositions relating knowledge distance and knowledge 
distinctiveness to the favorability of the recommendations that a firm receives from 
analysts that are already covering it.  After developing these main propositions, I also 
explore two contingencies that may help shed additional light on the mechanisms 
underlying the link between knowledge distance and the favorability of 
recommendations. 
KNOWLEDGE DISTANCE 
 In the previous study I argued that a firm’s use of distant knowledge will make 
securities analysts less familiar with its knowledge and will, therefore, make them less 
able to evaluate the firm.  In this current study, I focus on the influence that a firm’s use 
of distant knowledge has on the favorability of the recommendations that it receives from 
analysts, controlling for analysts’ decision to cover the firm. Analysts’ decision to cover a 
firm suggests that they have likely already had to overcome some of the cognitive 
challenges discussed previously. Therefore, I argue that their concerns shift to accurately 
evaluating the firms that they are covering.  Since analysts make decisions under 
uncertainty, their recommendations and forecasts are likely developed based on an 
assessment of the expected value associated with different events (Beunza & Garud, 
2007; Whitwell, Lukas & Hill, 2007).  Expected value assessments enable decision 
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makers to compare the value of alternatives that have different levels of risk and return, 
such as the alternatives analysts compare to develop recommendations.   
 The nature of the career incentives in the investment firms that employ analysts 
may influence securities analysts’ risk preferences by making them more risk-averse. 
Although there is evidence that more accurate analysts can expect to gain upside 
opportunities in the form of higher compensation (Stickel, 1992), there is also evidence 
showing that less accurate analysts may face significant risk of termination (Hong, Kubik 
& Solomon, 2000).  The consequential nature of the risk of termination may contribute to 
making securities analysts risk averse when they develop their recommendations. 
 When developing their buy/sell recommendations, analysts consider a firm’s 
approach to innovation (Benner, 2010). In doing so, they may need to make comparisons 
among firms that make different risk/return trade-offs with regard to their innovation 
decisions. Prior literature suggests that a firm with an approach to innovation based on 
exploration of more distant knowledge may be riskier than a firm whose approach is 
based on exploitation of existing knowledge (March, 1991).  When determining the 
favorability of a company’s recommendations, analysts may encounter situations where 
the expected value associated with exploratory and exploitative approaches to innovation 
are very similar, even though the risk/return trade-offs are quite different. However, 
given the tendency toward risk aversion discussed above, analysts may place relatively 
less weight on the extreme positive outcomes associated with exploration and more 
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weight on extreme negative outcomes associated with it. In this way, the risk aversion of 
securities analysts may cause them to assign more value to the greater certainty 
associated with an approach to innovation based on exploitation. This may occur even 
when the expected value associated with such an approach is actually comparable to one 
based on exploration of distant knowledge.   
 In light of analysts’ tendency toward risk aversion and the fact that exploring 
knowledge outside of the firm entails greater risk (March, 1991), securities analysts 
should be less likely to provide a favorable recommendation when a firm explores more 
distant knowledge from outside its boundaries. It is important to note that this conjecture 
is fully consistent with Benner’s (2010) finding that incumbent firms that pursued 
strategies that preserve existing technologies were more likely to receive favorable 
evaluations from securities analysts. Therefore, for the reasons mentioned above: 
 Proposition 7 (P7):  Exploring distant knowledge will have a negative impact on 
 the favorability of the analyst’s recommendation for the firm. 
  
KNOWLEDGE DISTINCTIVENESS  
            In the previous study I argued that knowledge overlap between the firm and its 
industry rivals increases the degree to which the firm’s knowledge is comprehensible to 
analysts, which helps the firm to attract coverage of a securities analyst. However, I argue 
here that after controlling for analysts’ decision to cover the firm, greater knowledge 
overlap may have an opposite effect on the favorability of the analyst’s 
recommendations.  Analysts’ decision about whether to cover a company is likely based 
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on a general consideration of how successful they will be evaluating that company given 
cognitive limitations and the ease with which it can be compared to rivals. However, 
analysts’ decision about providing a more favorable recommendation hinges on their 
expectations about the firm’s future performance (Lys & Soo, 1995; Mikhail, Walther & 
Willis, 1997). Prior literature has established the importance of the uniqueness of a firm’s 
knowledge to its ability to compete with rivals to create value (Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 
1993; Polidoro & Toh, 2011). Therefore, when emphasizing a firm’s performance versus 
rivals, the increased value associated with possessing knowledge that is different from 
that of its industry rivals will outweigh the increased difficulty that analysts face 
evaluating a firm that does not conform to industry norms. Conversely, when a firm’s 
knowledge overlaps more with its rivals, it will be less unique, which will reduce the 
value associated with this knowledge. The reduced value associated with knowledge that 
overlaps with a firm’s industry will lower the likelihood that securities analysts will 
provide a firm with a more favorable recommendation. Hence:   
 Proposition 8 (P8):  Greater knowledge overlap between the firm and its rivals 
 will have a negative impact on the favorability of the analyst’s 
 recommendation for the firm. 
 To increase confidence in the proposed mechanisms behind proposition seven, in 
the next section I develop two contingencies related to analysts’ job security and their 






 I argued above in proposition seven that analysts will tend to be risk-averse as a 
result of the incentive structure within the investment firms where they work.  Prior 
research shows that analysts’ risk tolerance may vary depending on their level of job 
security. Since more experienced securities analysts are less likely to be terminated as a 
result of making inaccurate evaluations, they can afford to take greater risks than less 
experienced analysts. For example, Hong, Kubik and Solomon (2000) found that more 
experienced securities analysts were less likely to be terminated when their evaluations 
were inaccurate.  If it is true that increased risk associated with the exploration of distant 
knowledge reduces the likelihood that securities analysts will provide a more favorable 
recommendation, then it should be the case that analysts with greater experience, who 
have a greater tolerance for risk due to their lower chances of being terminated for 
inaccurate evaluations, will be more willing to provide a more favorable recommendation 
to an exploratory firm than more risk-averse analysts with lower experience.  Hence: 
 Proposition 9 (P9):  The greater the analyst’s experience, the less negative the 
 effect that exploration of distant knowledge will have on the favorability of the 
 recommendation. 
  
 In this next proposition I explore how analysts’ previous experience covering 
firms that explore distant knowledge will moderate the relationship between a firm’s 
exploration of distant knowledge and the favorability of the recommendations it gets 
from a securities analyst. Extant research shows that prior experience taking risks can 
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influence future risk-taking behavior (e.g., March & Shapira, 1987; Thaler & Johnson, 
1990) and that decision makers that took risks in the past are more likely to take them in 
the future (Lant & Montgomery, 1987). Similarly, managers’ prior experience influences 
whether their firms will engage in exploration and exploitation (Hambrick, Geletkanycz 
& Fredrickson, 1993; Beckman & Burton, 2008). Accordingly, analysts who have prior 
experience evaluating riskier firms that explore more distant knowledge may be more 
receptive to evaluating riskier firms, which may increase their willingness to provide 
such firms with positive evaluations.   
 Analysts with prior experience evaluating these types of firms may also be better 
at understanding the causal relationships between exploration and future performance.  
Securities analysts’ experience influences the way in which they evaluate firms and prior 
research shows that forecast accuracy improves based on experience (Mikhail, Walther & 
Willis, 1997).  The improved performance of more experienced analysts is likely related 
to their increased ability to understand causal relationships (Huber, 1991). Consequently, 
analysts who have greater experience evaluating firms that build more extensively on 
new knowledge may be better able to understand the causal linkages between exploring 
knowledge and a firm’s performance. The combination of being more receptive to more 
exploratory firms and analysts’ increased ability to understand and evaluate the 
relationship between exploration and performance may diminish the negative effect that 
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building on distant knowledge has on the likelihood that the analysts will increase the 
favorability of the firm’s recommendation. Hence: 
  Proposition 10 (P10):  The more extensively other firms covered by the analyst 
 explore external knowledge, the less negative the effect that exploration of distant 
 knowledge will have on the favorability of the recommendation. 
  
 This study examined the influence that a company’s approach to innovation exerts 
on the firm’s ability to gain more favorable recommendations from a securities analyst 
who is already covering that company. Figure 2 illustrates the theoretical model for study 
two that was developed in this chapter of the dissertation. 
 In the next and final study, I complete the circle by examining how securities 
analysts’ recommendations influence the firm’s ability to attract investment. Specifically, 
I consider how disagreement among securities analysts’ recommendations influences the 











 Chapter 5:   Analysts’ Recommendations and Investment 
Having examined the influence of a firm’s approach to innovation on analysts’ 
coverage and recommendation decisions in the previous two studies, this current study 
completes the loop by exploring the final stage in the evaluation process, where 
assessments ultimately influence investment decisions.  Innovations are an important 
knowledge-based resource from which a firm can derive competitive advantage (Rumelt, 
1984; Barney, 1991; Grant, 1996). Developing innovations depends on a company’s 
ability to access resources in the environment (Nelson & Winter, 1982; Henderson & 
Cockburn, 1994) and investors are an important source of financial resources (Useem, 
1996; Benner, 2007).  Profiting from resources, such as innovations, depends on 
uncertainty that limits competition that would otherwise erode the value of such resources 
(Rumelt, 1987; Peteraf, 1993). Although uncertainty helps a firm create valuable 
resources, it also creates difficulties for investors to understand and evaluate firms’ 
strategies (Haunschild, 1994; Sanders & Bovie, 2004).   
Securities analysts’ recommendations help to mitigate uncertainty and research 
shows that getting favorable recommendations helps firms attract investment (Womack, 
1996; Zuckerman, 1999).  Therefore, the importance of winning favorable assessments 
from securities analysts has spurred interest in understanding how a firm’s strategies 
influence the favorability of analysts’ recommendations (e.g., Westphal & Clement, 
2008; Westphal & Graebner, 2010; Benner, 2010).  By emphasizing favorable 
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recommendations as a means of reducing uncertainty to attract investment, studies have 
overlooked the potential importance of uncertainty to investors’ own efforts to create 
value.  Analysts do not always agree about their recommendations (Fanelli, Misangyi & 
Tosi, 2009) and disagreement among evaluations implies that some uncertainty remains 
(Barney, 1986), even after evaluations have been made.  Just as a firm’s ability to 
compete for valuable resources is enhanced when uncertainty creates opportunities by 
clouding the valuation of resources (Barney, 1986; Peteraf, 1993; Denrell, Fang & 
Winter, 2003), investors’ ability to compete for profitable opportunities may also be 
enhanced when uncertainty obscures the valuation of investments.  
This final study builds on insights from prior literature about the role of 
uncertainty as an antecedent of opportunity and value creation (Knight, 1921; Rumelt, 
1987; McGrath & MacMillian, 2000) and focuses on the impact of the level of consensus 
among analysts about a firm’s prospects.  Whereas perfect consensus among experts 
suggests that opportunities for value creation may be narrowly based on a given 
trajectory whose value can be easily anticipated, lack of consensus suggests opportunities 
for unforeseen value creation based on multiple potential trajectories.  Accordingly, in 
this study I propose that uncertainty related to disagreement among securities analysts’ 
recommendations will improve a company’s ability to attract shareholders by creating 
opportunities for investors to identify profitable investment opportunities. 
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By demonstrating how the interplay between securities analysts and investors 
affects the ability of a firm engaged in innovation to attract investors, this study may 
make contributions to strategy research. Furthering understanding of factors that 
influence the extent to which investors buy shares of a firm in innovation-driven contexts 
is relevant because financial markets constitute crucial elements in the broader selection 
environment that ultimately assesses the prospects of the firm’s innovation-based 
strategies.  Prior research has envisaged securities analysts as expert intermediaries that 
help mitigate the uncertainty that prospective investors face. Accordingly, researchers 
have examined how a firm can elicit favorable recommendations from securities analysts.   
This present study investigates whether those recommendations, in turn, shape the 
firm’s ability to attract investors. In this study I argue that financial markets are not fully 
intermediated by securities analysts’ recommendations and suggest that a firm’s approach 
to innovation may be important to its efforts to create value from this residual uncertainty 
by attracting investors. Contrary to received wisdom about the benefits that accrue to a 
firm that is consistently viewed favorably by securities analysts, this study argues that 
consensus among securities analysts can cause some investors to discount opportunities 
to buy the firm’s shares, making it more difficult  for the firm to attract the investment 





SECURITIES ANALYSTS’ RECOMMENDATIONS 
 The ability to profit from an investment requires ex ante uncertainty that enables 
buyers to make investments at a cost below the ex post value (Rumelt, 1987).  In 
competitive contexts, uncertainty can serve as an ex ante limit to competition among 
investors for valuable strategic investments and can increase the relevance of 
idiosyncratic information needed to identify opportunities (Peteraf, 1993; Denrell, Fang 
& Winter, 2003).  Differences in expectations reflect uncertainty in competitive 
environments (Barney, 1986).  At the same time that agreement about a firm’s prospects 
implies lower levels of uncertainty, it also causes valuations to converge around the 
shared expectations, which results in asset prices getting bid up to the point of the agreed 
upon expected value (Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993).  
  The recommendations that securities analysts make for the different firms that 
they cover reflect some mix of idiosyncratic and common expectations about the link 
between firms’ strategies and future financial performance (Bradshaw, 2004; Barniv, 
Hope, Myring & Thomas, 2009). While perfect consensus among securities analysts’ 
recommendations suggests that opportunities for value creation may be narrowly defined 
around a trajectory whose value can be easily anticipated by all of the analysts evaluating 
the firm, lack of consensus suggests opportunities for unforeseen value creation based on 
multiple idiosyncratic interpretations.  In this way, greater consensus about the prospects 
of a firm can diminish opportunities for investors to acquire it at favorable terms. In 
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contrast, the existence of diverse views and interpretations about the link between a 
firm’s current strategic position and future performance suggests, not one, but rather 
multiple potential trajectories to which many different values may be assigned. 
Accordingly, the uncertainty associated with lack of consensus about the firm’s prospects 
may present buyers with opportunities to capture unrecognized value (Knight, 1921; 
Rumelt, 1987; McGrath & MacMillan, 2000), which may increase the firm’s ability to 
attract investment.   
 In addition to the greater buying opportunities that lower levels of analyst 
consensus may entail for investors, investors may also discount firms with high levels of 
consensus among securities analysts’ recommendations due to a concern that this 
consensus may be a signal of consequential ‘herding’ behavior on the part of analysts 
(e.g., Welch, 2000).  For example, prior literature has found that consensus sometimes 
suggests the type of ‘herding’ behavior that can lead to overvaluation (Hong, Kubik & 
Solomon, 2000; Rao, Greve & Davis, 2001). Since lower levels of consensus among 
securities analysts’ recommendations suggest both an increased potential for identifying 
unforeseen opportunities and a reduced risk of overpaying for unwarranted exuberance, 
after controlling for the favorability of securities analysts’ recommendations, it follows 
that: 
Proposition 11 (P11):  The lower the level of consensus among securities 
analysts’ recommendations about the firm, the greater the likelihood that the 
investor will buy shares in the firm. 
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  To further probe the argument that lower levels of consensus among securities 
analysts will enhance a firm’s ability to attract investors, I now turn to contingencies 
about the investor’s industry experience, investor’s time horizon and aspects of the firm’s 
innovation strategy that should exacerbate this influence.  
CONTINGENT EFFECTS 
 If a lack of consensus among analysts’ recommendations presents investors with 
increased opportunities to buy firms at favorable terms, then it follows that more 
experienced investors who have more knowledge and greater access to unique 
information should be more capable than less experienced investors at recognizing these 
opportunities.  Investors sometimes trade based on idiosyncratic or private information 
(Ke & Petroni, 2004; Bushee & Goodman, 2007).  Further, their prior experience 
influences their investment decisions (Kaustia & Knupfer, 2008) and their performance 
can improve based on experience (Seru, Shumway & Stoffman, 2010). Just as the prior 
experience of entrepreneurs helps them to recognize opportunities more effectively than 
less experienced peers (Shane, 2000),  so too will more experienced investors be better 
able to identify the opportunities that arise due to analyst disagreement.  Other evidence 
of the importance of experience to investment decision making comes from strategy 
research showing that more experienced foreign investors were more willing to undertake 
entry into the US market using higher risk acquisitions rather than safer equity joint 
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ventures (Hennart & Reddy, 1997) and that firms’ investment experience enhances 
foreign direct investment survival prospects (Shaver, Mitchell & Yeung, 1997).    
 Experienced investors may also be better than less experienced peers at 
identifying situations where investments are potentially overpriced due to excess 
exuberance (e.g., Rao, Greve & Davis, 2001). For example, research shows that more 
experienced ‘serial acquirers’ are less likely to overpay when making acquisitions 
(McNamara, Haleblian & Dykes, 2008) and that experienced investors are less likely to 
induce stock market bubbles (Greenwood & Nagel, 2009).  Taken together, this research 
suggests that investors’ experience may both be beneficial to their efforts to identify 
opportunities related to analyst disagreement, while also promoting a greater awareness 
of the potential risks associated with unwarranted optimism and herding. For both of 
these reasons: 
Proposition 12 (P12): The greater the investor’s industry experience, the more 
likely the investor will be to buy shares in the firm when consensus is low among 
securities analysts’ recommendations. 
 Having explored the contingent effect of industry experience in the previous 
proposition, I turn next to the contingent effect of the investor’s time horizon. Prior 
research has shown that investors differ with respect to their time horizon (e.g., Bushee, 
1998).  Since investors with a longer time horizon should be especially interested in 
investments that create long-term value, they may be more sensitive to concerns about the 
potential for herding-related overvaluation that is suggested by greater consensus among 
analysts’ recommendations than short-term investors who are more likely to sell their 
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shares before overvaluation is recognized.   Additionally, the longer time horizon of these 
investors may increase their incentives to more closely and independently scrutinize 
firms for opportunities that analysts may have overlooked.  For both of these reasons: 
Proposition 13 (P13): The longer the investor’s time horizon, the more likely the 
investor will be to buy shares in the firm when consensus is low among securities 
analysts’ recommendations. 
 In addition to the influence that characteristics of the focal investor exert on 
investment decisions based on disagreement among securities analysts’ 
recommendations, characteristics of the firm itself may also be relevant to whether 
investors decide to increase their ownership amidst analyst uncertainty.  Prior research 
shows that costly and visible signals help decision makers to distinguish between higher 
and lower quality in the absence of clear assessments (Spence, 1973). Studies also show 
that visible aspects of a firm’s innovation strategy can serve as an important signal of its 
innovative potential that can enhance the firm’s ability to secure external resources (e.g., 
Baum & Silverman, 2004; Levitas & McFadyen, 2009).   Accordingly, the next two 
contingencies examine the influence that characteristics of the firm’s approach to 
innovation exert on the investor’s decision. Proposition fourteen deals with the contingent 
effect of the scope of a firm’s innovation portfolio and proposition fifteen explores the 
contingent effect of a firm’s ability to commercialize innovations. 
 Differences in expectations reflect uncertainty (Barney, 1986). Prior research has 
shown that the scope of the firm’s technological portfolio can create technological 
options, which can become even more valuable when uncertainty increases (McGrath, 
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1997; McGrath & Nerkar, 2003). Furthermore, other studies show that the scope of firms’ 
technological knowledge can also help them deal with fluctuating rates of technological 
change and with unpredictable interdependencies among products (Brusoni, Prencipe & 
Pavitt, 2001). 
 In light of these different benefits related to greater technological scope amidst 
uncertainty, it follows that investors faced with disagreement among analysts may be 
even more likely to invest when the firm’s innovation scope is greater. This is because 
greater innovation scope makes the firm even better able to capitalize on the unforeseen 
opportunities inherent under uncertainty. Because of the increased flexibility and greater 
opportunities for future growth associated with possessing a broader portfolio of 
technologies that can be either developed or abandoned depending on how technology 
evolves, investors who are faced with the increased opportunity related to disagreement 
will be even more likely to invest in a company with broader technological scope, since 
the firm is even better positioned to capitalize on this uncertainty. Therefore:    
Proposition 14 (P14):  The greater the scope of the firm’s innovation portfolio, 
the more likely the investor will be to buy shares in the firm when consensus is 
low among securities analysts’ recommendations. 
 Whereas the scope of the firm’s innovation portfolio discussed above in 
proposition fourteen benefits the firm by increasing its technological options, the firm’s 
ability to capitalize on the multiple possibilities that exist amidst uncertainty also depends 
on its ability to transform different types of technological knowledge into innovations 
that can be monetized in product markets.  The capability to bring new innovations into 
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the marketplace often depends on the possession of domain-specific manufacturing and 
product market experience (Nerkar & Roberts, 2004) and a firm that possesses 
‘complementary assets’ such as specialized manufacturing and sales networks is better 
positioned to profit from its innovative efforts when faced with technological change 
(Teece, 1986).  When technological uncertainty renders the value of some types of 
knowledge obsolete, a firm that possesses the specialized complementary assets and 
capabilities required to bring new products into the marketplace may have additional time 
to build knowledge in emerging technological domains (Tripsas, 1997). Furthermore, 
being able to successfully bring new products to market is suggested to be especially 
important in dynamic contexts characterized by high levels of uncertainty (Eisenhardt & 
Martin, 2000).  Taken together, this research suggests that the ability to commercialize 
innovations may be especially valuable in uncertain contexts where technological change 
is most likely to create new opportunities and render innovations based on existing 
knowledge obsolete. 
 Even if none of the firm’s technological options turn out to be compatible with the 
technologies that dominate, the increased speed and responsiveness related to knowing 
how to successfully commercialize innovations may both allow the firm additional time 
to develop the dominant types of knowledge and enable it to exploit new technological 
opportunities more effectively than rivals.  Accordingly, investors faced with increased 
opportunities associated with the multiple technological possibilities that disagreement 
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among securities analysts suggests will be even more likely to increase their investment 
when a firm has demonstrated the capability to successfully develop new products. This 
is because the firm will have a greater chance of being able to successfully deploy an 
innovation in whatever technological area ultimately prevails.  Hence: 
Proposition 15 (P15):  The greater the firm’s ability to commercialize 
innovations, the more likely the investor will be to buy shares in the firm when 
consensus is low among securities analysts’ recommendations. 
 Figure 3 illustrates the theoretical model for study 3 that was developed in this 















Chapter 6:  Data and Methods 
SETTING  
 This research focuses on the interplay between a firm’s approach to innovation 
and experts’ evaluations in financial markets. Consequently, it is important to test this 
theory in an innovation-driven context where securities analysts’ coverage and 
evaluations help a firm to attract critical inputs in equity markets. Also, since some of the 
theory developed in this research considers the focal firm in relation to its industry (i.e., 
innovation intensity of the industry, knowledge overlap with industry rivals), it is also 
important to consider firms across different types of knowledge-intensive industries.  
Accordingly, I use data from the medical devices (e.g., Mitchell, 1989; Chaterji, 2009), 
computer hardware (e.g., Baysinger, Kosnik & Turk, 1991) and computer software 
industries (e.g., Lavie, 2007). 
 The medical devices industry is appropriate because medical device companies 
and their investors face substantial uncertainty when developing and evaluating 
innovations (Garud & Rappa, 1994; Rasheed, Datta & Chinta, 1997).  Such firms often 
depend on financial support from equity markets to pay for innovation (Zinner, 2000) and 
the high financial stakes associated with developing and commercializing medical 
technology make the evaluation of expert intermediaries important to investors’ decision 
making (Topol & Blumenthal, 2005; Bukh & Nielsen, 2011).    
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 Similarly, the computer hardware and software industries are also innovation-
driven contexts (e.g., Eisenhardt & Tabrizi, 1995; Henderson & Stern, 2004; Lavie, 
2006), where securities analysts are relevant to the evaluation of firms’ strategies (Jensen, 
2004). Studies one and two of the dissertation draw on all three of these industries and 
study three focuses in greater detail on the medical devices industry only, since the 
detailed data from the Food and Drug Administration used to assess innovation in study 
three are not available for the other two industries.   
SAMPLE 
 Studies one and two examine securities analysts’ decisions about providing 
coverage and favorable recommendations to firms in the medical devices, computer 
hardware and computer software industries. Accordingly, these studies require data on 
both securities analysts and on the firms that these analysts consider when making their 
coverage and recommendation decisions. When constructing the sample I needed to 
include: (1) all analysts that might cover a given firm in the respective industry and (2) all 
firms in that industry that these analysts might consider when making decisions about 
coverage and recommendations.  Consequently, I required a sampling approach that 
provides a representative group of the analysts who evaluate the firms across the three 
industries of interest and the firms that these analysts consider in making their 
evaluations. I describe below the rationale behind the procedure that I employed to 
identify the analysts and firms that were included in the sample for studies one and two. 
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 Before elaborating on the procedure that I used to select the group of securities 
analysts for the sample it is important to acknowledge trade-offs associated with some of 
the different sampling alternatives that I considered. At the extremes one could develop a 
sample that includes all of the securities analysts who are active during the period of 
analysis or one could only include those analysts who are currently covering a firm in one 
of the three industries.  Although basing the sample on the entire population of securities 
analysts would help to minimize selection bias, the inclusion of a large number of 
securities analysts who may never realistically consider evaluating a firm in one of the 
three focal industries could inflate the number of zero observations in the dataset.  
Having an excess number of zeros in the sample could bias estimates (King & Zeng, 
1999), while also increasing the computational difficulty of the analysis. Therefore, any 
potential benefits of reduced selection bias gained by including the entire population of 
securities analysts may be more than offset by these potential analytical and 
computational costs. 
 At the other extreme one could develop a sample based exclusively on those 
securities analysts who are already providing coverage and recommendations to a firm in 
one of the three focal industries. This alternative sampling procedure would help to 
eliminate many of the non-active securities analysts who would be present when 
including the entire population of analysts. However, since securities analysts sometimes 
evaluate firms that reside outside of the industry in which they specialize (Zuckerman, 
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1999), failing to consider securities analysts who do not specialize in a given industry 
may engender selection bias.  
 Given the potential issues associated with these two extreme approaches, I have 
instead chosen a sampling approach for selecting securities analysts that falls somewhere 
in between taking the whole population of analysts and only those analysts who 
specialize in a given industry. Specifically, I only consider securities analysts employed 
by firms that have previously provided recommendations on firms in one of the three 
focal industries. To the extent that brokerage firms may specialize in certain industries 
this sampling procedure should help to minimize selection bias by ensuring that I am 
including the majority of the securities analyst who could potentially evaluate firms in 
these industries, without artificially inflating the number of zero observations in the 
sample. To develop the set of analysts I first identified all securities analysts whose 
employer had previously provided recommendations for a firm in each of the three 
industries (i.e., medical devices, computer hardware, computer software) between 1993 
and 2006.  Using this approach I identified roughly 2,500 securities analysts for the 
medical devices and computer hardware industries and approximately 3,000 analysts for 
the computer software industry from the Institutional Brokers Estimation System 
(I/B/E/S) Database.  In comparison, the entire population of analysts during this period 
exceeded 10,000 securities analysts.  
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 After identifying the securities analysts to include in the sample, the next step was 
to determine the set of firms that these analysts might consider evaluating across the three 
industries. Given that securities analysts typically provide forecasts and recommendations 
on publically traded firms (Useem, 1996), a logical starting point to develop the sample 
of firms was to consider the set of publically traded firms for which data are reported in 
COMPUSTAT. Since COMPUSTAT contains data on firms across multiple industries, I 
used four digit standard industry classifications (SIC) to identify firms in the medical 
devices, computer hardware and computer software industries.  Consistent with prior 
literature, I consider medical devices firms in the 3841 and the 3842 SIC codes (e.g., 
Short et al., 2007), computer hardware firms in the 3570 though 3579 SIC codes (e,g., 
Iyengar & Zampelli, 2009) and computer software firms in the 7372 SIC code (e.g., 
Matusik, 2002) .  The groups of firms indentified in COMPUSTAT were then matched 
with patent data from the National Bureau of Economic Research Patent Database (Hall, 
Jaffe & Trajtenberg, 2001). The resulting sample of firms, which increases over the 
period of analysis, includes between 38 to 50 firms from the medical devices industry, 
between 36 and 71 firms from the computer hardware industry and between 36 and 151 
firms from the computer software industry.  After constructing the sample for studies one 
and two, the next step was to develop a sampling frame for study three. 
 Study three examines a focal investor’s decision to increase her ownership stake 
in a given medical devices firm in response to disagreement among securities analysts’ 
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recommendations. This study requires data on investors and medical devices firms. Since 
the study examines equity investment decisions made by individual investors the first 
step in developing the sample involves the identification of investors.  Since it is 
important to be able to account for sources of unobserved heterogeneity across investors 
that may influence the extent to which these investors will increase their ownership in 
response to analyst disagreement, it is critical to develop a sample that provides detailed 
information on individual investor characteristics.  Thus, for the purpose of this study 
using an aggregate firm-level construct, such as the firm’s average stock price, was not 
appropriate as it would not have provided the requisite investor-level granularity to test 
the theory. 
 While one would ideally develop a sample comprised of all equity investors who 
could potentially trade in medical devices firms, comprehensive data of this sort on 
investment patterns are not readily available for all investors. Consequently, I follow the 
approach used in other strategy studies of developing a sample comprised of large, 
institutional investors (Dharwadka et al., 2008). Institutional investors, such as pension 
funds, banks and investment funds hold approximately 60% of U.S. equity (Hoskisson et 
al., 2002). These institutional investors, with more than $100 million dollars of invested 
capital, are required to report their investments to the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) on a quarterly basis. Therefore, I use the Thomson-Reuters 
Institutional Holdings (13F) Database to develop a sample based on all of the 
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approximately two thousand institutional investors in the database. Since basing the 
sample on data on institutional investors may influence the generalizability of the 
findings, I will consider potential limitations associated with this approach in the 
discussion section at the end of the dissertation.   
 After identifying the set of investors to include in the sample, I next needed to 
identify the medical devices firms in which these investors could potentially buy equity 
in response to securities analysts’ recommendations. Because of my interest in analysts’ 
recommendations, I only considered publically traded firms that were covered by at least 
one securities analyst between 1993 and 2006. I identified medical devices firms in SIC 
3841 and SIC 3842 using COMPUSTAT for which analysts’ recommendations were also 
available in the Institutional Brokers Estimation System (I/B/E/S) Database. By 
integrating these different datasets I was able to identify more than 25,000 distinct 
investments that institutional investors made between 1993 and 2006 in roughly 50 
medical devices firms.  
DATA SOURCES 
 As mentioned previously, this research integrates data from multiple archival 
sources to examine the interplay between a firm’s approach to innovation and evaluations 
in financial markets. The primary source of financial data for R&D expenditures, 
revenue, net income, stock prices, etc. is COMPUSTAT.  The Institutional Brokers 
Estimation System (I/B/E/S) from Thomson Reuters is used as a primary source of data 
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about securities analysts’ coverage and recommendations. The patent data required to 
assess firms’ approach to innovation is taken from the National Bureau of Economic 
Research Patent Database (Hall, Jaffe & Trajtenberg, 2001).  The detailed investment 
data required for study three of the dissertation comes from the Thomson-Reuters 
Institutional Holdings (13F) Database. This database is used to collect data on the 
investment patterns of more than two thousand large, institutional investors. For study 
three, data from the US Food & Drug Administration (FDA) are used to develop 
contingency variables and controls related to firms’ approach to innovation.  
UNIT OF ANALYSIS 
 Studies one and two of the dissertation use yearly data at the level of the firm-
analyst dyad. In study one I examine the likelihood that a firm in the medical devices, 
computer hardware or computer software industry will receive coverage by a given 
securities analyst. In study two, I assess the likelihood that a focal firm in the medical 
devices, computer hardware or computer software industry will receive more favorable 
coverage from a focal securities analyst that is already covering the focal firm, 
controlling for the likelihood that securities analysts will provide coverage for the focal 
firm.  Finally, in study three, I use yearly data at the level of the firm-investor dyad to 
assess the likelihood that the focal firm in the medical devices industry will attract 





Approach to Innovation and Analysts’ Coverage – Study 1 
Dependent Variable - Likelihood the firm will gain analyst coverage.   The propositions 
in study one relate the influence that a firm’s approach to innovation exerts on a focal 
securities analyst’s decision to cover the focal firm.  Consistent with the approach used in 
other studies that have examined analyst coverage (e.g., Rao, Greve, &  Davis, 2001; 
Jensen, 2004), for each firm-analyst observation I created a dichotomous variable set to 
“1” if the focal securities analyst decided to cover the focal firm in the observation year. 
Alternatively, if the focal securities analyst did not decide to cover the focal firm, this 
variable is set to “0”.  The determination of whether the firm was covered by a securities 
analyst was based on whether the focal securities analyst had issued a recommendation 
for the focal firm as reported in the Institutional Brokers Estimation System (I/B/E/S) 
Database. 
Independent Variables. In line with prior strategy studies that have examined the 
influences of a firm’s approach to innovation on different organizational outcomes (e.g., 
Sorenson & Stuart, 2000; Rosenkopf & Nerkar, 2001; Benner & Tushman, 2002; Song, 
Almeida & Wu, 2003), I use patent data to measure different aspects of the firm’s 
approach to innovation.      
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Firm’s knowledge diversity (P1).  Knowledge diversity is measured using the number of 
distinct technological classes in which the focal firm has filed patents during the previous 
five years (Ahuja & Katila, 2004).  
Extent to which the firm explores distant knowledge (P2).  Knowledge distance is 
assessed using the focal firm’s citations to existing (previously cited within firm) patents 
divided by its total citations made during the previous five years (Benner & Tushman, 
2002; Katila & Ahuja, 2002). To check for robustness to alternative measures of this key 
variable, I also assess knowledge distance based on the focal firm’s self-citations divided 
by its total citations made during the previous five years (Sorenson & Stuart, 2000; 
Rosenkopf & Nerkar, 2001). 
Knowledge overlap between the firm and its industry rivals (P3). Knowledge overlap 
between the firm and industry rivals is measured using the common citation rate between 
firm and industry rivals during the previous 5 years.  This measure is appropriate because 
it has been used previously to gauge the similarity between firms’ knowledge in the 
alliance literature (e.g., Mowery, Oxley & Silverman, 1996; Mowery, Oxley & 
Silverman, 1998).  For each firm in the sample I calculated the percentage of that firm’s 
outward patent citations that had also been cited by another firm in the firm’s industry.  
Knowledge overlap between the analyst and the firm (P4). The degree of knowledge 
overlap between the analyst and the firm is measured as the percentage of the focal firm’s 
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primary patent classes in which the focal analyst has had experience based on the set of 
firms that she has covered over her career. 
Innovation intensity of firm’s industry (P5 & P6). Consistent with prior research, 
innovation intensity is measured using the average R&D expense / revenue for the firm’s 
4-digit SIC (Sarkar, Echambadi, Agarwal  & Sen, 2006; Ang, 2008),  
Control Variables. To capture potential sources of unobserved heterogeneity I include 
controls to account for various influences related to the focal firm, the focal securities 
analyst and the focal investor that may affect both a firm’s approach to innovation and 
analyst coverage. Larger firms may be more likely to attract analyst coverage due to the 
increased visibility associated with their size (Bhushan, 1989). Such firms may also be 
better able to adopt a particular approach to innovation.  I control for firm size based on 
the number of employees. Firm performance may also affect the degree to which the firm 
is covered by securities analysts (Bhushan, 1989; McNichols & O’Brien, 1997), while 
also influencing the firm’s ability to conduct an approach to innovation based on diverse, 
distant and distinctive knowledge.  To capture this potential influence I control for firm 
performance based on net income.  
 Prior research shows that securities analysts sometimes engage in herding 
behavior by following one others’ coverage decisions (Rao, Greve & Davis, 2000). Since 
the extent to which analysts cover an industry may also vary with the approach to 
innovation used by firms in the industry, it is important to account for the potential 
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influence that the prior level of industry coverage by securities analysts may have on the 
firm’s approach to innovation and the decision of a focal securities analyst to cover that 
firm. I capture this potential influence by controlling for the number of analysts covering 
the firm’s industry.  
 Additionally, since a firm’s innovative output, technological capabilities and 
geographic scope may influence both its approach to innovation and the likelihood that it 
will gain the coverage of a securities analyst, I control for the firm’s number of patents, 
the citations that the firm receives from other firms and the number of geographic 
locations in which the firm conducts R&D.  Also, prior literature suggests that the level 
of analyst coverage may be greater when firms engage more heavily in R&D and in the 
development of intangible assets (Barth, Kasznik & McNichols, 2001).  Given that the 
degree to which firms draw upon diverse, distant and distinctive knowledge may also be 
influenced by the innovation intensity of the firm’s industry, I control for this potential 
influence by including a control for the research and development expense as a 
percentage of sales in the firm’s four digit SIC. Furthermore, to help account for 
heterogeneity across analysts that may relate to coverage and the firm’s approach to 
innovation, I also control for the degree of knowledge overlap between the analyst and 
the focal firm. 
 There have been important changes in the information environment that may 
influence securities analysts’ decisions to cover and evaluate firms.  One particularly 
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important change to the information environment in the United States occurred on 
October 23rd, 2000 with the enactment of Regulation Fair Disclosure (RegFD) by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (Bailey, Li, Mao & Zhong, 2003).  This regulation 
made it illegal for companies to selectively or privately disclose information to securities 
analysts or investors.  By providing more equal access to information across analysts, the 
enactment of RegFD influenced the pattern of analyst coverage across firms (Mohanram 
& Sunder, 2006).  Accordingly, I include a dummy variable to capture any potential 
influence that the passage of RegFD had on a firm’s coverage and its approach to 
innovation.  In addition to all of these other controls, I also include year dummies to 
capture influences related to specific years that may influence the firm’s approach to 
innovation and coverage. 
Approach to Innovation and Analysts’ Recommendations – Study 2 
Dependent Variable - Likelihood securities analyst will increase favorability of the firm’s 
recommendation. The propositions in this study relate the influence that a firm’s 
approach to innovation exerts on a focal securities analyst’s decision to increase the 
favorability of her recommendation for the focal firm.  For each firm-analyst observation 
I created a dichotomous dependent variable to assess when the favorability of the 
recommendations that the firm receives from a securities analyst improves. I used the 
analyst detail file from the Institutional Brokers Estimation System (I/B/E/S) Database. 
Securities analysts recommendations typically range from favorable, ‘strong buy’ 
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recommendations to unfavorable, ‘sell’ recommendations (i.e., 1=Strong Buy, 2=Buy, 
3=Hold, 4=Underperform, 5=Sell).  Accordingly, this measure is set to “1” if the focal 
firm’s recommendation from the focal analyst becomes more favorable versus the 
previous year, “0” otherwise (Hayward & Boeker, 1998; Westphal & Clement, 2008; 
Westphal & Graebner, 2010). 
Independent Variables. In line with prior strategy studies that have examined the 
influences of a firm’s approach to innovation on different organizational outcomes (e.g., 
Sorenson & Stuart, 2000; Rosenkopf & Nerkar, 2001; Benner & Tushman, 2002; Song, 
Almeida & Wu, 2003), I use patent data to measure different aspects of the firm’s 
approach to innovation. 
Extent to which the firm explores distant knowledge (P7). Please refer to description 
above for proposition 2. 
Knowledge overlap between the firm and its industry rivals (P8). Please refer to 
description above for proposition 3. 
Analyst’s experience (P9). I measure an analyst’s experience based on the number of 
years that the analyst has provided recommendations (Hong, Kubik & Solomon, 2000). 
Degree to which other firms covered by the securities analyst explore new knowledge 
(P10). This construct is assessed by taking the average across the firms covered by the 
analyst of citations to existing (previously cited within firm) patents divided by the total 
citations these firms made during the previous 5 years (Katila & Ahuja, 2002). 
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Control Variables. When examining the analyst’s likelihood of increasing the 
favorability of the focal firm’s recommendation in study two, it is important to account 
for other influences that may affect the firm’s approach to innovation and the likelihood 
that the analyst will increase the favorability of the recommendation.  Since larger and 
more profitable firms may be more able to pursue a particular approach to innovation, 
while also being more likely to garner favorable recommendations, I control for firm size 
based on number of employees (Westphal & Graebner, 2010) and for firm performance 
based on net income (Fanelli, Misangyi & Tosi, 2009).  
 The average recommendation that the focal firm receives from all analysts 
covering the firm may also influence the likelihood that the focal firm will be given a 
more favorable recommendation (Hayward & Boeker, 1998; Westphal & Clement, 
2008).  As the firm’s approach to innovation may also be influenced by the prior 
evaluation of securities analysts, I include a control for the average recommendation that 
the firm received from all analysts covering that firm. Moreover, since other aspects of 
the firm’s innovation strategy may influence the degree to which it explores distant 
knowledge and builds on the knowledge of rivals and also affect the likelihood that the 
securities analyst will increase the favorability of her recommendation it is important to 
account for these other attributes of innovation.  Consequently, I also control for the 
firm’s number of patents, the citations that it receives from other firms and the number of 
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geographic locations in which it conducts R&D, to account for the influence of 
innovative output, technological capabilities and geographic scope.    
 In addition to accounting for heterogeneity across firms, it is also important to 
account for heterogeneity across securities analysts that may correlate with the firm’s 
approach to innovation and the likelihood that the firm will garner a more favorable 
recommendation.  Since an analyst’s general experience evaluating firms and her specific 
experience covering firms that explore distant knowledge may both affect the likelihood 
that she will increase the favorability of the recommendation given to a firm and since 
these types of experience may relate to the firm’s approach to innovation, I control for the 
number of years of experience that the analyst has and the average percentage of new 
knowledge used by the firms that the analyst has previously covered.  I also control for 
the analyst’s accuracy in developing earnings per share forecasts, which may relate to the 
favorability of recommendations and the firm’s approach to innovation.  
 There is also evidence that the passage of Fair Disclosure Regulation (RegFD) in 
2000 contributed to a reduction in forecast accuracy (Mohanram & Sunder, 2006) and 
increased the dispersion in securities analysts’ forecasts (Bailey, Li, Mao & Zhong, 
2003). Given that this change may have influenced a firm’s approach to innovation, I 





Analysts’ Recommendations and Investment – Study 3 
Dependent Variable - Likelihood that investor will buy shares in the firm.  The 
propositions in this third study relate the influence that consensus among securities 
analysts’ recommendations about the focal firm exerts on a focal investor’s decision to 
increase her ownership in the focal firm.  For each firm-investor observation I created a 
dichotomous variable that is set to “1” if the focal investor buys or increases her 
ownership of the firm’s shares, “0” otherwise (e.g., Baum & Silverman, 2004). 
Independent Variables. The measures used for the independent and contingency variables 
are described below.       
Consensus among analysts’ recommendations (P11). To examine the degree of 
consensus among securities analysts’ recommendations I follow the approach used in 
prior literature of measuring the standard deviation of the average recommendations 
across all of the securities analysts covering the focal firm in the year preceding the 
observation year (Fanelli, Misangyi and Tosi, 2009).  
Investor’s industry experience (P12). To examine the contingent effect of the focal 
investor’s industry experience on her hazard of increasing investment in the focal firm, I 
created a variable using the count of the total number of medical devices firms held by 
the focal investor in the year preceding the observation year (Sorenson and Stuart, 2001). 
Investor’s time horizon (P13).  The investor’s time horizon is measured based on the 
annual percentage of shares that she holds rather than selling (e.g., Bushee, 1998; 
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Dharwadka et al. 2008).  Investors who turn over their portfolio more frequently likely 
have a shorter time horizon than those who turn over their portfolios less frequently. 
Scope of the firm’s innovation portfolio (P14). The scope of the investor’s innovation 
portfolio is measured based on the number of distinct FDA product codes in which the 
focal firm has introduced innovations.  
Firm’s ability to commercialize innovations (P15). The firm’s ability to commercialize 
innovations is measured based on the firm’s yearly number of FDA approved products in 
the year preceding the observation year (Hitt et al., 1996; Katila & Ahuja, 2002; Zahra 
and Nielsen, 2002).  
Control Variables.  Since prior literature shows that the favorability of securities 
analysts’ recommendations enhances firms’ ability to attract investors (Womack, 1996) 
and since the favorability of recommendations may contribute to the level of consensus, I 
control for the average favorability of all of the buy/sell recommendations made by all of 
the analysts covering the focal firm. Accordingly, this control captures the average 
opinion about whether to buy or sell the firm’s shares held by all analysts covering the 
firm. The number of securities analysts covering the firm can influence the level of 
agreement among analysts (Hong, Kubik & Solomon, 2000; Rao, Greve & Davis, 2001) 
while also influencing the likelihood that investors will buy the firm’s shares (Jensen, 
2004). Accordingly, I include a control that captures the count of the number of securities 
analysts who provide coverage for the focal firm.   
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 Prior studies suggest that firm size may influence the level of consensus among 
analysts (Barron, Byard, Kile & Riedl, 2002) while also affecting investors’ efforts to 
profit from analysts’ recommendations (Barber, Lehavy, McNicols & Trueman, 2001). I 
control for firm size based on the number of employees.  Given that studies have shown 
that firm performance can influence the uniformity of the recommendations that analysts 
make (Fanelli, Misangyi & Tosi, 2009) and that firm performance also influences the 
firm’s ability to attract investors, I account for this potential influence by including a 
control for the firm’s profitability based on net income. It is also possible that the firm’s 
share price or dividends may influence both the level of consensus of analysts’ 
recommendations and its ability to attract investment. To capture these potential 
influences I include controls for the firm’s average share price and its annual dividend.  
Prior literature shows that the level of consensus can be influenced by the extent to which 
firms produce intangible assets, such as R&D and innovations (e.g., Barron, Byard, Kile 
& Riedl, 2002). Due to the possibility that innovation-intensive firms may also differ in 
their ability to attract investors, I control for several characteristics of the firm’s 
innovation strategy, including the average age of its products, its ability to commercialize 
innovations, the amount of competition it faces from rivals’ innovations and its share of 
innovations in its product categories.  
 It is also important to control for potential unobserved heterogeneity related to 
investors.  I, therefore, include controls for the investor’s experience, portfolio size, 
69 
 
portfolio turnover and for the type of investor (dummies for pension and investor fund). 
Note that the inclusion of these dummies for pension and investor fund may also help 
capture potential differences in risk preferences across types of investors. Finally, the 
potential exists that general economic conditions may contribute to uncertainty among 
securities analysts while also influencing the willingness of investors to buy shares in 
medical innovation companies.  To help mitigate this potential concern I control for 
macroeconomic factors such as inflation, U.S. Government T-bill rates and the index 
value of U.S. equities.  
MODEL SPECIFICATION 
This research examines discrete choices involving dichotomous outcomes which 
violate the OLS assumption of linearity (Kennedy, 2003). Because the use of linear 
models to examine discrete outcomes can yield spurious results, I instead use logit 
models based on the logistic distribution to assess the likelihood of increased coverage, 
favorability and investment (Greene, 2003). I use discrete-time logistic method with 
robust standard errors to analyze the hazards across the three sections of this study. This 
approach deals with right-censored observations while also accommodating time-varying 
covariates. In the logit model, log [πijt/(1-πit)] =  Xijt-1β + εijt , where  Xitj-1 is a time-
varying vector of lagged covariates, β is a vector of estimated coefficients, and εijt is a 
vector of normally distributed error terms.  
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In study one (chapter 3), where I examine the influence of a firm’s approach to 
innovation on the likelihood that an analyst will provide coverage for the firm (Figure 1), 
the dependent variable – Analyst’s coverageijt – denotes whether a given securities 
analyst (subscript i) decided to cover a specific firm (subscript j) in a given year 
(subscript t). The logit specification models the logarithm of the odds that the securities 
analyst will cover a specific firm in the observation year, that is, log [πijt/(1-πijt)], where 
πijt = Pr (Analyst covering the firmijt = 1) and (1-πijt) = Pr (Analyst covering the firmijt = 
0).  
Similarly, in study two (chapter 4), where I examine the influence of a firm’s 
approach to innovation on the likelihood that an analyst will increase the favorability of 
the recommendation for a given firm (Figure 2), the dependent variable – Analyst’s 
increased favorablityijt – denotes whether a given securities analyst (subscript i) decided 
to increase the favorability of the recommendation given to a specific firm (subscript j) in 
a given year (subscript t). The logit specification models the logarithm of the odds that 
the securities analyst will increase the favorability of the recommendation in the 
observation year, that is, log [πijt/(1-πijt)], where πijt = Pr (Analyst increasing favorability 
of recommendation given to the firmijt = 1) and (1-πijt) = Pr (Analyst increasing 
favorability of recommendation given to the firmijt= 0).  
For studies one and two that examine three distinct industries, I had the option of 
either pooling the sample and analyzing the three industries together with industry 
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dummies or of analyzing each industry separately.  Since the pooled sample approach 
does not allow the coefficients to vary across the three industries, it would result in a less 
conservative test of the theory. Consequently, I opted to use the more stringent test of 
running separate models for each of the three industries across the first two studies of the 
dissertation. This approach results in a more conservative test, since it allows the 
coefficients to vary across the different industries, which should increase the hurdle 
required to find empirical support. 
Finally in study three (chapter 5), where I examine the influence of a 
disagreement among securities analysts’ recommendations on the likelihood that an 
investor will buy additional shares of a given firm’s stock (Figure 3), the dependent 
variable – Investor’s decision to increase investmentijt – denotes whether a given investor 
(subscript i) decided to buy additional shares of a specific firm’s stock (subscript j) in a 
given year (subscript t). The logit specification models the logarithm of the odds that the 
investor will increase the ownership in the firm’s shares during the observation year, that 
is, log [πijt/(1-πijt)], where πijt = Pr (Investor increasing ownership in the firmijt = 1) and 
(1-πijt) = Pr (Investor increasing ownership in the firmijt= 0).  
  Prior studies highlight the importance of accounting for endogeneity in strategy 
research (e.g., Hamilton & Nickerson, 2003; Bascle, 2008). Failing to account for 
endogeneity can bias estimates which can lead to erroneous results (Shaver, 1998). In 
light of the possibility that analysts’ decisions to provide coverage for a particular firm 
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may itself influence their subsequent decisions about providing favorable 
recommendations in the second study, it is important to take steps to address potential 
endogeneity concerns.  Consequently, I use a two-stage estimate procedure (Hamilton & 
Nickerson, 2003), following the approach introduced by Heckman (1974; 1979) and Lee 
(1978).  
 In the first stage I use the variables from study one and two new variables to 
estimate the likelihood that a securities analyst will cover a given firm.  I then include the 
inverse mills ratio derived from these new variables and the other variables as regressors 
when estimating the influence that a firm’s approach to innovation exerts on the 
favorability of the recommendation that it receives from an analyst.  The first new 
variable that I have selected measures the number of firms in the same two-digit SIC 
code that are listed on the stock exchange (e.g., NYSE, NASDAQ) where the firm is 
listed.  I expect that having a greater number of firms with the same two-digit SIC code 
listed on the stock exchange may have a negative effect on the likelihood that it will be 
covered by an analyst.  However, the number of firms with the same two-digit SIC code 
listed on the stock exchange may not as directly affect the favorability of the 
recommendations that the firm receives.  
 The second new variable that I have selected measures whether the focal firm is 
headquartered in the state of New York.  Due to the concentration of investment banks 
located in New York, firms that are headquartered there may find it easier to attract 
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analyst coverage.  However, being located in New York may not directly influence the 
favorability of the recommendations that analysts provide for firms. This two-stage 
approach helps ensure that the influence of a firm’s approach to innovation on the 
favorability of coverage it receives is conditional on, or net of, the analyst’s decision to 
cover that firm.  Note that since the inclusion of the inverse mills ratio may cause the 
standard errors to be understated which can erroneously inflate the statistical significance 
of the coefficients (Hamilton & Nickerson, 2003), I use bootstrapping to correct for this 
potential issue. 
 A number of the propositions involve contingency effects.  However, because 
logit models are non-linear, I am not able to test these contingencies using the standard 
approach of multiplicative interaction terms (Penner-Hahn & Shaver, 2005; Hoetker, 
2007; Wiersema & Bowen, 2009). Furthermore, the marginal effects of logit models 
depend on levels of other variables.  Accordingly, to test the contingencies, I use a 
combination of graphical analysis and split sample econometric tests where I conduct a t-
test to compare differences in the marginal effect at different levels of the contingency 







Chapter 7:  Results 
 The results section is divided into three sections that correspond to the three main 
theory chapters of the dissertation. The first two sections are further broken down into 
sub-sections corresponding to the medical devices, computer hardware and computer 
software industries.   
APPROACH TO INNOVATION AND ANALYSTS’ COVERAGE – STUDY 1 
 Table 1 summarizes the results for propositions 1 through 6 across the medical 
devices, computer hardware and computer software industries. This summary table shows 
the propositions that received support across the three industries.  Specifically, this table 
shows that four out of the six propositions from study one received empirical support 
across at least two of the three industries.  
 The subsections below, corresponding to each of the three industries, explain how 
the empirical tests were conducted to analyze the results for propositions 1 through 6.  I 
begin below by exploring the results for medical device firms in study one. 
Results for Medical Devices Industry 
 Table 2 shows descriptive statistics and correlations for the medical devices 
industry.  I ran variance inflation factors to examine collinearity. Since all of the variance 
inflation factors were well below the critical threshold of 10 (Kennedy, 2003), I found no 
evidence that multi-collinearity is affecting the results (mean 2.2; max 5.6.). 
75 
 
 Table 3 shows the logit estimates for the independent variables and controls. 
Proposition 1 predicted that the likelihood that a securities analyst will provide coverage 
to a given firm will be lower when the firm’s knowledge diversity increases. Model 4 
from Table 3 offers support for this proposition for the medical devices industry (β = -
0.04, p < .001). These findings support proposition 1.  
 Proposition 2 predicted that the likelihood that a securities analyst will provide 
coverage to a given firm will be lower when the firm explores more distant knowledge. 
Model 4 from Table 3 offers support for this proposition for the medical devices industry 
(β = -1.83, p < .001). These findings support proposition 2.  
 Proposition 3 predicted that the likelihood that a securities analyst will provide 
coverage to a given firm will be greater when the firm’s knowledge overlaps more with 
industry rivals. Model 4 from Table 3 offers support for this proposition for the medical 
devices industry (β = 2.95, p < .001). These findings offer support for proposition 3.  
 Propositions 4 through 6 involve contingency effects. Proposition 4 predicts that 
the greater the knowledge overlap between the analyst and the firm, the less negative the 
effect that exploration of distant knowledge will have on the likelihood an analyst will 
cover the firm. Proposition 5 predicts that the greater the innovation intensity of the 
firm’s industry, the more negative the effect that exploration of distant knowledge will 
have on the likelihood an analyst will cover the firm. Finally, proposition 6 predicts that 
the greater the innovation intensity of the firm’s industry, the less positive the effect of 
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knowledge overlap between the firm and its industry rivals on the likelihood an analyst 
will cover the firm. Due to the non-linearity of logit models and the fact that values of the 
main variable can vary at different levels of the contingency variables, the approach of 
testing contingency effects through multiplicative interaction terms is not appropriate 
(Hoetker, 2007; Wiersema & Bowen, 2009). Consequently, I tested the contingency 
effects using a combination of graphical analysis and split sample econometric tests 
(Penner-Hahn & Shaver, 2005).  I split the sample into high and low groups of 
observations based on the mean of the contingency variables (knowledge overlap 
between the analyst and firm in proposition 4, and innovation intensity of the firm’s 
industry in proposition 5 and 6), while holding all other variables at their respective 
means.  The high group contains values above the mean of the contingency variable, 
while the low group contains values below the mean of the contingency variable. These 
groups were then used as a basis for the graphical analysis and econometric tests. 
 Figures 4-6 show the graphical analysis of these contingencies based on the high 
and low values.  Since the figures suggest that the slopes of the lines for high and low 
values of the moderating variables may be different, I also performed a split sample 
econometric test to formally examine whether the contingent effects in propositions 4, 5 
and 6 were supported for medical devices firms.  Comparing coefficients between models 
in a split-sample analysis can be misleading because of the fact that these models are 
non-linear and due to the possibility that observations can fall systematically in different 
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parts of the curve across models (Penner-Hahn & Shaver, 2005; Wiersema & Bowen, 
2009).  Therefore, I instead compare the marginal effects.  Thus, to determine whether 
the contingency effects are supported for propositions 4 through 6, I conducted t-tests to 
establish whether the marginal effects for high and low levels of the contingency 
variables are statistically significant in the hypothesized direction. Specifically, I 
calculated for each group of observations the marginal effects of the main variable, while 
holding the other variables constant at their respective mean values. I then performed t-
tests to compare differences in marginal effects of the main variable at different levels of 
the contingency variable. Tables 4 and 5 report the results of the split-sample analyses.  
 Proposition 4 predicts that the greater the knowledge overlap between the analyst 
and the firm, the less negative the effect that exploration of distant knowledge will have 
on the likelihood an analyst will cover the firm.  To find support for this proposition I 
would need to establish that the marginal effect of knowledge distance on coverage is 
significantly less negative (i.e., more likely to provide coverage) for high levels of 
knowledge overlap between the firm and analyst than it is for low levels of knowledge 
overlap between the firm and the analyst. However, contrary to this prediction, results of 
models 1 and 2 in Table 4 show that high levels of knowledge overlap between the firm 
and analyst actually had the opposite effect by making the analyst even less likely to 
cover a firm that explores distant knowledge (t = 4,500; p < .001).  Therefore, the split 
sample econometric test does not support proposition 4 for the medical devices industry. 
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 Proposition 5 predicts that the greater the innovation intensity of the firm’s 
industry, the more negative the effect that exploration of distant knowledge will have on 
the likelihood an analyst will cover the firm.  Finding support for this proposition 
requires that the split sample econometric test shows that the marginal effect of 
knowledge distance on coverage is significantly more negative (i.e., less likely to provide 
coverage) for high levels of innovation intensity than it is for low levels of innovation 
intensity. Again, contrary to this prediction, results of models 1 and 2 in Table 5 show 
that high levels of innovation intensity actually had the opposite effect by making the 
analyst more likely to cover a firm that explores distant knowledge (t = 200; p < .001).  
Therefore, the split sample econometric test does not support proposition 5 for the 
medical devices industry. 
 Proposition 6 predicts that the greater the innovation intensity of the firm’s 
industry, the less positive the effect of knowledge overlap between the firm and its 
industry rivals on the likelihood an analyst will cover the firm. Finding support for this 
proposition requires that the split sample econometric test shows that the marginal effect 
of knowledge overlap on coverage is significantly less positive (i.e., less likely to provide 
coverage)  for high levels of innovation intensity than it is for low levels of innovation 
intensity. In support of this prediction, results of models 1 and 2 in Table 5 show that 
high levels of innovation intensity made the analyst less likely to cover a firm when the 
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firm’s knowledge overlaps with rivals (t = 320; p < .001).  Therefore, the split sample 
econometric test strongly supports proposition 6 for the medical devices industry. 
 Many of the control variables had a significant effect on the securities analyst’s 
decision to provide coverage for the focal medical devices firm.  In the medical devices 
industry, firm size, firm performance, the firm’s innovative output, the level of 
knowledge overlap between the focal firm and the analyst and the Fair Disclosure 
Regulation (RegFD) controls all exerted a positive influence on the likelihood that the 
securities analyst would provide coverage for the focal firm.  
 I turn next to the results for the computer hardware industry for study one. 
Results for Computer Hardware Industry 
 Table 6 shows descriptive statistics and correlations for the computer hardware 
industry. I ran variance inflation factors to examine collinearity (Kennedy, 2003) and 
found no evidence that multi-collinearity is affecting the results (mean 3.0; max 5.5.). 
 Table 7 shows the logit estimates of analysts’ hazard of covering the focal firm in 
the computer hardware industry. Proposition 1 predicted that the likelihood that a 
securities analyst will provide coverage to a given firm will be lower when the firm’s 
knowledge diversity increases. Contrary to the prediction in proposition 1, Model 4 from 
Table 7 shows that greater knowledge diversity increased the likelihood that the analyst 
would cover the focal firm in the computer hardware industry (β = 0.01, p < .01). 
Therefore, proposition 1 is not supported in the computer hardware industry.  
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 Proposition 2 predicted that the likelihood that a securities analyst will provide 
coverage to a given firm will be lower when the firm explores more distant knowledge. 
Model 4 from Table 7 offers support for this proposition for the computer hardware 
industry (β = -1.44, p < .001). These findings support proposition 2.  
 Proposition 3 predicted that the likelihood that a securities analyst will provide 
coverage to a given firm will be greater when the firm’s knowledge overlaps more with 
industry rivals. Model 4 from Table 7 offers support for this proposition for the computer 
hardware industry (β = 1.38, p < .01). These findings offer support for proposition 3.  
 Propositions 4 through 6 involve contingency effects. Following the approach 
described above, I used a combination of graphical analysis and split sample econometric 
tests to test these propositions. Figures 7 through 9 show the graphical analysis of these 
contingencies based on the high and low values.   
 Since these figures suggest that the slopes of the lines for high and low values of 
the moderating variables may be different, I also performed a split sample econometric 
test to formally examine whether the contingent effects in propositions 4, 5 and 6 were 
supported for computer hardware firms.  Tables 8 and 9 show the split sample econometric 
test used in conjunction with the graphs to examine the contingency effects.    
 Proposition 4 predicts that the greater the knowledge overlap between the analyst 
and the firm, the less negative the effect that exploration of distant knowledge will have 
on the likelihood an analyst will cover the firm.  To find support for this proposition I 
would need to establish that the marginal effect of knowledge distance on coverage is 
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significantly less negative (i.e., more likely to provide coverage) for high levels of 
knowledge overlap between the firm and the analyst than it is for low levels of 
knowledge overlap between the firm and the analyst. Contrary to this prediction, results 
of models 1 and 2 in Table 8 show that high levels of knowledge overlap between the 
firm and the analyst actually had the opposite effect by making the analyst even less 
likely to cover a firm that explores distant knowledge (t = 3,100; p < .001).  Therefore, 
the split sample econometric test does not support proposition 4 for the computer 
hardware industry. 
 Proposition 5 predicts that the greater the innovation intensity of the firm’s 
industry, the more negative the effect that exploration of distant knowledge will have on 
the likelihood an analyst will cover the firm.  Finding support for this proposition 
requires that the split sample econometric test shows that the marginal effect of 
knowledge distance on coverage is significantly more negative (i.e., less likely to provide 
coverage)  for high levels of innovation intensity than it is for low levels of innovation 
intensity. Again, contrary to this prediction, results of models 1 and 2 in Table 9 show 
that high levels of innovation intensity actually had the opposite effect by making the 
analyst more likely to cover a firm that explores distant knowledge (t = 2,500; p < .001).  
Therefore, the split sample econometric test does not support proposition 5 for the 
computer hardware industry. 
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 Proposition 6 predicts that the greater the innovation intensity of the firm’s 
industry, the less positive the effect of knowledge overlap between the firm and its 
industry rivals on the likelihood an analyst will cover the firm. Finding support for this 
proposition requires that the split sample econometric test shows that the marginal effect 
of knowledge overlap on coverage is significantly less positive (i.e., less likely to provide 
coverage)  for high levels of innovation intensity than it is for low levels of innovation 
intensity. In support of this prediction, results of models 1 and 2 in Table 9 show that 
high levels of innovation intensity made the analyst less likely to cover a firm when the 
firm’s knowledge overlaps with rivals (t = 3,200; p < .001).  Therefore, the split sample 
econometric test strongly supports proposition 6 for the computer hardware industry. 
 Many of the control variables had a significant effect on the securities analyst’s 
decision to provide coverage for the focal computer hardware firm.  In the computer 
hardware industry, firm size, the number of analysts covering the firm, the firm’s 
technological quality and the level of knowledge overlap between the focal firm and the 
analyst exerted a positive influence on the likelihood that the securities analyst would 
provide coverage for the focal firm. Conversely, the firm’s geographic scope, the 
innovation intensity of the firm’s industry and the dummy variable for the Fair Disclosure 
Regulation change (RegFD) exerted a negative influence on the likelihood that a 
securities analyst would provide coverage for a firm in the computer hardware industry. 
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Now that I have reported the results of study one for the medical devices and computer 
hardware industries, I consider below the results for study one for computer software 
firms. 
Results for Computer Software Industry 
 I ran variance inflation factors to examine collinearity (Kennedy, 2003) and found 
no evidence that multi-collinearity is affecting the results (mean 1.8; max 2.6). Table 10 
shows descriptive statistics and correlation matrix. 
 Table 11 shows the logit estimates of the analyst’s hazard of covering a firm in 
the computer software industry.  
 Proposition 1 predicted that the likelihood that a securities analyst will provide 
coverage to a given firm will be lower when the firm’s knowledge diversity increases. 
Model 4 from Table 11 offers support for this proposition for the computer software 
industry (β = -0.05, p < .001). These findings support proposition 1.  
 Proposition 2 predicted that the likelihood that a securities analyst will provide 
coverage to a given firm will be lower when the firm explores more distant knowledge. 
Model 4 from Table 11 offers support for this proposition for the computer software 
industry (β = -0.36, p < .05). These findings support proposition 2.  
 Proposition 3 predicted that the likelihood that a securities analyst will provide 
coverage to a given firm will be greater when the firm’s knowledge overlaps more with 
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industry rivals. Model 4 from Table 11 does not offer support for this proposition for the 
computer software industry.  
 Propositions 4 through 6 involve contingency effects. Following the approach 
described above I used a combination of graphical analysis and split sample econometric 
tests to test these propositions. 
 Figures 10 through 12 show the graphical analysis of these contingencies based 
on the high and low values of the contingency variables.   
  Since these graphs suggest that the slopes may be different for high and low levels 
of the contingency variables, I have also conducted split sample econometric analyses to 
formally test these propositions. Tables 12 and 13 show the split sample econometric test 
used in conjunction with the graphs to examine the contingency effects. 
 Proposition 4 predicts that the greater the knowledge overlap between the analyst 
and the firm, the less negative the effect that exploration of distant knowledge will have 
on the likelihood an analyst will cover the firm.    To find support for this proposition I 
would need to establish that the marginal effect of knowledge distance on coverage is 
significantly less negative (i.e., more likely to provide coverage) for high levels of 
knowledge overlap between the firm and the analyst than it is for low levels of 
knowledge overlap between the firm and the analyst. Contrary to this prediction, results 
of models 1 and 2 in Table 12 show that high levels of knowledge overlap between the 
firm and the analyst actually had the opposite effect by making the analyst even less 
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likely to cover a firm that explores distant knowledge (t = 2,600; p < .001).  Therefore, 
the split sample econometric test does not support proposition 4 for the computer 
software industry. 
 Proposition 5 predicts that the greater the innovation intensity of the firm’s 
industry, the more negative the effect that exploration of distant knowledge will have on 
the likelihood an analyst will cover the firm.  Finding support for this proposition 
requires that the split sample econometric test shows that the marginal effect of 
knowledge distance on coverage is significantly more negative (i.e., less likely to provide 
coverage) for high levels of innovation intensity than it is for low levels of innovation 
intensity. Again, contrary to this prediction, results of models 1 and 2 in Table 13 show 
that high levels of innovation intensity actually had the opposite effect by making the 
analyst more likely to cover a firm that explores distant knowledge (t = 110; p < .001).  
Therefore, the split sample econometric test does not support proposition 5 for the 
computer software industry. 
 Proposition 6 predicts that the greater the innovation intensity of the firm’s 
industry, the less positive the effect of knowledge overlap between the firm and its 
industry rivals on the likelihood an analyst will cover the firm.  Since the main effect of 
knowledge overlap between the firm and its rivals (proposition 3) was not supported for 
the computer software industry, this related contingency is also not supported.   
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 Many of the control variables had a significant effect on the securities analyst’s 
decision to provide coverage for the focal computer software firm.  In the computer 
software industry, firm size, the number of analysts covering the firm, the firm’s 
technological quality, the firm’s innovative output and the level of knowledge overlap 
between the focal firm and the analyst exerted a positive influence on the likelihood that 
the securities analyst would provide coverage for the focal firm. Conversely, the firm’s 
geographic scope, the innovation intensity of the firm’s industry and the dummy variable 
for the Fair Disclosure Regulation change (RegFD) exerted a negative influence on the 
likelihood that a securities analyst would provide coverage for a firm in the computer 
software industry. 
 Having explored the results for propositions 1 through 6 for all three industries 
considered in study one, I next focus on the results for propositions 7 through 10 from 
study two across these same three industries.  
APPROACH TO INNOVATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS – STUDY 2 
 Table 14 summarizes the empirical findings for propositions 7 through 10 across 
the medical devices, computer hardware and computer software industries. This table 
shows that none of the four propositions from this study received support across more 
than one industry and only one proposition received support in a single industry (i.e., 
proposition 8 for the computer software industry). 
 I begin below with the results from the medical devices industry for study two 
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Results for Medical Devices Industry 
 Table 15 shows descriptive statistics and correlations for the medical devices 
industry.  I computed variance inflation factors to examine multicollinearity (Kennedy, 
2003). With the exception of the variance inflation factor of 15.4 for the control variable 
for firm size, all of the other variance inflation factors (mean: 4.3, max: 15.4) were well 
below the threshold of 10.  Since dropping the firm size variable from models altogether 
and including a different measure of firm size based on revenues yielded results 
consistent to the ones reported below, it does not, however, appear that multicollinearity 
is affecting the results. 
 Table 16 shows the first stage model that was used to predict the likelihood that a 
securities analyst would provide coverage for the focal firm. As discussed previously, this 
first stage model is similar to the model from study one with addition of two new 
variables that were expected to influence coverage, but not the favorability of 
recommendations. Model 1 from Table 16 shows that the variable for the number of 
firms in the firm’s industry listed on the same stock exchange exerts a positive and 
statistically significant effect on the likelihood that the analyst will cover the firm in the 
first stage model (β = 0.01, p < .001).  This suggests that one of these new, first stage 
selection variables contributed to the analyst’s coverage decision. 
 Table 17 shows the second stage model that includes the inverse mills ratio 
derived based on the first stage logit model reported above in Table 16. The inclusion of 
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the inverse mills ratio can cause the standard errors to be understated which can 
erroneously inflate the statistical significance of the coefficients and bootstrapping is one 
method to correct for this potential issue (Hamilton & Nickerson, 2003).  Models 1 
through 3 in Table 17 report the logit results without the bootstrap correction and Model 
4 reports the full model with the bootstrap corrected standard errors. 
 Proposition 7 predicted that when a firm explores more distant knowledge it will 
have a negative impact on the favorability of the analyst’s recommendation for the firm. 
Model 4 from Table 17 does not offer support for this proposition for the medical devices 
industry (β = 0.03, not significant). These findings do not support proposition 7 for the 
medical devices industry.   
 Proposition 8 predicted that when a firm’s approach to innovation emphasizes 
greater knowledge overlap between the firm and its rivals it will have a negative impact 
on the favorability of the analyst’s recommendation for the firm. Contrary to this 
prediction, Model 4 from Table 17 shows a positive, yet non-significant, coefficient for 
knowledge overlap (β = -2.26, not significant). These findings do not support proposition 
8 for the medical devices industry. 
 Proposition 9 and 10 predict contingency effects  that attenuate the relationship 
between the exploration of distant knowledge and the likelihood that the focal analyst 
will increase the favorability of the recommendation for the firm. Proposition 9 predicts 
that the greater the analyst’s experience, the less negative the effect that exploration of 
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distant knowledge will have on the favorability of the recommendation. Proposition 10 
predicts that the more extensively other firms covered by the analyst explore external 
knowledge, the less negative the effect that exploration of distant knowledge will have on 
the favorability of the recommendation Since neither the main effect of exploration of 
distant knowledge nor the contingency variables themselves had a statistically significant 
effect on the likelihood that the analyst will increase the favorability of the 
recommendation, the proposed contingencies are also not supported. Hence, I do not find 
any support for propositions 9 and 10 for the medical devices industry. 
 Some of the control variables had a significant effect on the securities analyst’s 
decision to increase the favorability of the recommendation for the focal medical devices 
firm.  In the medical devices industry, the average favorability of the recommendation 
that the firm received from securities analysts in the prior period had a positive influence 
on the likelihood that the firm would receive a more favorable recommendation from the 
focal analyst. 
 I turn next to the results from the computer hardware industry for study two. 
Results for Computer Hardware Industry 
 Table 18 shows descriptive statistics and correlations for the computer hardware 
industry. I computed variance inflation factors to examine multicollinearity and found 
that all of the variance inflation factors (mean: 3.3, max: 7.2) were well below the 
threshold of 10. 
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 Table 19 shows the first stage model that was used to predict the likelihood that a 
securities analyst would provide coverage for the focal firm. Model 1 from Table 19 
shows that both the new variable for the number of firms in the firm’s industry listed on 
the same stock exchange (β = 0.01, p < .001) and the new variable measuring whether the 
firm is headquartered in New York (β = 1.45, p < .001) had a positive and statistically 
significant effect on the likelihood that the analyst will cover the firm in the first stage 
model.  This suggests that these new, first stage selection variables contributed to the 
analyst’s coverage decision. 
 Table 20 shows the second stage models. The inclusion of the inverse mills ratio 
can cause the standard errors to be understated which can erroneously inflate the 
statistical significance of the coefficients and bootstrapping is one method to correct for 
this potential issue (Hamilton & Nickerson, 2003).  Models 1 through 3 in Table 20 
report the logit results without the bootstrap correction and Model 4 reports the full 
model with the bootstrap corrected standard errors. 
 Proposition 7 predicted that when a firm explores more distant knowledge it will 
have a negative impact on the favorability of the analyst’s recommendation for the firm. 
Model 4 from Table 20 does not offer support for this proposition for the computer 
hardware industry (β = -0.77, not significant). These findings do not support proposition 
7 for the computer hardware industry.   
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 Proposition 8 predicted that when a firm’s approach to innovation emphasizes 
greater knowledge overlap between the firm and its rivals it will have a negative impact 
on the favorability of the analyst’s recommendation for the firm. Contrary to this 
prediction, Model 4 from Table 20 shows a positive, yet non-significant, coefficient for 
knowledge overlap (β = 0.39, not significant). These findings do not offer support for 
proposition 8 for the computer hardware industry. 
 Proposition 9 and 10 predict contingency effects  that attenuate the relationship 
between the exploration of distant knowledge and the likelihood that the focal analyst 
will increase the favorability of the recommendation for the firm. Proposition 9 predicts 
that the greater the analyst’s experience, the less negative the effect that exploration of 
distant knowledge will have on the favorability of the recommendation. Proposition 10 
predicts that the more extensively other firms covered by the analyst explore external 
knowledge, the less negative the effect that exploration of distant knowledge will have on 
the favorability of the recommendation.  Since neither the main effect of distant 
knowledge nor the effects of the contingency variables themselves were statistically 
significant, the proposed contingencies are also not supported. Therefore, I also do not 
find any support for propositions 9 and 10 for the computer hardware industry. 
 Some of the control variables had a significant effect on the securities analyst’s 
decision to increase the favorability of the recommendation for the focal computer 
hardware firm.  In the computer hardware industry, the firm’s performance and the 
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average favorability of the recommendation that the firm received from securities 
analysts in the prior period had a positive influence on the likelihood that the firm would 
receive a more favorable recommendation from the focal analyst. 
 Finally, I proceed, in the next section, to report the results from the computer 
software industry for study two. 
Results for Computer Software Industry 
 Table 21 shows descriptive statistics and correlations for the computer software 
industry. I computed variance inflation factors to examine multicollinearity and found 
that all of the variance inflation factors (mean: 3.6, max: 7.1) were well below the 
threshold of 10 (Kennedy, 2003). 
 Table 22 shows the first stage logit model predicting the likelihood that the 
analyst will cover the firm. Model 1 from Table 22 shows that both the new variable for 
the number of firms in the firm’s industry listed on the same stock exchange (β = 0.0017, 
p < .001) and the new variable measuring whether the firm is headquartered in New York 
(β = -3.41, p < .001) had a statistically significant effect on the likelihood that the analyst 
will cover the firm in the first stage model.  This suggests that these new, first stage 
selection variables contributed to the analyst’s coverage decision. 
 Table 23 shows the second stage model. The inclusion of the inverse mills ratio 
may cause the standard errors to be understated which can erroneously inflate the 
statistical significance of the coefficients and bootstrapping is one method to correct for 
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this potential issue (Hamilton & Nickerson, 2003).  Models 1 through 3 in Table 23 
report the logit results without the bootstrap correction and Model 4 reports the full 
model with the bootstrap corrected standard errors. 
 Proposition 7 predicted that when a firm explores more distant knowledge it will 
have a negative impact on the favorability of the analyst’s recommendation for the firm. 
Model 4 from Table 23 does not offer support for this proposition for the computer 
software industry (β = 0.23, not significant). These findings do not support proposition 7 
for the computer software industry.   
 Proposition 8 predicted that when a firm’s approach to innovation emphasizes 
greater knowledge overlap between the firm and its rivals it will have a negative impact 
on the favorability of the analyst’s recommendation for the firm. Contrary to this 
prediction, Model 4 from Table 23 shows a negative,  non-significant, coefficient for 
knowledge overlap (β = -0.52, not significant). These results do not support proposition 8 
for the computer software industry. 
 Proposition 9 and 10 predict contingency effects  that attenuate the relationship 
between the exploration of distant knowledge and the likelihood that the focal analyst 
will increase the favorability of the recommendation for the firm. Proposition 9 predicts 
that the greater the analyst’s experience, the less negative the effect that exploration of 
distant knowledge will have on the favorability of the recommendation. Proposition 10 
predicts that the more extensively other firms covered by the analyst explore external 
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knowledge, the less negative the effect that exploration of distant knowledge will have on 
the favorability of the recommendation.  Since the main effect of exploration of distant 
knowledge did not exert a statistically significant effect on the likelihood that the analyst 
will increase the favorability of the recommendation, these related contingencies are also 
not supported. Therefore, I also do not find any support for propositions 9 and 10 for the 
computer software industry. 
 One of the control variables had a significant effect on the securities analyst’s 
decision to increase the favorability of the recommendation for the focal firm in the 
computer software industry.  The average favorability of the recommendation that the 
firm received from securities analysts in the prior period had a positive influence on the 
likelihood that the firm would receive a more favorable recommendation from the focal 
analyst.  
 In the final section of this chapter, I report the results for propositions 11 through 
15, which correspond to study three of the dissertation. As discussed earlier, this study 
relates to medical device firms only. 
ANALYSTS’ RECOMMENDATIONS AND INVESTMENT – STUDY 3 
 Table 24 summarizes the empirical findings for propositions 11 through 15. This 
table shows that all five propositions from this study received empirical support. The 
results in this section correspond to the medical devices industry. 
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 Table 25 reports descriptive statistics and correlations between the variables. I 
computed variance inflation factors to examine multicollinearity and found that all of the 
variance inflation factors (mean: 2.4, max: 5.4) were well below the threshold of 10.  
  Table 26 reports the logistic estimates of influences on the investor’s hazard of 
increasing the investment in the focal firm.  Proposition 11 predicted that the hazard that 
the investor will increase ownership in the focal firm increases the greater the 
disagreement among securities analysts’ recommendations about the focal firm. Even 
after controlling for the favorability of securities analysts’ recommendations, I find that 
the coefficient on ‘Standard deviation of securities analysts’ recommendations’ is 
positive and statistically significant (β = 0.26, p < .001), showing that the greater the 
disagreement among securities analysts’ recommendations (i.e., the lower the level of 
consensus), the greater the hazard that the focal investor will increase ownership in the 
focal firm. These findings strongly support proposition 11.   
 Propositions 12 through 15 involve moderating variables that exacerbate the main 
relationship between lack of consensus and increased investment. Propositions 13 and 14 
deal with contingencies related to the focal investor. Propositions 14 and 15 deal with 
contingencies related to the focal firm’s innovation strategy. In support of these 
propositions, the four graphs in Figures 13 through 16 suggest differences in the slope for 
high investor’s industry experience, time horizon, firm’s innovation scope and firm’s 
ability to commercialize innovations, lending support for these contingent effects.  
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 For each of the four contingencies, I also conducted a split sample econometric 
test.  Proposition 12 predicts that the focal investor’s industry experience will exacerbate 
the positive influence of disagreement among securities analysts’ recommendations on 
the likelihood that the focal investor will increase ownership in the focal firm. To find 
support for this proposition requires that the split sample econometric test shows that the 
marginal effect of analyst disagreement on investment is significantly more positive for 
high levels of investor industry experience than it is for low levels of investor industry 
experience. Results of models 1 and 2 in Table 27 show that high levels of investor’s 
industry experience made investors more likely to buy shares in the firm when analysts 
disagreed (t = 4,700; p < .001).  Accordingly, the split sample econometric test offers 
support for proposition 12. 
 Proposition 13 predicts that the focal investor’s time horizon will exacerbate the 
positive influence of disagreement among securities analysts’ recommendations on the 
likelihood that the focal investor will increase ownership in the focal firm.  To find 
support for this proposition requires that the split sample econometric test shows that the 
marginal effect of analyst disagreement on investment is significantly more positive for 
high levels of investor time horizon than it is for low levels of investor time horizon. 
Results of models 1 and 2 in Table 28 show that high levels of investor’s time horizon 
made investors more likely to buy shares in the firm when analysts disagreed (t = 1,000; 
p < .001). This test supports proposition 13. 
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 Proposition 14 predicts that the scope of the firm’s innovation portfolio will 
increase the positive effect of disagreement among securities analysts’ recommendations 
on the likelihood that the focal investor will increase ownership in the focal firm.  To find 
support for this proposition requires that the split sample econometric test shows that the 
marginal effect of analyst disagreement on investment is significantly more positive 
when the focal firm’s innovation scope is high than when the focal firm’s innovation 
scope is low. Results of models 1 and 2 in Table 29 show that high levels of innovation 
scope increased the likelihood that investors would buy shares in the firm when analysts 
disagreed (t = 3,200; p < .001). This test offers support for proposition 14. 
 Finally, proposition 15 predicts that the firm’s ability to commercialize 
innovations will exacerbate the positive influence of disagreement among securities 
analysts’ recommendations on the likelihood that the focal investor will increase 
ownership in the focal firm.  To find support for this proposition requires that the split 
sample econometric test shows that the marginal effect of analyst disagreement on 
investment is significantly more positive when the focal firm’s ability to commercialize 
innovations is high than when this ability is low. Consistent with this predictions, results 
of models 1 and 2 in Table 30 show that high ability to commercialize innovations 
increased the likelihood that investors would buy shares in the firm when analysts 
disagreed (t = 3,400; p < .001). Therefore, proposition 15 is also supported. 
98 
 
 Therefore, the results of the graphical analysis for study 3 are fully corroborated 
by the split sample econometric tests shown in Tables 27 through 30.  
 Many of the control variables had a significant effect on the focal investor’s 
decision to increase her stake in the focal firm.  Consistent with prior studies (e.g., 
Womack, 1996), the average favorability of securities analysts’ recommendations for the 
focal firm increased the likelihood that the focal investor bought additional shares in the 
focal firm. Firm size, average share price, the firm’s share of products in its product 
categories, its average product age, R&D spending and ability to commercialize 
innovations all positively contributed to the likelihood that the focal investor increased 
ownership in the firm. Additionally, investor-specific controls related to the focal 
investor’s experience, size of portfolio, level of diversification and prior investment in the 
focal firm also positively influenced the decision to increase ownership in the focal firm. 
All three of the macroeconomic controls were also significant, with inflation and the risk-
free rate increasing the hazard of increased investment and the index level of US-based 
equities decreasing the hazard of increased investment.  Finally, the focal firm’s annual 







Chapter 8: Sensitivity Analyses and Robustness Checks 
 I have conducted various sensitivity analyses to explore the robustness of the 
empirical findings for the main hypothesized effects across each of the three studies.  In 
the subsections below, corresponding to the three studies of the dissertation, I describe 
the supplemental analyses that I have conducted to increase confidence in the initial 
findings for studies one and three and to probe the non-findings for study two. 
APPROACH TO INNOVATION AND ANALYSTS’ COVERAGE – STUDY 1 
Robustness to Alternative Sampling Frames 
 A potential concern may be that the results discussed above for study one are 
specific to the selection of analysts and firms included in the sampling frame. By 
including any analyst employed by a brokerage house that has previously provided 
coverage for any firm in the three industries it is possible that the sampling procedure is 
including analysts who are dedicated to other industries and who, therefore, may never 
realistically even consider covering a firm in the medical devices or computer industries.  
The inclusion of these analysts who are not active in the focal industries may be 
problematic as it may inflate the number of zeros in the sample, which can bias estimates. 
To help account for this possibility, I ran additional models on a reduced sample of 
analysts who had themselves previously covered one the three industries under 
consideration. This alternative sampling procedure reduced the number of analysts from 
more than 2,500 to less than 100 across each of the three industries (computer hardware, 
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computer software and medical devices). Model 1 in Table 31 shows consistent results 
for propositions 1 through 3 for the medical devices industry. Model 2 in Table 31 shows 
support for propositions 2 and 3 for the computer hardware industry, but not for 
proposition 1. Finally, for the computer software industry, model 3 from Table 31 only 
supports proposition 1. Overall, these models based on the alternative sampling frame for 
analysts support the majority of the main propositions for study one. 
 As mentioned above, another potential issue with the sampling approach 
employed in the dissertation relates to the choice of firms included in the three industries. 
While the computer software industry is mostly comprised of firms in the 7372 SIC code 
(e.g., Lavie, 2007), the computer hardware and medical devices industries span multiple 
SIC codes and have been constructed using a variety of different groups of SIC codes in 
prior studies (e.g., Henderson, Miller & Hambrick, 2006; Iyengar & Zampelli, 2009).  To 
help account for the possibility that the results may be influenced by the specific set of 
SIC codes that I have selected to include, I have constructed alternate industry groupings 
for the medical devices and computer hardware industries.  
 For the medical devices industry, I expanded the industry scope from the 3841 
and 3842 SIC codes that were included in the main analysis to also include firms in the 
3443, 3844 and 3845 SIC codes (Kor, 2003; 2006).  This alternative sampling procedure 
roughly doubled the number of medical devices firms from about 50 to more than 100.   
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Model 1 in Table 32 shows robust results when using this more expansive industry 
definition of the medical devices industry.   
 For the computer hardware industry, I reduced the number of SIC codes from 
3570 through 3579 to consider a more narrow industry scope, based on SIC 3570 through 
3572 (Henderson, Miller & Hambrick 2006).  This alternative sampling procedure 
reduced the number of computer hardware firms from about 70 to about 20. Model 2 in 
Table 32 shows consistent results when considering this narrower definition of the 
computer hardware industry.  
Robustness to Alternative Measures 
 In addition to the efforts taken to examine whether the results in study one are 
robust to different sampling approaches, it is also important to understand whether these 
results are robust to an alternative measure of the key independent variable for 
knowledge distance.  As mentioned previously, prior studies have used different 
measures of exploration of distant knowledge (e.g., Sorenson & Stuart, 2000; Rosenkopf 
& Nerkar, 2001; Benner & Tushman, 2002; Katila & Ahuja, 2002).  In conjunction with 
the reported measure based on repeat citations as a percentage of total citations, I also 
report below a logit model that uses a different measure based on the firm’s citation of 
internal knowledge (i.e., cites to the focal firm’s own patents) divided by total citations. 
Models 1, 2 and 3 in Table 33 show the full logit model for the medical devices, 
computer hardware and computer software industries using this alternative measure of 
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knowledge distance.  Although model 2 in Table 33 shows robust results to this 
alternative measure of knowledge distance for the computer hardware industry (β = -2.43, 
P < .001), the results shown in models 1 and 3 for the medical devices and computer 
software industry are not robust to this different measure of knowledge distance. 
Robustness to Alternative Model Specifications 
 There is also the possibility that the results for study one are somehow influenced 
by the model specification that I have selected. Consequently, it is important to explore 
whether alternative model specifications will produce consistent findings. Toward this 
end, Tables 34, 35 and 36 report three additional model specifications for each of the 
medical devices, computer hardware and computer software industries.  Given the low 
frequency with which analysts cover firms in the sample (i.e., less than 1%), it is 
appropriate to test robustness to model specifications for rare or low frequency events. 
With this goal in mind, I have run models identical to the ones reported above based on 
complementary log-log (Allison, 1995; Long, 1997) and rare events logistic regression 
(King & Zeng, 1999).   
 It is also a possibility that unobserved differences across analysts may somehow 
relate in a systematic fashion to the firm’s approach to innovation and the analysts 
decision to provide or withhold coverage to the focal firm.  To help mitigate this concern, 
I also report robustness to a logit model with analyst fixed effects, which captures time 
invariant heterogeneity across analysts.  In Tables 34, 35 and 36 below, model 1 is 
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complementary log-log (cloglog), model 2 is rare events logit (relogit) and model 3 is 
fixed effects logit. 
 Table 34 reports complementary log-log, rare events logit and analyst fixed 
effects models for the medical devices industry. For the medical devices industry these 
alternative model specifications produced fully consistent results in support of 
propositions 1, 2 and 3. 
 Table 35 reports these same models for the computer hardware industry. For the 
computer hardware industry these alternative model specifications produced consistent 
results in support of propositions 2 and 3. 
 Finally, Table 36 reports these models for the computer software industry. In 
comparison to the main logit model reported above, the cloglog model (model 1) and the 
relogit models (model 2) generated comparable results in support of propositions 1 and 2. 
The fixed effects model (model 3) only offered support for proposition 1.  On balance, 
the robustness tests to alternative model specifications produced results that were 
consistent with the main logit models for the computer software industry. 
 Now that I have discussed the robustness tests for study one, I turn next to 
consider the results for study two. 
APPROACH TO INNOVATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS – STUDY 2 
 In the previous section I conducted sensitivity analyses to assess the robustness of 
the empirical findings reported for study one. In contrast, this current section uses 
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sensitivity analyses to probe the lack of empirical findings for study two. Specifically, I 
examine whether the failure to find empirical support for propositions 7 though 10 may 
somehow be influenced by the sample, measures or model specification that I used in the 
main analysis reported in the results section above. Since the bootstrap corrections in the 
report models were not significantly different from the uncorrected models, I did not 
bootstrap correct the standard errors in the robustness tests reported below. 
Robustness to Alternative Sampling Frames 
 As a first step, I consider whether the manner in which I constructed the industry 
groupings for the medical devices and computer hardware industries contributed to the 
absence of results. Table 37 shows logit models based on different industry definitions 
for the medical devices (model 1) and the computer hardware industries (model 2). 
Analogous to the  approach described above for study one, I have expanded the number 
of medical devices firms to included SIC 3841 through 3845 and have reduced the 
number of computer hardware firms to only include SIC 3570 through 3572.  As models 
1 and 2 in Table 37 show, the coefficients for knowledge distance and knowledge overlap 
continue to be statistically insignificant when using these alternative industry definitions.   
Robustness to Alternative Measures 
 It is also important to consider whether the lack of empirical support for study two 
may be related to the measures that were selected. Consequently, I have run a robustness 
test using a different measure of exploration based on the focal firm’s self-citations 
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divided by its total citations made during the previous 5 years (Sorenson & Stuart, 2000; 
Rosenkopf & Nerkar, 2001). 
 Table 38 reports the full models for each of the three industries based on this 
alternative measure. Models 2 and 3, corresponding to the computer software and the 
computer hardware industries, continue to show non-significant coefficients for 
knowledge distance and knowledge overlap when using the alternate measure of distance.  
Similarly, Model 1 from Table 38, which shows a logit model for the medical devices 
industry with an alternate measure of knowledge distance, also continues to find no 
support for knowledge distance (proposition 7), while showing significant results for 
knowledge overlap in proposition 8 (β = -2.15, P < .05). Overall, the continued lack of 
support for the main propositions in study two when employing this alternative measure 
of knowledge distance suggests that the lack of empirical support for study two is not 
merely due to the measures that I have chosen. 
Robustness to Alternative Model Specifications  
 It may also be the case that the estimation procedure or the choice of a 
dichotomous dependent variable may contribute to the lack of findings in study two.  To 
help rule out these possibilities I have run an alternative regression model with a 
continuous version of the dependent variable based on the average recommendation that 
the focal firm received from the securities analyst.  Analysts’ recommendations are 
reported on a scale from “1 – Stong Buy” to “5 – Sell”. Therefore, higher values of this 
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alternative dependent variable reflect less favorable recommendations. Model 1 from 
Tables 39, 40 and 41 shows the results of this regression model for the medical devices, 
computer hardware and computer software industries respectively. 
 In these same tables I also report robustness to a firm fixed-effects logit model 
based on the dichotomous version of the dependent variable.  Including fixed effects at 
the level of the firm should help to reduce the potential concern that I am not finding 
results due to a failure to control for time invariant heterogeneity across firms.  Model 2 
from Tables 39, 40 and 41 shows the results of this fixed effects logit for the medical 
devices, computer hardware and computer software industries respectively. 
 Model 1 from Tables 39, which reports a regression model based on a continuous 
version of dependent variable, shows results consistent with the ones reported above. The 
fact that coefficients on knowledge distance and knowledge overlap continue to be non-
significant using this alternative specification helps to further increase confidence in the 
insignificance of the reported results.  The firm fixed-effects logit models, which help 
capture potential time invariant heterogeneity across firms, also points to a lack of 
significance in the coefficients for knowledge distance and knowledge overlap. Hence, 
model 2 from Tables 39 shows consistently non-significant findings for the medical 
devices industry.   
 Model 1 from Tables 40, which reports a regression model based on a continuous 
version of dependent variable for the computer hardware industry, continues to show 
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insignificant results for this industry.  The firm fixed-effects logit model reported in 
model 2 from Table 40, however, does offer support for proposition 7 (β = -3.97, P < 
.01), while still failing to offer support for proposition 8.   
 Turning to the results of the computer software industry, model 1 from Table 41 
reports a regression model based on a continuous version of dependent variable. While 
the coefficient for knowledge distance in proposition 7 remains insignificant, the 
coefficient for knowledge overlap in proposition 8 (β = 0.52, P < .05) becomes significant 
in the hypothesized direction in this regression model.  I also ran a firm fixed-effects logit 
model to help capture potential time invariant heterogeneity across firms that may affect 
the results. The lack of significance in the coefficients for knowledge distance and 
knowledge overlap in model 2 from Table 41 corroborates the lack of findings of the 
main logit models reported above.    
 In conjunction with the other robustness tests that I discuss above, I also explored 
the possibility that the failure to find empirical support may somehow result from a 
misspecification of the original theoretical model.  For all three industries, the models 
reported in Tables 17, 20, and 23 show that the control variable for the average analyst 
recommendation had a significant influence on the likelihood that the focal analyst would 
increase the favorability of the recommendation for the focal firm.  Since it is possible 
that the inclusion of this highly significant control variable could be masking the 
influence of knowledge distance and knowledge overlap on the likelihood that the analyst 
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will increase the favorability of the firm’s recommendations, I ran models excluding the 
control for the average favorability of analysts’ recommendations. The main effects of 
knowledge distance and knowledge overlap, however, continued to be insignificant even 
when dropping this control variable from the models.  This additional step reduces the 
possibility that the failure to find empirical support is being driven by the model 
specification.   Overall, the results of the multiple robustness and sensitivity tests 
conducted in this section corroborate the lack of findings for propositions 7 through 10.  
In the next section I explore the robustness of the results reported in study three. 
ANALYSTS’ RECOMMENDATIONS AND INVESTMENT – STUDY 3 
Robustness to Alternative Model Specifications 
 In addition to the logit model upon which the results of study three were based, I 
have also run sensitivity analyses to alternative model specifications.  Table 42 robusts 
robustness to complementary log-log (model 1), rare events logit (model 2) and firm 
fixed effects logit models (model 3). This table shows that the predicted relationship 
between analyst disagreement and investment is fully robust across these different model 
specifications. 
Robustness to Alternative Dependent Variables 
 Study three examines the influence of analyst disagreement on the likelihood that 
an investor will either buy shares in the firm for the first time or will increase the number 
of shares that she already holds in the focal firm. While the shares that investors purchase 
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may in some cases coincide with new equity issued by the focal firm, in other cases 
investors may simply purchase shares that are sold by other investors. Thus, a potential 
concern is that disagreement may predict both sales and purchases of the focal firm’s 
shares by investors.   
 I have taken various steps to address this potential concern.  I ran models with 
other variations of the dependent variable.  For example, I considered whether analyst 
disagreement would increase the likelihood that a firm could attract new investors that 
did not already own shares in the firm. I also considered whether analyst disagreement 
would increase the likelihood that a firm could attract new investment from existing 
investors who already held shares in the firm.  Models 1 and 2 in Table 43 show that the 
positive relationship between analyst disagreement and the firm’s ability to attract 
investment remained robust to these alternative measures of the dependent variable based 
respectively on new and existing investors.    
 I also ran an identical model to the ones reported predicting the likelihood that the 
focal investor will sell her shares in the focal firm in response to securities analyst 
disagreement. See model 1 in Table 44. Not only did analyst disagreement not 
significantly predict the likelihood that an investor would sell shares in the focal firm, but 
the sign of the coefficient in this model changed from positive to negative.  The results of 
this supplementary analysis helps to mitigate the potential concern identified above by 
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providing some evidence that sales and purchases do not respond identically to 
disagreement among securities analysts’ recommendations.  
 Taken together, these robustness tests help to assuage potential concerns that the 
reported findings for study three are merely an artifact of the model specification or the 
dependent variable that I selected for the analysis.  Having discussed the different 
sensitivity analyses and tests to examine the robustness of the findings across three 
studies of the dissertation, I now turn to the final chapter of the dissertation where I 















Chapter 9: Discussion and Conclusions 
 Strategy research highlights the innovative benefits that can accrue to firms that 
rely on an approach to innovation based on the use of diverse, distant, and distinctive 
knowledge. However, after firms have created innovations their ability to capture value 
from them often depends on the evaluations of outside parties.  This dissertation explores 
the influence that an approach to innovation based on diverse, distant, and distinctive 
knowledge has on evaluations in financial markets. It also examines how disagreement 
among evaluations subsequently influences firms’ ability to attract resources in financial 
markets.  Table 45 summarizes the empirical findings across the three studies in the 
dissertation.  Overall, this table shows that nine of the fifteen propositions across the 
three studies were supported.   
 Before considering the potential theoretical contributions that the dissertation 
offers to the literature on innovation and expert evaluations, it is important to briefly 
discuss the empirical findings. It is especially important to consider some possible 
reasons why some of the propositions in studies one and two were not supported. 
DISCUSSION 
 Even though nine of the fifteen propositions were empirically supported, it is still 
important to consider potential reasons why I did not find support for six propositions 
across the first two studies of the dissertation. As mentioned above, four of the six 
propositions for study one were empirically supported.  Furthermore, most of these 
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propositions that received support were robust when considering alternative sampling 
approaches for analysts and firms and when employing different model specifications. It 
is nonetheless worthwhile to consider some possible reasons why the contingent effects 
in propositions 4 and 5 were not supported and why the coefficients had a significant 
effect in the opposite direction.   
 Proposition 4 predicted that when there is more knowledge overlap between the 
analyst and the firm, exploration of distant knowledge will have a less negative influence 
on the likelihood that a securities analyst will cover the firm because analysts are more 
familiar with the distant knowledge upon which the firm is building. However, contrary 
to this prediction, I found that greater knowledge overlap between the firm and the 
analyst had the opposite effect by making the analyst even less likely to provide coverage 
for firms that engage in exploration.   
 One possible explanation for this finding may be that exploration diminishes the 
value of analysts’ own knowledge base more when there is greater knowledge overlap 
between the analyst and the firm.  It is possible that covering firms that engage in 
exploration of distant knowledge may simultaneously prevent securities analysts from 
fully utilizing their knowledge overlap with the firm, while also requiring them to invest 
additional time and resources developing an understanding of the more distant knowledge 
upon which the firm is building. For both of these reasons, analysts may be less willing to 
cover firms that engage in exploration when their knowledge overlaps with that of the 
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firm since it requires greater effort on their part while simultaneously making them less 
able to utilize the knowledge that they already possess.   
 Another possible explanation for these findings is that greater knowledge overlap 
may increase securities analysts’ awareness of the potential risks that exploration entails 
(March, 1991).  This might also help explain why analysts with greater knowledge 
overlap with the focal firm are less likely to provide coverage for the firm when it 
engages in exploration. 
 Proposition 5 predicted that the greater the innovation intensity of the firm’s 
industry, the more that exploration of distant knowledge will decrease the likelihood that 
a securities analyst will cover the firm.  In opposition to this prediction, the results 
suggest that greater innovation intensity made securities analysts even more likely to 
provide coverage to a firm that engaged in exploration.  An explanation for this finding 
may relate to the fact that the desirability and value associated with exploration can 
depend on characteristics of the environment in which firms operate. Since exploration 
can be especially valuable in dynamic, innovation-intensive contexts (Uotila et al., 2009),  
analysts may be more inclined to provide coverage to firms that engage in exploration 
when these firms operate in a high innovation-intensity environment where exploration is 
most likely to pay off.  Therefore, under these circumstances, the benefits associated with 
being an analyst who is covering a more profitable firm could offset the risks associated 
with not being as able to accurately evaluate the firm engaged in exploration.  If this 
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conjecture is correct, this would help to explain why an analyst is more likely to provide 
coverage to a firm engaged in exploration when the innovation-intensity of the industry is 
high.   
 I shift next to discussing the lack of results for study two. As discussed 
previously, all four of the propositions relating a firm’s approach to innovation and the 
favorability of securities analysts’ recommendations were not supported in the medical 
devices, computer hardware and software industries.  Furthermore, these findings 
remained non-significant even when considering a different sampling frame, a different 
measure of one of the key independent variables and when using several alternative 
model specifications.  Although the lack of results may not be very informative when 
viewed in isolation, some potential lessons may emerge when these findings are viewed 
in combination with the results of study one.  
 In particular, the fact that securities analysts responded to the firm’s approach to 
innovation when making coverage decisions, but not when making recommendations 
may help us to better understand how analysts evaluate innovation. One possible reason 
that securities analysts may attend to these aspects of a firm’s approach to innovation 
when making coverage decisions, but not when making recommendations, may be due to 
the fact that analysts have better access to information about firms that they are already 
covering.  Prior literature suggests that securities analysts sometimes obtain the 
information that they use for evaluations directly from firms’ managers (Baldwin & Rice, 
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1997).  Perhaps, the personal relationships that securities analysts covering a firm 
develop with managers enable them to obtain richer internal information that reduces the 
need to interpret external signals related to the firm’s approach to innovation.   If this 
conjecture is correct, it may help to explain why securities analysts respond to external 
information about the firm’s approach to innovation prior to covering a firm, but not after 
they are already covering the firm.   
 Another possibility is that the type of external information that securities analysts 
pay attention to and use to make recommendations may change after they begin covering 
a firm.  For example, it is possible that analysts may pay attention to a firm’s knowledge 
distance and knowledge overlap when they are trying to generally determine how 
successful they will be evaluating a firm if they decide to cover it. However, once 
analysts are already covering a firm, they may require finer-grained information about the 
firm’s approach to innovation in order to develop accurate buy/sell recommendations.  
Thus, rather than broadly considering exploration or knowledge overlap when developing 
their recommendations, analysts already covering a firm may, for example, consider ways 
in which the firm balances exploration and exploitation (Benner & Choi, 2011) or other 
aspects of R&D that more fully comprehend the different costs and benefits trade-offs 
associated with  innovation.  In this section I have considered some possible reasons for 
the lack of empirical support for propositions across studies one and two. In the final 
sections, I discuss the theoretical contributions, potential limitations and conclusion. 
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THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTIONS  
Innovation and Strategic Management 
 The dissertation makes contributions to the strategic management literature by 
drawing attention to a trade-off that a company may face when attempting to develop 
competitive advantage based on innovation. Somewhat paradoxically, it suggests that an 
approach to innovation based on the use of diverse, distant, and distinctive knowledge 
that is beneficial to a firm’s efforts to develop knowledge-based resources may actually 
hinder its efforts to win the favorable evaluations needed to attract critical inputs from 
outside parties.  
 An additional contribution of this research is to further understanding of the role 
that financial intermediaries may play in the evolution of technology.  Prior literature 
suggests that firms often favor the use of existing knowledge because of the inertia that 
results from the persistence of internal routines (Nelson & Winter, 1982; Helfat, 1994).  
In addition to these internal pressures related to firms’ own routines, other studies show 
that firms may also face external pressures to avoid developing knowledge in new 
technological areas that emanate from their customers (Christensen & Bower, 1996). This 
current study adds to an emerging stream of literature about the influence of financial 
intermediaries on innovation (e.g., Benner, 2010; Benner & Ranganathan, 2012). By 
showing that securities analysts are less likely to provide coverage for firms that build on 
more diverse, distant or distinctive knowledge, this study may help to advance 
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understanding of the role that financial markets can play as a selection environment for a 
firm’s innovations. 
 Finally, the theory about how analysts’ assessments influence firms’ ability to 
attract investors developed in study three also has potential implications for the strategy 
literature. Importantly, I highlight the role that investor and firm heterogeneity exert on 
the influence of securities analysts’ recommendations and show that the firm’s innovation 
strategy is an important factor that can be used in conjunction with securities analysts’ 
recommendations to attract investors.  In particular, this study draws attention to the 
relevance of internal innovation to external value assessments in selection environments. 
Recently, scholars have called for additional studies to understand how firms can 
influence the amount of value that is assigned to their resources (e.g., Lepak, Smith & 
Taylor, 2007; Sirmon, Hitt & Ireland, 2007). This current research suggests that firms’ 
innovation strategy may be one tool that firms can use to influence how much value 
outside parties assign to their resources.  
Expert Evaluations and Financial Intermediaries  
 The dissertation also attempts to contribute to the management literature on 
financial intermediaries.   Extant management literature is largely divided between 
studies that examine the consequences of being covered by securities analysts 
(Zuckerman, 1999; Pollock & Gulati, 2007) and other studies that explore the different 
strategies that firms can use to garner favorable evaluations from securities analysts who 
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are already providing coverage to the firm (e.g., Westphal & Clement, 2008). By 
focusing on these consequences of analyst coverage, these prior studies have largely 
overlooked the role that firm strategy plays in the decision of securities analysts to 
provide coverage in the first place.   Consequently, an important contribution of this 
current study is to illuminate how a firm’s innovation strategy can influence its ability to 
attract analyst coverage. 
 The dissertation also offers insights regarding the role of uncertainty in 
competitive contexts. Prior research has primarily emphasized the challenges that 
uncertainty creates for firms (e.g., Podolny, 1994; Beckman, Haunschild & Phillips, 
2004) and suggests the important role that intermediaries play in mitigating uncertainty 
(e.g., Rao, 1994; Rindova et al., 2005). This current research shows that markets are not 
fully intermediated and that residual uncertainty among experts in financial markets may 
sometimes be beneficial to firms’ efforts to attract critical external resources.  Moreover, 
it also highlights potential trade-offs associated with using consensus to interact with 
outside parties. By broadening the focus of research from firms’ competition with rivals 
for favorable evaluations to also consider external competition in selection environments 
among investors, the dissertation illuminates a potential downside of using consensus to 
attract external resources.  
 Finally, this research may also extend the literature on financial intermediaries by 
showing that the expert advice of intermediaries may be subject to greater scrutiny than 
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previously assumed. Prior literature has found that securities analysts’ evaluations can 
lead investors to discount the value of firms’ shares (e.g., Zuckerman, 1999; Benner, 
2007), whereas this dissertation suggests that too much consensus among analysts’ 
recommendations may sometimes also cause investors to discount the expert advice of 
securities analysts.   
LIMITATIONS 
 It is important to acknowledge some potential limitations associated with this 
research. The first three limitations discussed below are especially relevant to studies one 
and two.  These first two studies examine how securities analysts respond to medical 
devices and computer firms’ approach to innovation. Since the medical devices and 
computer hardware and software industries are highly innovation-driven contexts that are 
subject to technological change, it is possible that these results may not fully generalize 
to less innovative industry contexts where firms are less subject to technological change 
and uncertainty. Consequently, it is possible that theory developed in this study is most 
applicable to other innovation-intensive industries (e.g., semiconductor, chemicals, 
robotics, pharmaceuticals, etc.), that are similar to the ones examined.   
 Second, because the dissertation focuses on the effect of a firm’s approach to 
innovation on analysts’ evaluations and the fact that securities analysts typically only 
provide coverage and recommendations for publically-traded firms, the theory is tested 
based on publically traded companies for which data are available in COMPUSTAT.  
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Since it is possible that smaller firms or privately held firms may differ from the ones that 
I have studied, caution should be exercised when generalizing this theory to different 
types of companies.  
 Finally, the fact that the dissertation assesses a firm’s approach to innovation 
using patent data means that this current research shares the same limitations as all of the 
other studies that assess innovation via the patent records (e.g., Rosenkopf & Nerkar, 
2001; Ahuja & Katila, 2004).  For example, it is possible that a firm’s approach to 
innovation may not be fully reflected in its patenting activities.  In spite of the potential 
limitations associated with the use of patents, prior researchers have argued that patents 
can provide a valid measure of firms’ innovative activity (e.g., Podolny & Stuart, 1995; 
Benner & Tushman, 2002). Although it cannot entirely be ruled out that the firm’s 
approach to innovation may not be reflected in its patenting activity, the fact that firms in 
the medical devices and computer industries frequently file patents to protect their 
innovations (Levin et al., 1987) should help to partially assuage this concern since these 
firms have strong incentives to file patents. 
 It is also important to consider potential limitations associated with study three.  
As mentioned previously, this section of the dissertation uses data on large, institutional 
investors to assess the likelihood that an investor will buy additional shares in response to 
disagreement among securities analysts. Since professional institutional investors control 
portfolios valued in the hundreds of millions of dollars, they are likely to be more 
121 
 
knowledgeable and have greater resources to analyze investments than investors with 
smaller portfolios. Hence, it is possible that the theory developed in study 3 may not fully 
generalize across all classes of investors.  In spite of this potential limitation, the fact that 
institutional investors hold the majority of U.S. equity (Hoskisson et al., 2002) and that 
significant heterogeneity exists across different types of institutional investors (Bushee, 
1998) suggests that this theory may generalize to many different types of U.S. equity 
investors. 
 Another potential limitation of study 3 pertains to the use of the medical devices 
industry as the empirical context. Since medical devices firms are subject to 
governmental regulation from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) (Birbaum, 
1985), it is possible that FDA regulators may help to reduce the uncertainty that securities 
analysts and investors face when evaluating firms. Since the level of disagreement among 
securities analysts and the extent to which investors depend on securities analysts’ 
evaluations may be influenced by the regulated nature of this industry context, it is 
important to entertain the possibility that the theory developed in study three may not 
fully generalize across industry contexts, especially to industries that are not subject to 
external oversight or governmental regulation. 






 This dissertation illuminates important trade-offs that firms may face when 
attempting to develop competitive advantage based on innovation. Contrary to the 
benefits that prior studies associate with the use of diverse, distant, and distinctive 
knowledge to firms’ efforts to create valuable resources (e.g., Rosenkopf & Nerkar, 2001; 
Ahuja & Katila, 2004), this dissertation shows that these aspects of firms’ approach to 
innovation may entail costs related to greater difficulty gaining analyst coverage.  
 Furthermore, this dissertation also shows that too much consensus among 
analysts’ recommendations may sometimes make it more difficult for firms to attract 
financial resources from investors. In doing so, this research challenges prevailing views 
on how firms interact with financial intermediaries.  While many prior management 
studies suggest that the evaluations of financial intermediaries help to mitigate the 
uncertainty that outside parties face (e.g., Rao & Sivakumar, 1999; Beunza & Garud, 
2007), this dissertation shows that these intermediaries may sometimes avoid evaluating 
the firms that are pursuing an approach to innovation that is most likely to create value 
for investors. Moreover, this research suggests that financial markets are not always fully 
intermediated by securities analysts. This lack of intermediation results both from 
securities analysts not providing coverage to all firms and from the disagreement that can 
exist across the recommendations that different securities analysts make for the firms that 
they do cover. This research shows that opportunities for investors may arise precisely 
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when financial markets are not perfectly intermediated. Specifically, the dissertation 
suggests that the uncertainty implied by disagreement among analysts may be an 
important signal of opportunities that investors consider in addition to the favorability of 
securities analysts’ recommendations.   
 Overall, this dissertation highlights the importance of innovation to firms’ efforts 
to attract evaluations and financial resources from outside parties by showing that 
innovation may not only be relevant to firms’ efforts to attract the coverage of securities 
analysts, but that it may also be an important factor that shareholders use in conjunction 
with analysts’ recommendations to make investment decisions. I hope that this research 
contributes to a more complete understanding of the role that expert evaluations play in 












Figures and Tables 
Figure 1- Approach to Innovation and Analysts’ Coverage 
 








































Summary of Empirical Findings - Study 1 
Propositions 1 -6
Medical Computer Computer 
Devices Hardware Software
Proposition 1 (P1):  The greater the 
firm's knowledge diversity, the lower the 
likelihood that a securities analyst will 
cover the firm. Yes No Yes Partially Supported
Proposition 2 (P2):  The more 
extensively the firm explores distant 
knowledge, the lower the likelihood that 
a securities analyst will cover the firm. Yes Yes Yes Supported
Proposition 3 (P3):  The greater the 
knowledge overlap between the firm 
and its industry rivals, the greater the 
likelihood that a securities analyst will 
cover the firm. Yes Yes No Partially Supported
Proposition 4 (P4):  The greater the 
knowledge overlap between the analyst 
and the firm, the less negative the effect 
that exploration of distant knowledge 
will have on the likelihood an analyst will 
cover the firm. No No No Not Supported
Proposition 5 (P5):  The greater the 
innovation intensity of the firm’s industry,  
the more negative the effect that 
exploration of distant knowledge will 
have on  the likelihood an analyst will 
cover the firm. No No No Not Supported
Proposition 6 (P6):  The greater the 
innovation intensity of the firm's industry, 
the less positive the effect of knowledge 
overlap between the firm and its industry 
rivals on the likelihood an analyst will 






Descriptive Statistics For Medical Devices - Study 1
Medical Devices Industry (SIC 3841-3842)
Variable Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1 Analysts Coverage 0.001 0.03
2 Knowledge Diversity 5.06 6.97 0.00
3 Knowledge Distance 0.55 0.22 0.00 -0.19
4 Knowledge Overlap 0.25 0.19 0.01 -0.31 0.44
5 Firm Performance 57.01 141.76 0.02 0.49 -0.01 0.06
6 Firm Size 0.93 0.93 0.01 0.72 -0.05 -0.18 0.68
7 Number of Analysts Covering the Industry 62.80 12.23 0.00 -0.02 0.04 0.11 0.05 -0.02
8 Firm's Yearly Number of Patents 5.97 15.53 0.01 0.59 -0.20 -0.20 0.31 0.55 -0.24
9 Firm's Technological Quality 5.06 2.33 0.01 0.57 -0.37 -0.26 0.47 0.69 -0.01 0.48
10 Firm's Geographic Scope 1.71 1.47 0.00 0.69 -0.13 -0.27 0.53 0.82 -0.01 0.48 0.63
11 Innovation intensity of firm’s industry 0.07 0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.11 0.10 -0.01 0.04 -0.10 0.04 0.10 0.00
12 Knowledge overlap between the analyst and the firm 0.17 0.31 0.06 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.05 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.03
13 Regulation FD (dummy) 0.57 0.50 0.01 0.00 0.08 0.18 0.18 0.05 0.55 -0.25 0.04 -0.01 -0.07 -0.05






Logit Estimates on Coverage For Medical Devices - Study 1
Estimates of Analyst's Hazard of Covering the Focal  Firm
Logit Logit Logit Logit
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Knowledge Diversity (H1 < 0) -0.05 *** -0.06 *** -0.04 ***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Knowledge Distance (H2 < 0) -1.00 *** -1.83 ***
(0.30) (0.36)
Knowledge Overlap (H3 > 0) 2.95 ***
(0.49)
Control Variables
Firm Performance 0.00 *** 0.00 *** 0.00 *** 0.00 **
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Firm Size 0.63 *** 0.62 *** 0.79 *** 0.60 ***
(0.13) (0.12) (0.14) (0.13)
Number of Analysts Covering the Industry 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Firm's Yearly Number of Patents 0.01 ** 0.01 *** 0.01 *** 0.01 ***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Firm's Technological Quality -0.01 0.01 -0.06 -0.02
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
Firm's Geographic Scope -0.30 *** -0.16 ** -0.17 ** -0.09
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Innovation intensity of firm’s industry 2.31 -2.86 -3.24 -7.66
(5.45) (5.79) (5.81) (5.90)
Knowledge overlap between the analyst and the firm 5.96 *** 5.87 *** 5.86 *** 5.80 ***
(0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.25)
Regulation FD (dummy) 0.53 0.46 0.39 0.49 ***
(0.28) (0.28) (0.30) (0.29)
Year Dummies Included Included Included Included
Constant -12.084 *** -11.773 *** -10.919 *** -11.089 ***
Number of Observations 773,684 773,684 773,684 773,684
Model log likelihood -4,795.89 -4,770.56 -4,758.80 -4,722.56
Wald X 2 1171.23 *** 1315.22 *** 1307.26 *** 1329.67 ***
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001
Standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed test for hypotheses and control variables. 
Medical Devices Industry





Econometric Test #1 For Medical Devices - Study 1
Split-Sample Logit Estimates of Influences on Firm's Ability to Attract Analyst Coverage
Model 1 Model 2
Firm-Analyst Overlap < Mean Firm-Analyst Overlap > Mean
Knowledge Distance -1.16 -2.17 ***
(0.72) (0.36)
 [Marginal effects] [-.0000972] [-.0042226]
t  = 4,500
p-value of t -test of difference in marginal effects ***
Knowledge Overlap 1.70 3.65 ***
(0.91) (0.85)
 [Marginal effects] [ .0001429] [.0071186]
Control Variables
Knowledge Diversity -0.05 -0.05 ***
(0.02) (0.01)
Firm Performance 0.00 *** 0.00 ***
(0.00) (0.00)
Firm Size -0.29 0.59 ***
(0.25) (0.12)
Number of Analysts Covering the Industry 0.07 * -0.04
(0.04) (0.05)
Firm's Yearly Number of Patents 0.02 *** 0.01 ***
(0.01) (0.00)
Firm's Technological Quality 0.05 -0.04
(0.09) (0.05)
Firm's Geographic Scope 0.04 -0.11 *
(0.08) (0.06)
Innovation intensity of firm’s industry 16.45 -5.00
(12.22) (6.10)
Regulation FD (dummy) -3.49 *** 0.89
(0.96) (0.27)
Year Dummies Included Included
Constant -13.670 *** -6.013 ***
Number of Observations 552,208 221,476
Model loglikelihood -1,102.98 -4,007.45
Wald X 2 330.91 *** 286.84 ***
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001
Standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed test for all variables; Marginal effects in brackets
Medical Devices Industry (3841 & 3842)




Econometric Test #2 For Medical Devices - Study 1
Split-Sample Logit Estimates of Influences on Firm's Ability to Attract Analyst Coverage
Model 1 Model 2
Innov. Intensity < Mean Innov. Intensity > Mean
Knowledge Distance -1.84 *** -1.18 *
(0.38) (0.51)
 [Marginal effects] [-.00015] [-.00013]
t = 200
p-value of t -test of difference in marginal effects ***
Knowledge Overlap 3.58 * 2.13 *
(0.48) (0.85)
 [Marginal effects] [.0002916] [.00024]
t = 320
p-value of t -test of difference in marginal effects ***
Control Variables
Knowledge Diversity -0.12 *** -0.02
(0.01) (0.01)
Firm Performance 0.00 *** 0.00 **
(0.00) (0.00)
Firm Size 0.83 *** 0.51 **
(0.15) (0.19)
Number of Analysts Covering the Industry 0.00 -0.03
(0.01) (0.04)
Firm's Yearly Number of Patents 0.01 *** 0.01 *
(0.00) (0.00)
Firm's Technological Quality 0.06 -0.02
(0.05) (0.08)
Firm's Geographic Scope -0.26 *** 0.02
(0.07) (0.11)
Knowledge overlap betw. analyst and the firm 5.76 *** 5.76 ***
(0.36) (0.35)
Regulation FD (dummy) 0.38 1.14
(0.38) (0.95)
Year Dummies Included Included
Constant -11.341 *** -10.187 ***
Number of Observations 421,641 352,043
Model loglikelihood -2,212.45 -2,336.01
Wald X 2 951.71 *** 675.16 ***
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001
Standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed test for all variables; Marginal effects in brackets
Innovation Intensity of the Industry




Descriptive Statistics For Computer Hardware - Study 1
Computer Hardware Industry (SIC 3570-3579)
Variable Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1 Analysts Coverage 0.001 0.03
2 Knowledge Diversity 13.57 19.82 0.01
3 Knowledge Distance 0.56 0.22 -0.01 -0.18
4 Knowledge Overlap 0.31 0.22 0.00 -0.22 0.65
5 Firm Performance 173.44 702.14 0.02 0.42 -0.12 -0.13
6 Firm Size 1.18 1.26 0.02 0.75 -0.13 -0.15 0.55
7 Number of Analysts Covering the Industry 38.81 30.50 0.01 -0.25 0.11 0.25 -0.10 -0.45
8 Firm's Yearly Number of Patents 36.96 162.08 0.00 0.68 -0.11 -0.16 0.29 0.53 -0.26
9 Firm's Technological Quality 4.50 3.23 0.01 0.70 -0.49 -0.42 0.42 0.77 -0.26 0.45
10 Firm's Geographic Scope 1.50 1.17 0.00 0.73 -0.19 -0.29 0.44 0.72 -0.36 0.67 0.68
11 Innovation intensity of firm’s industry 0.09 0.06 0.00 -0.13 0.14 0.23 -0.05 -0.32 0.81 -0.05 -0.20 -0.18
12 Knowledge overlap between the analyst and the firm 0.19 0.33 0.07 -0.06 0.02 0.03 0.00 -0.05 0.01 -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 0.00
13 Regulation FD (dummy) 0.50 0.50 0.00 -0.06 0.00 0.08 0.00 -0.13 0.35 -0.16 -0.05 -0.10 0.14 0.01






Logit Estimates on Coverage For Computer Hardware - Study 1
Estimates of Analyst's Hazard of Covering the Focal  Firm
Logit Logit Logit Logit
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Knowledge Diversity (H1 < 0) 0.01 *** 0.01 * 0.01 **
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Knowledge Distance (H2 < 0) -0.82 ** -1.44 ***
(0.27) (0.30)
Knowledge Overlap (H3 > 0) 1.38 **
(0.44)
Control Variables
Firm Performance 0.00 0.00 0.00 * 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Firm Size 0.63 *** 0.59 *** 0.66 *** 0.62 ***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Number of Analysts Covering the Industry 0.03 *** 0.03 ** 0.03 *** 0.03 ***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Firm's Yearly Number of Patents 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Firm's Technological Quality 0.17 *** 0.16 *** 0.09 * 0.10 *
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
Firm's Geographic Scope -0.34 *** -0.36 *** -0.35 *** -0.32 ***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Innovation intensity of firm’s industry -9.48 *** -9.27 *** -9.21 *** -8.84 ***
(1.81) (1.77) (1.79) (1.76)
Knowledge overlap between the analyst and the firm 6.06 *** 6.08 *** 6.08 *** 6.06 ***
(0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21)
Regulation FD (dummy) -1.84 *** -1.82 *** -1.86 *** -1.97 ***
(0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.23)
Year Dummies Included Included Included Included
Constant -10.821 *** -10.711 *** -9.871 *** -9.844 ***
Number of Observations 1,062,971 1,062,971 1,062,971 1,062,971
Model log likelihood -7,846.30 -7,842.78 -7,833.60 -7,825.98
Wald X 2 2035.83 *** 2044.15 *** 2139.47 *** 2138.01 ***
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001






Econometric Test #1 For Computer Hardware - Study 1
Split-Sample Logit Estimates of Influences on Firm's Ability to Attract Analyst Coverage
Model 1 Model 2
Firm-Analyst Overlap < Mean Firm-Analyst Overlap > Mean
Knowledge Distance -2.61 *** -1.28 ***
(0.77) (0.32)
 [Marginal effects] [-.0003213] t  = 3,100 [ -.0033076]
p-value of t -test of difference in marginal effects ***
Knowledge Overlap 1.42 1.84 ***
(0.84) (0.45)
 [Marginal effects] [ .0001755] [.004772]
Control Variables
Knowledge Diversity -0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
Firm Performance 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Firm Size 0.79 *** 0.55 ***
(0.11) (0.06)
Number of Analysts Covering the Industry 0.02 *** 0.04 ***
(0.01) (0.00)
Firm's Yearly Number of Patents 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Firm's Technological Quality 0.01 0.06
(0.09) (0.05)
Firm's Geographic Scope -0.32 -0.11 *
(0.09) (0.06)
Innovation intensity of firm’s industry -7.54 * -10.35 ***
(3.35) (2.00)
Regulation FD (dummy) -3.26 *** -1.90 ***
(0.59) (0.26)
Year Dummies Included Included
Constant -6.839 *** -5.346 ***
Number of Observations 763,631 299,340
Model loglikelihood -1,913.40 -7,027.33
Wald X 2 446.28 *** 589.72 ***
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001
Standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed test for all variables; Marginal effects in brackets
Computer Hardware Industry (3570-3579)




Econometric Test #2 For Computer Hardware - Study 1
Split-Sample Logit Estimates of Influences on Firm's Ability to Attract Analyst Coverage
Model 1 Model 2
Innov. Intensity < Mean Innov. Intensity > Mean
Knowledge Distance -2.41 *** 0.26
(0.43) (0.47)
 [Marginal effects] [-.00022] t  = 2,500 [.000035]
p-value of t -test of difference in marginal effects ***
Knowledge Overlap 1.62 * -2.59 ***
(0.66) (0.76)
 [Marginal effects] [.00015] t  = 3,200 [-.00035]
p-value of t -test of difference in marginal effects ***
Control Variables
Knowledge Diversity 0.00 0.02 **
(0.00) (0.01)
Firm Performance 0.00 * 0.00 *
(0.00) (0.00)
Firm Size 0.76 *** 0.72 ***
(0.08) (0.09)
Number of Analysts Covering the Industry 0.03 *** 0.00
(0.01) (0.01)
Firm's Yearly Number of Patents 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Firm's Technological Quality 0.20 * 0.02
(0.06) (0.05)
Firm's Geographic Scope -0.36 *** -1.18 ***
(0.06) (0.18)
Knowledge overlap between the analyst and the firm 6.24 *** 5.61 ***
(0.27) (0.29)
Regulation FD (dummy) -2.30 *** -1.32 **
(0.30) (0.48)
Year Dummies Included Included
Constant -10.151 *** -8.605 ***
Number of Observations 677,746 380,387
Model loglikelihood -4,679.70 -3,020.05
Wald X 2 1397.38 *** 1045.3 ***
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001
Standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed test for all variables; Marginal effects in brackets
Innovation Intensity of the Industry






Descriptive Statistics For Computer Software - Study 1
Computer Software Industry (SIC 7372)
Variable Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1 Analysts Coverage 0.002 0.04
2 Knowledge Diversity 5.29 7.20 0.01
3 Knowledge Distance 0.68 0.24 -0.01 -0.47
4 Knowledge Overlap 0.35 0.20 0.00 -0.35 0.48
5 Firm Performance 257.02 1,266.04 0.02 0.60 -0.20 -0.17
6 Firm Size 1.04 0.88 0.02 0.50 -0.19 -0.01 0.59
7 Number of Analysts Covering the Industry 345.94 72.90 0.01 0.18 -0.06 0.14 -0.01 0.00
8 Firm's Yearly Number of Patents 17.66 83.89 0.02 0.60 -0.24 -0.21 0.79 0.48 0.00
9 Firm's Technological Quality 5.14 1.88 0.02 0.62 -0.49 -0.33 0.46 0.53 0.21 0.44
10 Firm's Geographic Scope 1.28 0.56 0.00 0.41 -0.20 -0.27 0.27 0.25 0.00 0.24 0.35
11 Innovation intensity of firm’s industry 0.17 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.06 -0.02 -0.02 0.28 -0.03 0.02 0.00
12 Knowledge overlap between the analyst and the firm 0.22 0.34 0.07 -0.04 0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.00 -0.06 -0.02 -0.04 -0.02 0.02
13 Regulation FD (dummy) 0.71 0.45 0.00 0.07 -0.01 0.18 -0.02 -0.01 0.52 -0.11 0.07 -0.03 0.37 0.01





Estimates on Coverage For Computer Software - Study 1
Estimates of Analyst's Hazard of Covering the Focal  Firm
Logit Logit Logit Logit
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Knowledge Diversity (H1 < 0) -0.05 *** -0.05 *** -0.05 ***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Knowledge Distance (H2 < 0) -0.46 ** -0.36 *
(0.17) (0.18)
Knowledge Overlap (H3 > 0) -0.33
(0.22)
Control Variables
Firm Performance 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Firm Size 0.39 *** 0.43 *** 0.44 *** 0.46 ***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
Number of Analysts Covering the Industry 0.01 0.01 ** 0.01 *** 0.01 ***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Firm's Yearly Number of Patents 0.00 ** 0.00 *** 0.00 *** 0.00 ***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Firm's Technological Quality 0.17 *** 0.22 *** 0.20 *** 0.19 ***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Firm's Geographic Scope -0.45 *** -0.33 *** -0.34 *** -0.36 ***
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Innovation intensity of firm’s industry -9.36 * -11.53 ** -12.19 ** -12.48 **
(4.19) (4.24) (4.26) (4.28)
Knowledge overlap between the analyst and the firm 4.51 *** 4.50 *** 4.50 *** 4.50 ***
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Regulation FD (dummy) -3.13 *** -4.10 *** 4.43 *** -4.46 ***
(0.91) (0.94) (0.95) (0.95)
Year Dummies Included Included Included Included
Constant -7.912 *** -7.906 *** -7.506 *** -7.558 ***
Number of Observations 1,025,863 1,025,863 1,025,863 1,025,863
Model log likelihood -11,979.18 -11,943.95 -11,936.55 -11,934.74
Wald X 2 2901.56 *** 2956.82 *** 2973.86 *** 2970.43 ***
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001







Econometric Test #1 For Computer Software - Study 1
Split-Sample Logit Estimates of Influences on Firm's Ability to Attract Analyst Coverage
Model 1 Model 2
Firm-Analyst Overlap < Mean Firm-Analyst Overlap > Mean
Knowledge Distance -0.54 -0.62 **
(0.29) (0.20)
 [Marginal effects] [-.0001038] [-.0025538]
 t  = 2,600
p-value of t -test of difference in marginal effects ***
Knowledge Overlap -0.34 0.20
(0.33) (0.27)
 [Marginal effects] [-.0000655] [.0008084]
Control Variables
Knowledge Diversity -0.06 *** -0.05 ***
(0.01) (0.01)
Firm Performance 0.00 *** 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Firm Size 0.59 *** 0.39 ***
(0.07) (0.05)
Number of Analysts Covering the Industry 0.02 0.01 **
(0.03) (0.00)
Firm's Yearly Number of Patents 0.00 0.00 ***
(0.00) (0.00)
Firm's Technological Quality 0.11 * 0.17 ***
(0.05) (0.02)
Firm's Geographic Scope -0.46 ** -0.38 ***
(0.15) (0.09)
Innovation intensity of firm’s industry -18.39 -10.94 *
(33.52) (4.30)
Regulation FD (dummy) -6.51 -4.17
(6.35) (0.96)
Year Dummies Included Included
Constant -6.303 *** -4.005 ***
Number of Observations 713,949 311,914
Model loglikelihood -3,200.28 -9,490.38
Wald X 2 673.02 *** 428.74 ***
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001
Standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed test for all variables; Marginal effects in brackets
Knowledge overlap between the analyst and the firm





Econometric Test #2 For Computer Software - Study 1
Split-Sample Logit Estimates of Influences on Firm's Ability to Attract Analyst Coverage
Model 1 Model 2
Innov. Intensity < Mean Innov. Intensity > Mean
Knowledge Distance -0.63 ** -0.53 *
(0.20) (0.23)
 [Marginal effects] [-.0009457 ] t  = 110 [-.000874]
p-value of t -test of difference in marginal effects ***
Knowledge Overlap 0.00 0.21
(0.28) (0.28)
 [Marginal effects] [0.00000124] [.00035]
Control Variables
Knowledge Diversity -0.06 *** -0.05 ***
(0.01) (0.01)
Firm Performance 0.00 * 0.00 *
(0.00) (0.00)
Firm Size 0.42 *** 0.47 ***
(0.05) (0.06)
Number of Analysts Covering the Industry 0.01 *** 0.00 **
(0.00) (0.00)
Firm's Yearly Number of Patents 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Firm's Technological Quality 0.10 *** 0.20 ***
(0.02) (0.03)
Firm's Geographic Scope -0.35 *** -0.51 ***
(0.09) (0.10)
Knowledge overlap between the analyst and the firm omited omited
Regulation FD (dummy) -4.29 -0.02
(0.94) (0.29)
Year Dummies Included Included
Constant -6.685 *** -7.858 ***
Number of Observations 569,800 456,063
Model loglikelihood -7,381.28 -6,608.92
Wald X 2 336.37 *** 403.90 ***
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001
Standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed test for all variables; Marginal effects in brackets
Innovation Intensity of the Industry




Summary of Empirical Findings - Study 2
 Propositions 7 -10
Medical Devices Computer Hardware Computer Software
Proposition 7 (P7):  Exploring distant knowledge will have a 
negative impact on  the favorability of the analyst’s 
recommendation for the firm. No No No Not Supported
Proposition 8 (P8):  Greater knowledge overlap between the 
firm and its rivals  will have a negative impact on the 
favorability of the analyst’s  recommendation for the firm. No No No Not Supported
Proposition 9 (P9):  The greater the analyst’s experience, the 
less negative the  effect that exploration of distant knowledge 
will have on the favorability of the  recommendation. No No No Not Supported
Proposition 10 (P10):  The more extensively other firms 
covered by the analyst  explore external knowledge, the less 
negative the effect that exploration of distant  knowledge will 





Descriptive Statistics For Medical Devices - Study 2
Medical Devices Industry (SIC 3841-3842)
Variable Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
1 Increased Favorability of Recommendation 0.14 0.35
2 Knowledge Distance 0.54 0.23 -0.03
3 Knowledge Overlap 0.28 0.17 0.03 0.68
4 Firm Size 1.54 1.05 -0.02 0.17 -0.03
5 Firm Performance 168.55 214.29 0.03 0.28 0.25 0.71
6 Average Analysts Recomendation 2.29 0.47 0.02 0.15 0.07 0.32 0.29
7 Firm's Yearly Number of Patents 15.63 33.03 0.01 -0.24 -0.40 0.52 0.18 -0.07
8 Firm's Technological Quality 6.52 1.89 0.00 -0.40 -0.45 0.53 0.17 0.18 0.52
9 Knowledge Diversity 6.56 7.95 -0.04 -0.25 -0.48 0.65 0.41 0.15 0.59 0.53
10 Firm's Geographic Scope 2.19 1.37 -0.08 -0.12 -0.36 0.81 0.44 0.30 0.48 0.64 0.73
11 Degree to which analysts' firms explore new knowledge 0.50 0.11 -0.02 0.43 0.23 0.01 0.05 0.15 -0.26 -0.23 -0.09 -0.03
12 Analyst Experience 6.18 5.35 0.02 0.10 0.03 0.14 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.02 0.10 0.06 0.04
13 Analyst Accuracy 0.44 1.31 0.05 0.13 0.14 0.09 0.11 0.03 -0.03 -0.01 -0.05 0.01 0.00 0.04
14 Regulation FD (dummy) 0.65 0.48 0.04 0.25 0.36 0.06 0.29 0.25 -0.44 -0.17 -0.07 -0.02 0.40 -0.01 0.07






First Stage Logit Model For Medical Devices - Study 2
Logit Esitmates on Analysts' Decision to Provide Coverage
Logit
Model 1
Knowledge Diversity -0.03 ***
(0.01)
Knowledge Distance -0.97 ***
(0.22)
Knowledge Overlap 2.17 ***
(0.31)
Control Variables
Firm Performance 0.00 *
(0.00)
Firm Size 0.99 ***
(0.11)
Number of Analysts Covering the Industry 0.00
(0.00)
Firm's Yearly Number of Patents 0.01 ***
(0.00)
Firm's Technological Quality -0.06
(0.06)
Firm's Geographic Scope -0.03
(0.05)
Innovation intensity of firm’s industry -0.33
(1.81)
Knowledge overlap between the analyst and the firm 5.13 ***
(0.14)
Regulation FD (dummy) 0.67 ***
(0.16)
Number of Industry Firms in Stock Exchange 0.01 ***
(0.00)




Number of Observations 773,684
Model log likelihood -4,568.54
Wald X 2 1427.14 ***
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001







Second Stage Logit Model For Medical Devices - Study 2
Logistic Regression Estimates of Analyst's Increasing Favorability of Recommendation
Logit Logit Logit Bootstrap Corr.Logit
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Knowledge Distance (P7 < 0) -1.02 0.03 0.03
(0.63) (0.81) (0.76)
Knowledge Overlap (P8 < 0) -2.26 -2.26
(1.28) (1.61)
Control Variables
Inverse Mills Ratio -1.08 *** -0.99 *** -1.35 *** -1.35 **
(0.29) (0.31) (0.39) (0.48)
Firm Size -0.69 * -0.43 -0.66 -0.66
(0.32) (0.37) (0.41) (0.43)
Firm Performance 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Average Analysts Recomendation 0.37 0.37 0.38 0.38 *
(0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.18)
Firm's Yearly Number of Patents 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Firm's Technological Quality 0.12 0.07 0.06 0.06
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Firm's Knowledge Diversity 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Firm's Geographic Scope -0.38 -0.46 * -0.37 -0.37
(0.21) (0.22) (0.20) (0.22)
Degree to which analysts' firms explore new knowledge -0.15 0.34 0.19 0.19
(1.05) (1.06) (1.04) (0.98)
Analyst Experience 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Analyst Accuracy 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.05
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.12)
Regulation FD (dummy) 0.06 0.09 0.07 0.07
(0.30) (0.30) (0.30) (0.31)
Constant 2.662 2.677 4.697 * 4.697 *
Number of Observations 758 758 758 758
Model log likelihood -288.96 -289.50 -286.95 -286.95
Wald X 2 27.76 ** 28.8 ** 32.66 ** 32.66 **
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001
Standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed test for hypotheses and control variables. 
Medical Devices Industry




Descriptive Statistics For Computer Hardware - Study 2
Computer Hardware Industry (SIC 3570-3579)
Variable Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
1 Increased Favorability of Recommendation 0.17 0.38
2 Knowledge Distance 0.52 0.18 -0.04
3 Knowledge Overlap 0.25 0.13 -0.02 0.78
4 Firm Size 2.32 1.30 0.04 -0.19 -0.14
5 Firm Performance 686.57 1,340.20 0.05 -0.19 -0.21 0.52
6 Average Analysts Recomendation 2.32 0.41 0.11 0.01 0.04 0.03 -0.13
7 Firm's Yearly Number of Patents 89.31 156.36 -0.01 -0.23 -0.33 0.51 -0.02 -0.03
8 Firm's Technological Quality 7.90 2.13 0.05 -0.50 -0.42 0.77 0.40 0.03 0.46
9 Knowledge Diversity 22.74 18.83 0.02 -0.23 -0.27 0.74 0.34 -0.05 0.74 0.69
10 Firm's Geographic Scope 1.90 1.33 0.01 -0.26 -0.39 0.56 0.12 -0.09 0.67 0.60 0.63
11 Degree to which analysts' firms explore new knowledge 0.55 0.11 -0.02 0.47 0.32 -0.14 0.02 0.04 -0.16 -0.28 -0.15 -0.19
12 Analyst Experience 6.34 5.80 0.04 -0.02 0.02 0.11 0.05 0.01 0.04 0.10 0.08 0.06 -0.05
13 Analyst Accuracy 0.80 3.62 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.03 -0.03 0.02 0.19
14 Regulation FD (dummy) 0.64 0.48 0.02 -0.15 0.01 -0.16 0.18 0.12 -0.38 -0.07 -0.16 -0.19 0.08 -0.01 0.00






First Stage Logit Model For Computer Hardware - Study 2
Logit Esitmates on Analysts' Decision to Provide Coverage
Logit
Model 1
Knowledge Diversity 0.01 **
(0.00)
Knowledge Distance -1.93 ***
(0.28)
Knowledge Overlap 2.30 ***
(0.46)
Control Variables
Firm Performance 0.00 ***
(0.00)
Firm Size 0.72 ***
(0.05)
Number of Analysts Covering the Industry 0.02 ***
(0.00)
Firm's Yearly Number of Patents 0.00
(0.00)
Firm's Technological Quality 0.11
(0.04)
Firm's Geographic Scope -0.32 ***
(0.06)
Innovation intensity of firm’s industry -6.27 ***
(1.64)
Knowledge overlap between the analyst and the firm 6.04 ***
(0.20)
Regulation FD (dummy) -1.89 ***
(0.22)
Number of Industry Firms in Stock Exchange 0.01 ***
(0.00)




Number of Observations 1,062,971
Model log likelihood -7,760.26
Wald X 2 2376.22 ***
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001





Second Stage Logit Model For Computer Hardware - Study 2
Logistic Regression Estimates of Analyst's Increasing Favorability of Recommendation
Logit Logit Logit Bootstrap Corr. Logit
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Knowledge Distance (P7 < 0) -0.57 -0.77 -0.77
(0.53) (0.75) (0.74)
Knowledge Overlap (P8 < 0) 0.39 0.39
(1.10) (1.20)
Control Variables
Inverse Mills Ratio -0.37 * -0.36 * -0.35 * -0.35 *
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15)
Firm Size -0.24 * -0.20 -0.21 -0.21
(0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.12)
Firm Performance 0.00 * 0.00 0.00 * 0.00 *
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Average Analysts Recomendation 0.75 *** 0.76 *** 0.77 *** 0.77 ***
(0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.19)
Firm's Yearly Number of Patents 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Firm's Technological Quality -0.03 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06
(0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Firm's Knowledge Diversity 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Firm's Geographic Scope 0.19 * 0.19 * 0.20 0.20
(0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.11)
Degree to which analysts' firms explore new knowledge -0.55 -0.23 -0.20 -0.20
(0.62) (0.67) (0.67) (0.62)
Analyst Experience 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Analyst Accuracy -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Regulation FD (dummy) 0.02 -0.03 -0.05 -0.05
(0.18) (0.18) (0.19) (0.21)
Constant -1.334 -1.079 -1.187 -1.187
Number of Observations 1,412 1,412 1,412 1,412
Model log likelihood -633.62 -633.14 -633.09 -633.09
Wald X 2 41.26 *** 42.6 *** 42.27 *** 42.27 ***
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001






Descriptive Statistics For Computer Software - Study 2
Computer Software Industry (SIC 7372)
Variable Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
1 Increased Favorability of Recommendation 0.17 0.38
2 Knowledge Distance 0.64 0.24 0.01
3 Knowledge Overlap 0.34 0.18 0.00 0.62
4 Firm Size 1.52 1.09 -0.03 -0.41 -0.34
5 Firm Performance 830.09 2,110.98 -0.01 -0.36 -0.37 0.74
6 Average Analysts Recomendation 2.28 0.39 0.09 0.07 0.25 -0.15 -0.24
7 Firm's Yearly Number of Patents 52.08 152.63 0.01 -0.36 -0.40 0.59 0.80 -0.23
8 Firm's Technological Quality 5.91 1.99 0.00 -0.64 -0.50 0.72 0.70 -0.09 0.60
9 Knowledge Diversity 6.66 8.71 -0.03 -0.47 -0.43 0.64 0.84 -0.18 0.72 0.77
10 Firm's Geographic Scope 1.24 0.44 -0.01 -0.44 -0.39 0.60 0.59 -0.18 0.52 0.71 0.66
11 Degree to which analysts' firms explore new knowledge 0.63 0.13 0.01 0.57 0.39 -0.26 -0.25 0.03 -0.29 -0.41 -0.33 -0.30
12 Analyst Experience 4.85 4.72 -0.03 -0.07 -0.05 0.06 0.06 -0.01 0.04 0.07 0.05 0.07 -0.06
13 Analyst Accuracy 0.74 4.73 0.00 0.05 0.04 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.04 -0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.16
14 Regulation FD (dummy) 0.74 0.44 0.02 0.06 0.30 -0.12 -0.11 0.42 -0.31 0.02 -0.03 -0.13 0.09 0.00 -0.07





First Stage Logit Model For Computer Software - Study 2
Logit Esitmates on Analysts' Decision to Provide Coverage
Logit
Model 1









Firm Size 0.60 ***
(0.05)
Number of Analysts Covering the Industry 0.01 *
(0.00)
Firm's Yearly Number of Patents 0.00 ***
(0.00)
Firm's Technological Quality 0.16
(0.03)
Firm's Geographic Scope -0.38
(0.10)
Innovation intensity of firm’s industry -11.17 **
(4.30)
Knowledge overlap between the analyst and the firm 4.50 ***
(0.10)
Regulation FD (dummy) -4.23 ***
(0.95)
Number of Industry Firms in Stock Exchange 0.00 ***
(0.00)




Number of Observations 1,025,863
Model log likelihood -11,765.85
Wald X 2 3151.3 ***
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001








Second Stage Logit Model For Computer Software - Study 2
Logistic Regression Estimates of Analyst's Increasing Favorability of Recommendation
Logit Logit Logit Bootstrap Corr. Logit
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Knowledge Distance (P7 < 0) 0.07 0.23 0.23
(0.45) (0.42) (0.41)
Knowledge Overlap (P8 < 0) -0.52 -0.52
(0.50) (0.49)
Control Variables
Inverse Mills Ratio -0.13 -0.13 -0.08 -0.08
(0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.18)
Firm Size -0.01 -0.02 0.02 0.02
(0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.16)
Firm Performance 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Average Analysts Recomendation 0.68 ** 0.67 ** 0.69 ** 0.69 ***
(0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.19)
Firm's Yearly Number of Patents 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Firm's Technological Quality 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.07)
Firm's Knowledge Diversity -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Firm's Geographic Scope 0.20 0.20 0.18 0.18
(0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.21)
Degree to which analysts' firms explore new knowledge 0.18 0.13 0.15 0.15
(0.64) (0.70) (0.72) (0.47)
Analyst Experience -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Analyst Accuracy 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Regulation FD (dummy) 0.08 0.08 0.13 0.13
(0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.19)
Constant -2.752 * -2.769 * -3.015 * -3.015 *
Number of Observations 1,916 1,916 1,916 1,916
Model log likelihood -857.84 -857.82 -857.31 -857.31
Wald X 2 72.12 *** 85.57 *** 91.94 *** 91.94 ***
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001






Summary of Empirical Findings - Study 3 
Propositions 11-15
Medical Devices Computer Hardware Computer Software
Proposition 11 (P11):  The lower the level of 
consensus among securities analysts' 
recommendations about the firm, the greater 
the likelihood that the investor will buy shares 
in the firm. Yes Supported
Proposition 12 (P12): The greater the 
investor's industry experience, the more likely 
the investor will be to buy shares in the firm 
when consensus is low among securities 
analysts' recommendations. Yes Supported
Proposition 13 (P13): The longer the 
investor's time horizon, the more likely the 
investor will be to buy shares in the firm when 
consensus is low among securities analysts' 
recommendations. Yes Supported
Proposition 14 (P14):  The greater the scope 
of the firm's innovation portfolio, the more 
likely the investor will be to buy shares in the 
firm when consensus is low among securities 
analysts' recommendations. Yes Supported
Proposition 15 (P15):  The greater the firm's 
ability to commercialize innovations, the more 
likely the investor will be to buy shares in the 
firm when consensus is low among securities 








Descriptive Statistics For Medical Devices - Study 3
Variable Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 Hazard of Increased Investment (dummy) 0.03 0.17
2 Standard Deviation of Securities Analysts' Recommendations 0.68 0.40 0.04
3 Investor's Industry Experience 2.87 5.76 0.30 0.03
4 Firm's Scope of Innovation Portfolio 72.51 121.15 0.09 0.11 -0.02
5 Firm's Ability to Commercialize Innovations 6.48 9.12 0.13 0.13 -0.01 0.71
6 Securities Analysts' Favorability of Firm's Recommendation -2.16 0.58 -0.02 -0.22 -0.01 -0.21 -0.15
7 Number of Securities Analysts Covering Focal Firm 5.46 4.99 0.14 0.34 0.02 0.32 0.53 -0.19
8 Firm's Products' Average Age 8.31 4.49 0.04 0.10 -0.01 0.48 0.16 -0.13 -0.05
9 Firm's Products % of Total Products in its Categories 0.02 0.03 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.07 0.09 0.03 0.05 -0.12
10 Firm's Number of Competing Products in its Product Categories 1,084.94 1,184.82 0.10 0.14 0.00 0.74 0.72 -0.25 0.49 0.16 -0.04
11 Firm's Innovative Inputs 2.77 1.67 0.12 0.24 0.03 0.64 0.63 -0.22 0.69 0.15 0.02 0.70
12 Firm Performance 73.41 287.38 0.06 0.05 0.01 0.35 0.30 -0.12 0.18 0.23 0.00 0.34
13 Firm Size 1.02 0.96 0.11 0.23 -0.01 0.73 0.63 -0.34 0.55 0.36 -0.03 0.74
14 Firm's Share Price 26.83 17.90 0.09 0.24 0.02 0.52 0.43 -0.25 0.37 0.33 -0.04 0.58
15 Firm's Annual Dividend 0.13 0.43 0.01 0.05 -0.02 0.40 0.25 -0.11 -0.01 0.22 -0.02 0.38
16 Investor's Portfolio Value 18.51 5.46 0.10 0.01 0.22 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.01 -0.01
17 Investor's Annual Number of Firms' Held % Total in Portfolio 0.56 0.28 0.07 0.00 0.14 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.01 -0.01
18 Investor's Number of Distinct Industries 25.58 9.44 0.16 -0.03 0.44 -0.04 -0.02 0.02 -0.02 -0.05 0.01 -0.02
19 Investor's Prior Number of Shares in the Focal Firm 0.49 2.28 0.41 0.05 0.43 0.13 0.17 -0.05 0.21 0.06 0.01 0.15
20 Annual Inflation (CPI) 100.51 6.53 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.18 0.11 -0.12 0.00
21 U.S. Government T-Bill Rate 5.06 0.86 -0.02 -0.26 -0.09 -0.09 -0.04 0.16 -0.20 -0.17 0.00 -0.06
22 Annual US Equities Index 87.37 26.14 -0.03 0.22 0.06 0.09 -0.02 -0.09 0.07 0.18 0.05 0.05
Variable 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
12 Firm Performance 0.22
13 Firm Size 0.67 0.31
14 Firm's Share Price 0.55 0.43 0.71
15 Firm's Annual Dividend 0.15 0.19 0.45 0.36
16 Investor's Portfolio Value 0.01 -0.01 -0.03 0.00 -0.02
17 Investor's Annual Number of Firms' Held % Total in Portfolio -0.01 0.00 -0.03 -0.01 -0.02 0.59
18 Investor's Number of Distinct Industries -0.03 -0.01 -0.05 -0.04 -0.03 0.30 0.20
19 Investor's Prior Number of Shares in the Focal Firm 0.17 0.09 0.17 0.12 0.02 0.14 0.11 0.19
20 Annual Inflation (CPI) 0.11 0.07 0.10 0.08 0.06 -0.03 -0.04 -0.08 0.06
21 U.S. Government T-Bill Rate -0.23 -0.11 -0.14 -0.27 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.10 -0.04 -0.48





Logit Estimates on Investment For Medical Devices - Study 3
Estimates of Investor's Hazard of Increasing Investment in the Focal  Firm
Logit Logit
Model 1 Model 2
Standard Deviation of Analysts' Recommendations (Higher Value = Less Consensus) 0.26 ***
(0.03)
Contingency Variables
Investor's Industry Experience 0.05 *** 0.05 ***
(0.00) (0.00)
Investor's Time Horizon 0.02 0.02
(0.05) (0.05)
Firm's Scope of Innovation Portfolio 0.00 *** 0.00 ***
(0.00) (0.00)
Firm's Ability To Commercialize Innovations 0.02 *** 0.02 ***
Other Control Variables (0.00) (0.00)
Firm's Innovative Inputs 0.11 *** 0.12 ***
(0.01) (0.01)
Securities Analysts' Favorability of Focal Firm's Recommendation 0.09 *** 0.12 ***
(0.02) (0.02)
Number of Securities Analysts Covering Focal Firm 0.01 * 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Firm's Products' Average Age 0.04 *** 0.04 ***
(0.00) (0.00)
Firm's Products % of Total Products in its Categories 2.78 *** 2.91 ***
(0.38) (0.39)
Firm's Number of Competing Products in its Product Categories 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Firm Performance 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Firm Size 0.28 *** 0.29 ***
(0.03) (0.03)
Firm's Share Price 0.01 *** 0.01 ***
(0.00) (0.00)
Firm's Annual Dividend -0.71 *** -0.72 ***
(0.09) (0.09)
Investor's Portfolio Value 0.08 *** 0.08 ***
(0.00) (0.00)
Investor's Number of Distinct Industries 0.11 *** 0.10 ***
(0.00) (0.00)
Investor's Prior Number of Shares in the Focal Firm 0.15 *** 0.15 ***
(0.00) (0.00)
Annual Inflation (CPI) 0.05 *** 0.05 ***
(0.00) (0.00)
U.S. Government T-Bill Rate 0.05 ** 0.06 ***
(0.02) (0.02)
Annual US Equities Index -0.02 *** -0.02 ***
(0.00) (0.00)
Constant -13.579 *** -13.979 ***
Number of Observations 566,472 566,472
Model log likelihood -52,319.53 -52,281.50
Wald X 2 30908.38 *** 30919.02 ***
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001





Econometric Test #1 For Medical Devices - Study 3
Split-Sample Logit Estimates on Contingent Effect of Investor’s Industry Experience on the Relationship between Analysts’ Consensus 
and the Hazard that the Focal Investor will Increase Investment in the Focal Firm  (test of proposition 12).
Model 1 Model 2
Investor's Experience < Mean Investor's Experience > Mean




p-value of t -test of difference in marginal effects ***
Contingency Variables
Investor's Time Horizon -0.42 *** 0.11
(0.10) (0.06)
Firm's Scope of Innovation Portfolio 0.00 *** 0.03 ***
(0.00) (0.00)
Firm's Ability To Commercialize Innovations 0.02 *** 0.02 ***
(0.00) (0.00)
Other Control Variables
Firm's Innovative Inputs 0.25 *** 0.10 ***
(0.04) (0.02)
Securities Analysts' Favorability of Focal Firm's Recommendation 0.26 *** 0.09 ***
(0.06) (0.02)
Number of Securities Analysts Covering Focal Firm 0.02 ** -0.01 *
(0.01) (0.00)
Firm's Products' Average Age 0.11 *** 0.03 ***
(0.01) (0.00)
Firm's Products % of Total Products in its Categories 7.53 *** 2.52 ***
(1.29) (0.39)
Firm's Number of Competing Products in its Product Categories 0.00 * 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Firm Performance 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Firm Size 0.53 *** 0.25 ***
(0.07) (0.03)
Firm's Share Price 0.01 *** 0.02 ***
(0.00) (0.00)
Firm's Annual Dividend -0.59 *** -0.70 ***
(0.17) (0.10)
Investor's Portfolio Value 0.07 *** 0.08 ***
(0.01) (0.00)
Investor's Number of Distinct Industries 0.08 *** 0.06 ***
(0.00) (0.00)
Investor's Prior Number of Shares in the Focal Firm 0.07 *** 0.14 ***
(0.01) (0.00)
Annual Inflation (CPI) 0.04 *** 0.05 ***
(0.00) (0.00)
U.S. Government T-Bill Rate 0.05 0.10 ***
(0.04) (0.02)
Annual US Equities Index -0.02 *** -0.02 ***
(0.00) (0.00)
Constant -13.612 *** -12.645 ***
Number of Observations 334,369 232,103
Model log likelihood -10,601.80 -40,799.59
Wald X 2 6382.13 *** 20374.26 ***
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001





Econometric Test #2 For Medical Devices - Study 3
Split-Sample Logit Estimates on Contingent Effect of Investor’s Time Horizon on the Relationship between Securities Analysts’ 
Consensus and the Hazard that the Focal Investor will Increase Investment in the Focal Firm  (test of proposition 13).
Model 1 Model 2
Investor's Time Horizon < Mean Investor's Time Horizon > Mean
Standard Deviation of Securities Analysts' Recommendations 0.26 *** 0.26 ***
(0.05) (0.04)
Marginal Effect [.00177] [.00277]
t = 1,000
p-value of t -test of difference in marginal effects ***
Contingency Variables
Investor's Industry Experience 0.07 *** 0.04 ***
(0.00) (0.00)
Firm's Scope of Innovation Portfolio 0.00 *** 0.00 ***
(0.00) (0.00)
Firm's Ability To Commercialize Innovations 0.02 *** 0.02 ***
(0.00) (0.00)
Other Control Variables
Firm's Innovative Inputs 0.14 *** 0.10 ***
(0.02) (0.02)
Securities Analysts' Favorability of Focal Firm's Recommendation 0.14 *** 0.11 ***
(0.03) (0.03)
Number of Securities Analysts Covering Focal Firm 0.01 0.00 *
(0.00) (0.00)
Firm's Products' Average Age 0.04 *** 0.04 ***
(0.00) (0.00)
Firm's Products % of Total Products in its Categories 4.07 *** 2.00 ***
(0.57) (0.51)
Firm's Number of Competing Products in its Product Categories 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Firm Performance 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Firm Size 0.32 *** 0.26 ***
(0.04) (0.04)
Firm's Share Price 0.01 *** 0.02 ***
(0.00) (0.00)
Firm's Annual Dividend -0.58 *** -0.79 ***
(0.12) (0.13)
Investor's Portfolio Value 0.09 *** 0.04 ***
(0.00) (0.01)
Investor's Number of Distinct Industries 0.09 *** 0.11 ***
(0.00) (0.00)
Investor's Prior Number of Shares in the Focal Firm 0.12 *** 0.17 ***
(0.00) (0.00)
Annual Inflation (CPI) 0.04 *** 0.05 ***
(0.00) (0.00)
U.S. Government T-Bill Rate 0.07 0.08 ***
(0.03) (0.02)
Annual US Equities Index -0.02 *** -0.02 ***
(0.00) (0.00)
Constant -13.443 *** -13.933 ***
Number of Observations 295,117 271,355
Model log likelihood -22,982.57 -29,136.26
Wald X 2 13872.7 *** 19254.2 ***
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001





Econometric Test #3 For Medical Devices - Study 3
Split-Sample Logit Estimates on Contingent Effect of Innovation Scope on the Relationship between Securities Analysts’ Consensus 
and the Hazard that the Focal Investor will Increase Investment in the Focal Firm  (test of proposition 14).
Model 1 Model 2
Scope of Innovation Portfolio < Mean Scope of Innovation Portfolio > Mean
Standard Deviation of Securities Analysts' Recommendations 0.13 * 0.34 ***
(0.06) (0.04)
Marginal Effect [.00053] [.00368]
t = 3,200
p-value of t -test of difference in marginal effects ***
Contingency Variables
Investor's Industry Experience 0.06 *** 0.04 ***
(0.00) (0.00)
Investor's Time Horizon -0.81 *** 0.17 **
(0.12) (0.06)
Firm's Ability To Commercialize Innovations -0.10 *** 0.02 ***
(0.02) (0.00)
Other Control Variables
Firm's Innovative Inputs 0.31 *** 0.09 ***
(0.04) (0.02)
Securities Analysts' Favorability of Focal Firm's Recommendation 0.07 0.10 ***
(0.05) (0.02)
Number of Securities Analysts Covering Focal Firm -0.04 *** 0.01 *
(0.01) (0.00)
Firm's Products' Average Age -0.01 0.04 ***
(0.01) (0.00)
Firm's Products % of Total Products in its Categories 2.22 *** -3.37 *
(0.46) (1.33)
Firm's Number of Competing Products in its Product Categories 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Firm Performance 0.00 *** 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Firm Size 0.19 *** 0.23 ***
(0.10) (0.04)
Firm's Share Price 0.01 *** 0.01 ***
(0.00) (0.00)
Firm's Annual Dividend 1.13 ** -0.91 ***
(0.44) (0.10)
Investor's Portfolio Value 0.15 *** 0.07 ***
(0.02) (0.00)
Investor's Number of Distinct Industries 0.09 *** 0.11 ***
(0.01) (0.00)
Investor's Prior Number of Shares in the Focal Firm 0.17 *** 0.15 ***
(0.01) (0.00)
Annual Inflation (CPI) 0.05 *** 0.05 ***
(0.00) (0.00)
U.S. Government T-Bill Rate -0.01 0.09 ***
(0.05) (0.02)
Annual US Equities Index -0.02 *** -0.02 ***
(0.00) (0.00)
Constant -13.646 *** -13.920 ***
Number of Observations 179,744 386,728
Model log likelihood -9,663.51 -42,283.66
Wald X 2 8137.97 *** 25608.03 ***
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001





Econometric Test #4 For Medical Devices - Study 3
Split-Sample Logit Estimates on Contingent Effect of Firm's Ability to Commercialize Innovations on the Relationship between Securities Analysts’ 
Consensus  and the Hazard that the Focal Investor will Increase Investment in the Focal Firm  (test of proposition 15).
Model 1 Model 2
Ability to Commercialize < Mean Ability to Commercialize > Mean
Standard Deviation of Securities Analysts' Recommendations 0.22 * 0.38 ***
(0.05) (0.04)
Marginal Effect [.00085] [.00449]
t = 3,400
p-value of t -test of difference in marginal effects ***
Contingency Variables
Investor's Industry Experience 0.06 *** 0.03 ***
(0.00) (0.00)
Investor's Time Horizon -0.93 *** 0.25 **
(0.10) (0.06)
Firm's Scope of Innovation Portfolio 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Other Control Variables
Firm's Innovative Inputs 0.20 *** 0.12 ***
(0.03) (0.02)
Securities Analysts' Favorability of Focal Firm's Recommendation 0.17 *** 0.06 *
(0.03) (0.03)
Number of Securities Analysts Covering Focal Firm -0.04 *** 0.01 **
(0.01) (0.00)
Firm's Products' Average Age -0.01 0.05 ***
(0.01) (0.00)
Firm's Products % of Total Products in its Categories 2.77 *** 3.06 ***
(0.46) (0.71)
Firm's Number of Competing Products in its Product Categories 0.00 0.00 ***
(0.00) (0.00)
Firm Performance 0.00 *** 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Firm Size 0.51 *** 0.21 ***
(0.08) (0.00)
Firm's Share Price 0.02 *** 0.01 ***
(0.00) (0.00)
Firm's Annual Dividend 0.29 -0.92 ***
(0.27) (0.10)
Investor's Portfolio Value 0.14 *** 0.06 ***
(0.01) (0.00)
Investor's Number of Distinct Industries 0.10 *** 0.10 ***
(0.01) (0.00)
Investor's Prior Number of Shares in the Focal Firm 0.17 *** 0.15 ***
(0.01) (0.00)
Annual Inflation (CPI) 0.05 *** 0.05 ***
(0.00) (0.00)
U.S. Government T-Bill Rate 0.07 0.08 ***
(0.04) (0.02)
Annual US Equities Index -0.02 *** -0.02 ***
(0.00) (0.00)
Constant 14.960 *** -14.331 ***
Number of Observations 227,191 339,281
Model log likelihood -12,724.68 -39,257.79
Wald X 2 9549.59 *** 23934.16 ***
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001





Robustness to Analysts Covering Industries - Study 1
Logistic Regression Estimates of Analyst's Hazard of Covering the Focal  Firm
Medical Devices Computer Hardware Computer Software
(SIC 3841 & 3842) (SIC 3570-3579) (SIC 7372)
Logit Logit Logit
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Knowledge Diversity (H1 < 0) -0.04 *** 0.00 -0.02 **
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Knowledge Distance (H2 < 0) -1.49 *** -1.67 *** -0.12
(0.37) (0.35) (0.18)
Knowledge Overlap (H3 > 0) 2.36 *** 1.57 ** -0.27
(0.54) (0.54) (0.26)
Control Variables
Firm Performance 0.00 * 0.00 0.00 *
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Firm Size 0.79 *** 0.70 *** 0.39 ***
(0.14) (0.07) (0.05)
Number of Analysts Covering the Industry 0.00 0.00 0.00 ***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Firm's Yearly Number of Patents 0.01 ** 0.00 0.00 ***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Firm's Technological Quality -0.02 0.09 0.17 ***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.02)
Firm's Geographic Scope -0.10 -0.29 *** -0.49 ***
(0.07) (0.06) (0.09)
Innovation intensity of firm’s industry -19.53 ** -0.50 14.37 ***
(6.48) (2.05) (2.70)
Knowledge overlap between the analyst and the firm 5.50 *** 7.81 *** 1.96 ***
(0.65) (0.89) (0.08)
Regulation FD (dummy) 0.81 * -1.42 *** -0.15 *
(0.33) (0.36) (0.07)
Year Dummies Included Included Not Included
Constant -8.155 *** -9.593 *** -9.584 ***
Number of Observations 19,152 22,605 162,891
Model log likelihood -2,278.55 -3,224.55 -9,246.98
Wald X 2 421.72 *** 674.99 *** 1290.38 ***
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001





Robustness to Different Industry Groupings - Study 1
Logistic Regression Estimates of Analyst's Hazard of Covering the Focal  Firm
Medical Devices Industry Computer Hardware Industry
(SIC 3841-3845) (SIC 3570-3572)
Logit Logit
Model 1 Model 2
Knowledge Diversity (H1 < 0) -0.02 ** 0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
Knowledge Distance (H2 < 0) -0.95 *** -1.48 **
(0.22) (0.58)
Knowledge Overlap (H3 > 0) 2.23 *** 6.96 ***
(0.32) (1.34)
Control Variables
Firm Performance 0.00 * 0.00 ***
(0.00) (0.00)
Firm Size 0.56 *** -0.17
(0.08) (0.12)
Number of Analysts Covering the Industry 0.00 0.07 ***
(0.00) (0.01)
Firm's Yearly Number of Patents 0.01 *** 0.00 ***
(0.00) (0.00)
Firm's Technological Quality 0.02 0.62 ***
(0.04) (0.10)
Firm's Geographic Scope -0.07 -1.24 ***
(0.05) (0.19)
Innovation intensity of firm’s industry 0.95 -26.27 ***
(1.77) (4.25)
Knowledge overlap between the analyst and the firm 5.17 *** 6.38 ***
(0.15) (0.34)
Regulation FD (dummy) 0.94 *** -4.10 ***
(0.16) (0.46)
Year Dummies Included Included
Constant -11.165 *** -12.259 ***
Number of Observations 1,444,159 387,317
Model log likelihood -8,861.26 -3,047.91
Wald X 2 2263.00 *** 1815.92 ***
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001





Robustness to Alternative Measures - Study 1
Logistic Regression Estimates of Analyst's Hazard of Covering the Focal  Firm
Medical Devices Computer Hardware Computer Software 
(SIC 3841 & 3842) (SIC 3570-3579) (SIC 7372)
Logit Logit Logit
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Knowledge Diversity (H1 < 0) -0.03 *** 0.01 * -0.05 ***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
Knowledge Distance (H2 < 0) 0.22 -2.43 *** 5.01 ***
(1.10) (0.60) (0.89)
Knowledge Overlap (H3 > 0) 1.77 *** 0.48 -0.47 *
(0.39) (0.40) (0.22)
Control Variables
Firm Performance 0.00 ** 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Firm Size 0.42 *** 0.61 *** 0.44 ***
(0.13) (0.06) (0.05)
Number of Analysts Covering the Industry 0.00 0.02 *** 0.01 **
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Firm's Yearly Number of Patents 0.01 *** 0.00 0.00 ***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Firm's Technological Quality 0.09 0.14 ** 0.28 ***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.03)
Firm's Geographic Scope -0.11 -0.49 *** -0.35 ***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.08)
Innovation intensity of firm’s industry -6.43 -7.84 *** -12.92 **
(5.85) (1.79) (4.30)
Knowledge overlap between the analyst and the firm 5.81 *** 6.08 *** 4.51 ***
(0.26) (0.21) (0.10)
Regulation FD (dummy) 0.77 *** -1.79 *** -4.17 ***
(0.25) (0.22) (0.94)
Year Dummies Included Included Included
Constant -11.903 *** -8.372 -12.876 ***
Number of Observations 773,684 1,062,971 1,025,863
Model log likelihood -4,606.35 -7,831.08 -11,904.66
Wald X 2 1356.47 *** 2122.88 *** 2996.69 ***
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001




Robustness to Different Models For Medical Devices - Study 1
Logistic Regression Estimates of Analyst's Hazard of Covering the Focal  Firm
Cloglog RELOGIT Analyst FE Logit
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Knowledge Diversity (H1 < 0) -0.04 *** -0.04 *** -0.04 ***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Knowledge Distance (H2 < 0) -1.56 *** -1.56 *** -1.28 ***
(0.34) (0.34) (0.25)
Knowledge Overlap (H3 > 0) 2.80 *** 2.81 *** 1.91 ***
(0.49) (0.49) (0.38)
Control Variables
Firm Performance 0.00 ** 0.00 ** 0.00 ***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Firm Size 0.56 *** 0.56 *** 0.70 ***
(0.13) (0.13) (0.10)
Number of Analysts Covering the Industry 0.01 0.00 0.01 ***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
Firm's Yearly Number of Patents 0.01 *** 0.01 *** 0.01
(0.00) (0.00) (0.03)
Firm's Technological Quality -0.02 0.01 0.01
(0.06) (0.05) (0.03)
Firm's Geographic Scope -0.09 -0.10 -0.11 *
(0.06) (0.06) (0.05)
Innovation intensity of firm’s industry -7.86 -7.75 -7.32
(5.82) (5.84) (4.42)
Knowledge overlap between the analyst and the firm 5.76 *** 5.76 *** 4.16 ***
(0.25) (0.25) (0.23)
Regulation FD (dummy) 0.76 ** 0.75 *** -0.08
(0.25) (0.25) (0.29)
Year Dummies Included Included Included
Constant -10.665 *** 10.650 ***
Number of Observations 773,684 773,684 31,883
Model log likelihood -4,584.20 -2,565.51
Wald X 2 1355.35 *** 953.25 ***
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001





Robustness to Different Models For Computer Hardware - Study 1
Logistic Regression Estimates of Analyst's Hazard of Covering the Focal  Firm
Cloglog RELOGIT Analyst FE Logit
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Knowledge Diversity (H1 < 0) 0.01 ** 0.01 ** 0.01 ***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Knowledge Distance (H2 < 0) -1.44 *** -1.44 *** -1.51 ***
(0.30) (0.30) (0.26)
***
Knowledge Overlap (H3 > 0) 1.39 ** 1.39 *** 1.19 ***
(0.43) (0.44) (0.37)
Control Variables
Firm Performance 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Firm Size 0.61 *** 0.62 *** 0.65 ***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.05)
Number of Analysts Covering the Industry 0.03 *** 0.03 *** 0.03 ***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Firm's Yearly Number of Patents 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Firm's Technological Quality 0.10 * 0.10 * 0.10 ***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.03)
Firm's Geographic Scope -0.32 *** -0.32 *** -0.31 ***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.04)
Innovation intensity of firm’s industry -8.86 *** -8.78 *** -9.17 ***
(1.76) (1.76) (1.23)
Knowledge overlap between the analyst and the firm 6.06 *** 6.06 *** 4.89 ***
(0.21) (0.21) (0.18)
Regulation FD (dummy) -1.96 *** -1.97 *** -3.89 ***
(0.23) (0.23) (0.27)
Year Dummies Included Included Included
Constant -9.854 *** -9.824 ***
Number of Observations 1,062,971 1,062,971 78,893
Model log likelihood -7,822.22 -4,860.55
Wald X 2 2189.3 *** 2022.14 ***
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001





Robustness to Different Models For Computer Software - Study 1
Logistic Regression Estimates of Analyst's Hazard of Covering the Focal  Firm
Cloglog RELOGIT Analyst FE Logit
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Knowledge Diversity (H1 < 0) -0.05 *** -0.06 *** -0.04 ***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
*
Knowledge Distance (H2 < 0) -0.36 * -0.39 * -0.04
(0.18) (0.18) (0.14)
Knowledge Overlap (H3 > 0) -0.33 -0.38 -1.17 ***
(0.22) (0.22) (0.18)
Control Variables
Firm Performance 0.00 0.00 * 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Firm Size 0.46 *** 0.48 *** 0.39 ***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04)
Number of Analysts Covering the Industry 0.01 *** 0.04 *** -0.99
(0.00) (0.00) (32.24)
Firm's Yearly Number of Patents 0.00 *** 0.00 *** 0.00 ***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Firm's Technological Quality 0.19 *** 0.19 *** 0.17 ***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Firm's Geographic Scope -0.36 *** -0.36 *** -0.28 ***
(0.08) (0.08) (0.06)
Innovation intensity of firm’s industry -12.42 ** -27.83 *** 1,217.59
(4.25) (3.22) (39,073.83)
Knowledge overlap between the analyst and the firm 4.50 *** 4.39 *** 4.44 ***
(0.10) (0.09) (0.13)
Regulation FD (dummy) -4.45 *** -9.49 *** 206.30
(0.94) (0.41) (6,860.84)
Year Dummies Included Included Included
Constant -7.570 *** -7.173 ***
Number of Observations 1,025,863 1,025,863 125,710
Model log likelihood -11,933.02 -7,395.46
Wald X 2 2996.74 *** 2844.54 ***
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001





Robustness to Different Industry Groupings - Study 2
Logistic Regression Estimates of Analyst's Increasing Favorability of Recommendation
Medical Devices Industry Computer Hardware Industry
(SIC 3841 - 3845) (SIC 3570 - 3572)
Logit Logit
Model 1 Model 2
Knowledge Distance (P7 < 0) -0.56 -1.65
(0.53) (1.53)
Knowledge Overlap (P8 < 0) -0.83 -0.96
(0.83) (2.15)
Control Variables
Inverse Mills Ratio -0.18 -0.38
(0.15) (0.34)
Firm Size 0.17 -0.14
(0.20) (0.35)
Firm Performance 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Average Analysts Recomendation 0.57 *** 0.45
(0.17) (0.34)
Firm's Yearly Number of Patents 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Firm's Technological Quality 0.00 -0.21
(0.05) (0.15)
Firm's Knowledge Diversity 0.00 0.01
(0.02) (0.02)
Firm's Geographic Scope -0.35 *** 0.59
(0.11) (0.40)
Degree to which analysts' firms explore new knowledge -0.13 0.66
(0.74) (0.96)
Analyst Experience 0.00 0.02
(0.01) (0.02)
Analyst Accuracy 0.00 0.01
(0.07) (0.03)
Regulation FD (dummy) 0.23 0.10
(0.21) (0.37)
Constant -1.321 0.719
Number of Observations 1,414 621
Model log likelihood -575.47 -305.79
Wald X 2 41 *** 19.65
+ p<.10;* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001





Robustness to Alternative Measures - Study 2
Logistic Regression Estimates of Analyst's Increasing Favorability of Recommendation
Medical Devices Computer Hardware Computer Software
(SIC 3841 & 3842) (SIC 3570-3579) (SIC 7372)
Logit Logit Logit
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Knowledge Distance (P7 < 0) -1.55 -1.24 -1.10
(3.35) (1.57) (1.22)
Knowledge Overlap (P8 < 0) -2.15 * 0.60 -0.33
(0.97) (0.85) (0.52)
Control Variables
Inverse Mills Ratio -1.34 *** -0.38 * -0.09
(0.33) (0.16) (0.16)
Firm Size -0.64 -0.30 0.01
(0.33) (0.14) (0.14)
Firm Performance 0.00 0.00 * 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Average Analysts Recomendation 0.40 0.73 *** 0.70 **
(0.25) (0.20) (0.22)
Firm's Yearly Number of Patents 0.00 0.00 0.00 **
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Firm's Technological Quality 0.04 0.04 -0.02
(0.09) (0.08) (0.10)
Firm's Knowledge Diversity 0.03 0.00 -0.04
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Firm's Geographic Scope -0.39 * 0.11 0.17
(0.19) (0.14) (0.28)
Degree to which analysts' firms explore new knowledge 0.18 -0.47 0.25
(1.03) (0.67) (0.65)
Analyst Experience 0.01 0.01 -0.02
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Analyst Accuracy 0.06 0.00 0.00
(0.07) (0.02) (0.01)
Regulation FD (dummy) 0.08 0.01 0.12
(0.30) (0.18) (0.23)
Constant 6.189 -0.581 -1.747
Number of Observations 758 1,412 1,916
Model log likelihood -286.86 -588.96 -857.21
Wald X 2 33.21 ** 37.04 ** 83.74 ***
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001





Robustness to Different Models For Medical Devices - Study 2
Logistic Regression Estimates of Analyst's Increasing Favorability of Recommendation
Regression Firm Fixed Effects Logit
Model 1 Model 2
Knowledge Distance (P7 < 0) 0.06 -2.53
(0.43) (1.86)
Knowledge Overlap (P8 < 0) 0.28 -6.47
(0.60) (6.27)
Control Variables
Inverse Mills Ratio 0.28 -1.03
(0.18) (0.60)
Firm Size 0.27 -2.84 *
(0.18) (1.24)
Firm Performance 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Average Analysts Recomendation 0.20 0.83 *
(0.13) (0.34)
Firm's Yearly Number of Patents 0.00 0.01
(0.00) (0.01)
Firm's Technological Quality -0.01 0.79
(0.05) (0.49)
Firm's Knowledge Diversity 0.00 0.06
(0.01) (0.04)
Firm's Geographic Scope 0.05 -0.79
(0.06) (0.62)
Degree to which analysts' firms explore new knowledge 0.23 0.50
(0.54) (1.30)
Analyst Experience 0.00 0.02
(0.01) (0.02)
Analyst Accuracy -0.01 0.05
(0.02) (0.07)
Regulation FD (dummy) 0.19 0.26
(0.15) (0.60)
Constant 0.054
Number of Observations 293 705
Model log likelihood -243
Wald X 2 34.34 **
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001
Standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed test for hypotheses and control variables. 
Medical Devices Industry





Robustness to Different Models For Computer Hardware - Study 2
Logistic Regression Estimates of Analyst's Increasing Favorability of Recommendation
Regression Firm Fixed Effects Logit
Model 1 Model 2
Knowledge Distance (P7 < 0) -0.03 -3.97 **
(0.36) (1.51)
Knowledge Overlap (P8 < 0) 0.17 -2.42
(0.55) (4.55)
Control Variables
Inverse Mills Ratio 0.01 0.04
(0.09) (0.36)
Firm Size -0.03 -0.61
(0.07) (0.42)
Firm Performance 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Average Analysts Recomendation 0.02 0.87 ***
(0.10) (0.24)
Firm's Yearly Number of Patents 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Firm's Technological Quality -0.02 -0.15
(0.03) (0.20)
Firm's Knowledge Diversity 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.01)
Firm's Geographic Scope -0.02 -0.43
(0.06) (0.47)
Degree to which analysts' firms explore new knowledge 0.19 -0.26
(0.39) (0.85)
Analyst Experience 0.01 0.02
(0.01) (0.01)
Analyst Accuracy 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.02)
Regulation FD (dummy) 0.09 -0.07
(0.08) (0.34)
Constant 2.235 ***
Number of Observations 602 1,380
Model log likelihood -571.31
Wald X 2 28.96 *
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001







Robustness to Different Models For Computer Software - Study 2
Logistic Regression Estimates of Analyst's Increasing Favorability of Recommendation
Regression Firm Fixed Effects Logit
Model 1 Model 2
Knowledge Distance (P7 < 0) 0.14 -1.28
(0.20) (1.27)
Knowledge Overlap (P8 < 0) 0.52 * 1.11
(0.23) (2.40)
Control Variables
Inverse Mills Ratio -0.24 * 0.33
(0.11) (0.43)
Firm Size -0.18 * 0.37
(0.08) (0.48)
Firm Performance 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Average Analysts Recomendation 0.23 * 0.89 ***
(0.09) (0.24)
Firm's Yearly Number of Patents 0.00 * 0.00 *
(0.00) (0.00)
Firm's Technological Quality -0.04 -0.65
(0.04) (0.36)
Firm's Knowledge Diversity 0.02 * -0.03
(0.01) (0.03)
Firm's Geographic Scope 0.04 -0.24
(0.10) (0.81)
Degree to which analysts' firms explore new knowledge -0.27 -0.12
(0.27) (0.62)
Analyst Experience 0.00 -0.02
(0.01) (0.01)
Analyst Accuracy 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.01)
Regulation FD (dummy) 0.14 0.30
(0.08) (0.35)
Constant 2.991 ***
Number of Observations 807 1,863
Model log likelihood -749.12
Wald X 2 30.17 **
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001







Robustness to Different Models For Medical Devices - Study 3
Estimates of Investor's Hazard of Increasing Investment in the Focal  Firm
Investor
Cloglog RELOGIT Fixed Effects Logit
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Standard Deviation of Securities Analysts' Recommendations 0.29 *** 0.26 *** 0.26 ***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Contingency Variables
Investor's Industry Experience 0.03 *** 0.05 *** 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Investor's Time Horizon 0.15 ** 0.02 -0.06
(0.05) (0.05) (0.09)
Firm's Scope of Innovation Portfolio 0.00 *** 0.00 *** 0.00 ***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Firm's Ability To Commercialize Innovations 0.02 *** 0.02 *** 0.02 ***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Other Control Variables
Firm's Innovative Inputs 0.12 *** 0.12 *** 0.10 ***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Securities Analysts' Favorability of Focal Firm's Recommendation 0.10 *** 0.12 *** 0.14 ***
(0.02) (0.00) (0.02)
Number of Securities Analysts Covering Focal Firm -0.01 *** 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Firm's Products' Average Age 0.03 *** 0.04 *** 0.04 ***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Firm's Products % of Total Products in its Categories 2.58 *** 2.92 *** 2.95 ***
(0.38) (0.39) (0.39)
Firm's Number of Competing Products in its Product Categories 0.00 0.00 0.00 ***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Firm Performance 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Firm Size 0.26 *** 0.29 *** 0.30 ***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
Firm's Share Price 0.01 *** 0.01 *** 0.01 ***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Firm's Annual Dividend -0.56 *** -0.72 *** -0.75 ***
(0.07) (0.09) (0.06)
Investor's Portfolio Value 0.06 *** 0.08 *** 0.07 ***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Investor's Number of Distinct Industries 0.11 *** 0.10 *** 0.04 ***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Investor's Prior Number of Shares in the Focal Firm 0.06 *** 0.15 *** 0.13 ***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Annual Inflation (CPI) 0.13 *** 0.05 *** 0.04 ***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.02)
U.S. Government T-Bill Rate 0.06 *** 0.06 *** 0.03
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Annual US Equities Index -0.02 *** -0.02 *** -0.02 ***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant -13.316 *** -13.975 ***
Number of Observations 566,472 566,472 368,488
Model log likelihood -53,376.32 -44,572.72
Wald X 2 33915.93 *** 21968.28 ***
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001





Robustness to Different Investors For Medical Devices - Study 3
Logistic Regression Estimates of Investor's Hazard of Increasing Investment in the Focal  Firm
New Investors Existing Investors
Logit Logit
Model 1 Model 2
Standard Deviation of Securities Analysts' Recommendations 0.21 *** 0.22 ***
(0.04) (0.05)
Contingency Variables
Investor's Industry Experience 0.08 *** 0.01 ***
(0.00) (0.00)
Investor's Time Horizon -0.74 1.60 ***
(0.06) (0.09)
Firm's Scope of Innovation Portfolio 0.00 * 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Firm's Ability To Commercialize Innovations 0.02 *** 0.02 ***
(0.00) (0.00)
Other Control Variables
Firm's Innovative Inputs 0.18 0.04 *
(0.02) (0.02)
Securities Analysts' Favorability of Focal Firm's Recommendation 0.21 0.06
(0.03) (0.03)
Number of Securities Analysts Covering Focal Firm 0.02 *** -0.02 ***
(0.00) (0.00)
Firm's Products' Average Age 0.06 *** 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Firm's Products % of Total Products in its Categories 4.54 *** -1.61 *
(0.45) (0.67)
Firm's Number of Competing Products in its Product Categories 0.00 * 0.00 *
(0.00) (0.00)
Firm Performance 0.00 *** 0.00 *
(0.00) (0.00)
Firm Size 0.36 *** -0.01
(0.04) (0.00)
Firm's Share Price 0.01 *** 0.01 ***
(0.00) (0.00)
Firm's Annual Dividend -1.06 *** -0.12
(0.12) (0.08)
Investor's Portfolio Value 0.12 *** 0.09 ***
(0.01) (0.01)
Investor's Number of Distinct Industries 0.12 *** 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Annual Inflation (CPI) 0.06 *** 0.03 ***
(0.00) (0.00)
U.S. Government T-Bill Rate 0.01 0.12 ***
(0.00) (0.03)
Annual US Equities Index -0.03 *** -0.01 ***
(0.00) (0.00)
Constant -15.335 *** -7.890 ***
Number of Observations 539,839 26,633
Model log likelihood -32,900.89 -16,540.13
Wald X 2 13735.62 *** 1341.35 ***
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001





Robustness to Different Dependent Variable For Medical Devices - Study 3




Standard Deviation of Securities Analysts' Recommendations -0.06
(0.05)
Contingency Variables
Investor's Industry Experience -0.03 ***
(0.00)
Investor's Time Horizon -0.32 ***
(0.09)
Firm's Scope of Innovation Portfolio 0.00
(0.00)
Firm's Ability To Commercialize Innovations -0.02 ***
(0.00)
Other Control Variables
Firm's Innovative Inputs 0.00
(0.02)
Securities Analysts' Favorability of Focal Firm's Recommendation -0.05
(0.03)
Number of Securities Analysts Covering Focal Firm 0.00
(0.01)
Firm's Products' Average Age 0.01
(0.01)
Firm's Products % of Total Products in its Categories 2.23 ***
(0.51)




Firm Size 0.11 **
(0.04)
Firm's Share Price 0.00 *
(0.00)
Firm's Annual Dividend 0.04
(0.07)
Investor's Portfolio Value -0.06 ***
(0.00)
Investor's Number of Distinct Industries 0.07 ***
(0.00)
Investor's Prior Number of Shares in the Focal Firm 0.64 ***
(0.00)
Annual Inflation (CPI) 0.00
(0.00)
U.S. Government T-Bill Rate -0.21 ***
(0.03)
Annual US Equities Index 0.00
(0.00)
Constant -5.704 ***
Number of Observations 566,472
Model log likelihood -21,851.27
Wald X 2 35,555.65 ***
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001






Summary of Empirical Findings Study 1, 2 and 3
Medical Computer Computer
Devices Hardware Software
Proposition 1 (P1):  The greater the firm's knowledge diversity, the lower the 
likelihood that a securities analyst will cover the firm. Yes No Yes Partially Supported
Proposition 2 (P2):  The more extensively the firm explores distant knowledge, 
the lower the likelihood that a securities analyst will cover the firm. Yes Yes Yes Supported
Proposition 3 (P3):  The greater the knowledge overlap between the firm and its 
industry rivals, the greater the likelihood that a securities analyst will cover the 
firm. Yes Yes No Partially Supported
Proposition 4 (P4):  The greater the knowledge overlap between the analyst and 
the firm, the less negative the effect that exploration of distant knowledge will 
have on the likelihood an analyst will cover the firm. No No No Not Supported
Proposition 5 (P5):  The greater the innovation intensity of the firm’s industry,  
the more negative the effect that exploration of distant knowledge will have on  
the likelihood an analyst will cover the firm. No No No Not Supported
Proposition 6 (P6):  The greater the innovation intensity of the firm's industry, 
the less positive the effect of knowledge overlap between the firm and its 
industry rivals on the likelihood an analyst will cover the firm. Yes Yes No Partially Supported
Proposition 7 (P7):  Exploring distant knowledge will have a negative impact on  
the favorability of the analyst’s recommendation for the firm. No No No Not Supported
Proposition 8 (P8):  Greater knowledge overlap between the firm and its rivals  
will have a negative impact on the favorability of the analyst’s  recommendation 
for the firm. No No No Not Supported
Proposition 9 (P9):  The greater the analyst’s experience, the less negative the  
effect that exploration of distant knowledge will have on the favorability of the  
recommendation. No No No Not Supported
Proposition 10 (P10):  The more extensively other firms covered by the analyst  
explore external knowledge, the less negative the effect that exploration of 
distant  knowledge will have on the favorability of the recommendation. No No No Not Supported
Proposition 11 (P11):  The lower the level of consensus among securities 
analysts' recommendations about the firm, the greater the likelihood that the 
investor will buy shares in the firm. Yes Supported
Proposition 12 (P12): The greater the investor's industry experience, the more 
likely the investor will be to buy shares in the firm when consensus is low among 
securities analysts' recommendations. Yes Supported
Proposition 13 (P13): The longer the investor's time horizon, the more likely the 
investor will be to buy shares in the firm when consensus is low among securities 
analysts' recommendations. Yes Supported
Proposition 14 (P14):  The greater the scope of the firm's innovation portfolio, 
the more likely the investor will be to buy shares in the firm when consensus is 
low among securities analysts' recommendations. Yes Supported
Proposition 15 (P15):  The greater the firm's ability to commercialize 
innovations, the more likely the investor will be to buy shares in the firm when 
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